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This thesis investigates the political economy of Egypt’s media system during the neoliberal 
transition that saw the beginnings of locally produced private broadcast outlets and the 
reintroduction of Egyptian private newspaper publications. It is an examination of power and 
capital for a sector that was at a distinctive intersection of political sensitivity and commercial 
promise. Privately-owned local television and print outlets burst onto the scene at the turn of 
the 21st century. For the following two decades, Egypt experienced the emergence of 
politically empowered businessmen amid a marked liberalization drive, followed by massive 
socio-political changes sparked by the Arab Spring, and then a return to an autocratic, 
military-led regime. Developments in Egypt’s media system during these changes showed 
high levels of political and economic parallelism. However, some of the structural shifts that 
occurred in the sector were not accompanied with institutional adjustments in the underlying 
approach that the state had been taking towards mass media for decades. As a result, private 
mass media development in Egypt was constantly fragmented and inconsistent. Policies 
governing the industry were often reactive, and dependent on ‘national security’ 
considerations. Factors that played into the early growth in the sector were quite 
circumstantial, contributing to the volatility outlined over the course of the research. Yet the 
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"When the national dream is lost, the only course of action left for [authoritarian] regimes is one that 
starts with a television station or radio station and ends with a tank, missile, or airplane.1” 
 
Prelude 
i. Information & Power 
Without explicitly acknowledging it, analysis and commentary on Egyptian media tend to 
veer towards an analysis of its political economy. However, many avoid structurally 
integrating “political economy” of media into an overall analysis. Instead, bearing in mind 
the long history of a state-controlled media, research goes towards issues such as red lines, 
censorship, state-intervention and general historic trends, while political economy of media 
remains a somewhat fringe subject. The composition of Egypt’s media system had ultimately 
been an expression of power dynamics within the country. Therefore, any observations of 
media operations or output (especially after privatization) should not be dissociated from the 
state’s role in the formation, constitution or facilitation of the sector’s activities. Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal’s2 quote above summarizes how the media were perceived in Egypt since 
the dawn of the Republic in 1952, when he was still a young journalist.3 In Heikal’s 
assessment, communication through mass media in the country up until that point had been a 
tool that was used to express the state’s authority and ensure popular support of large 
government plans, in the same way that a state uses weaponry and security apparatuses to 
ensure order.  
 
In 1960 President Gamal Abdel-Nasser issued law 156, which banned any private ownership 
of newspapers.4 That same year, the first television station aired and all terrestrial television 
broadcasts were also declared to be exclusive to the state. Broadcast television production 
within Egypt remained under direct government control effectively until 20015 when private 
satellite television stations were first allowed to operate. Soon after, private newspapers also 
began printing within the country’s borders. Since 2001, private mass media played a central 
																																								 																				
1 Heikal (1984) p.8 
2 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (b. 1923) was editor-in-chief of the Cairo newspaper AlAhram for 17 years 
(1957–1974) 
3 Heikal, a close friend and chief advisor of former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, followed that quote 
by saying: “if the regimes are unable to co-opt the will of the people with words, then weapons take up the job 
of subjugating them with fire,” (1984:8). 
4 Abdelfattah (2008) 
5 A 1980 law allowed for independent press outlets to form, which led to the establishment of some newspapers 
by political parties. In practice, the state maintained a monopoly of all mass media for another two more decades 





role in many social and political transformations, not least of which, the run-up and aftermath 
of the 25 January protests that led to the ouster of then President Hosni Mubarak. In a short 
period of time, satellite television penetration had reached 40% of households in Egypt and 
private newspaper circulation had begun to compete with its public sector counterparts.6 
Private mass media have offered somewhat alternative narratives to those offered by the 
government with regards to issues such as public administration and intellectual discourse. 
They have been instrumental in informing public opinion on several major social and 
political issues. However, these outlets have not been operating within a vacuum. Like 
private media establishments worldwide, they were affected by the interplay of social, 
political and economic factors. Media outlets have also attempted to achieve commercial 
viability, a difficult task given for a market that had been allowed to form in an atmosphere 
lacking in regulatory clarity or operational norms.  
This research aims to assess the ways in which power and control in the media landscape has 
changed since the introduction of private “independent” media in Egypt. It looks to assess the 
political economy of the private media system and its relationship to the state and to the 
interests of its media outlet owners. 
 
ii. Questions and scope 
Essentially this study examines the paradigms of power, control and agency in Egypt’s media 
system, especially after privatization. It attempts to answer the following: How much has 
control over communications and the Egyptian media system shifted to the private sector? 
Has the state been adopting new means of controlling media since allowing for privately 
owned broadcast and print mass media (how)? What are the main centers of power in 
politically sensitive, private broadcast and print media production and output? How has the 
relationship shifted between the private media establishment and public institutions (judiciary, 
security apparatus, the presidency, syndicates)? What are the ways these shifts affect 
practitioners (editors, journalists, producers etc.)? 
 
The media outlets that will be studied are major, privately owned and non-partisan news 
publications and broadcast media only. The research will focus on the media outlets that are 
politically sensitive or are important sources of news or analysis of current affairs. In other 
words, trends such as the proliferation of television stations specialized in religion or 
																																								 																				





entertainment (music, sports, children etc.) are not part of the scope of this research, unless 
there is an element of their output that is politically sensitive.  
This research addresses the development of media systems in Egypt insofar as it pertains to 
the the shifting political economy of the country. It delves into some of the more nuanced 
questions of media ownership, such as the question of commercial vs. political motives of 
launching a mass media outlet. Barriers to entry in this market exist globally, due to the high 
cost of capital and considerable manpower needed to run a successful mass media enterprise. 
To what extent are these “natural” market barriers to entry or directed hindrances put forth by 
a government that still holds many of the means of production along with a final say on 
regulatory matters? The state’s security services are known to play an active role in all areas 
of public life, the study addresses how this role was recalibrated during periods of political 
transition. Much of the research on censorship, self-censorship and hierarchical/institutional 
forms of maintaining control over the media for the most part has been anecdotal, with 
reference to the private media. 
 
iii. Methodology 
This study will most closely assess the proliferation of privately-owned mass media outlets 
with a focus on current affairs that were registered as private businesses. Original research 
and primary sourced material will mostly be focused between the years 2001-2019.   
This period in time tracks the sector from its fledgling beginnings through major transitions 
in the country’s history. The beginnings of this period coincide with intensive privatization as 
well as a shift towards neoliberalisation policies, driven by Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal and 
a cohort of mostly regime-friendly businessmen. The shift in attitude favoring private sector-
led growth would embolden businessmen to enter a sector that had for decades been 
monopolized by the state, and was seen as an area subject to major national security 
considerations. Also, embedded within the period of study are two major regime changes 
amid massive social upheaval and a renegotiation of power structures and social dynamics. 
Most notably, this period includes the Arab Spring in 2011 which led to the fall of Mubarak, 
the election and ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and the emergence of 
AbdelFattah El-Sisi from Defense Minister to President in 2014. This study will attempt to 
map the media system’s changes during this period. 
First-hand interviews anchor this research, with input from: media owners, managers, 





the first privately owned television station; OnTV, one of the more notable private 
broadcasting endeavors; and AlMasry AlYoum, the first privately daily newspaper registered 
and published in Egypt. Each will form a case study that starts from each outlet’s inception, 
highlighting their inner workings, and tracking their developments throughout the period in 
question. My own recollections and reflections from time spent working with AlMasry 
AlYoum English and Egypt Independent, (both owned by AlMasry AlYoum) between 2010 
and 2013, will also be included as primary source material. This input supplements my 
research and conclusions rather than superseding them. 
Where appropriate, this study will engage in discourse analysis of media content as a 
secondary level of analysis.  
Furthermore, daily newspaper reporting and interviews have helped supplement information, 
especially when faced with limitations in conducting research.  
In order to create a robust narrative of the period in question, this thesis also delves into an 
analysis of private media in the Arab World (Chapter 2) as well as an historical survey of 
mass media in Egypt (Chapter 3) as they provide crucial context for the study.  
iv. Limitations 
This research was conducted during a period when many journalists, academics and 
researchers were being persecuted, often in connection to their work. Human Rights Watch 
had called Egypt one of the worst jailers of journalists globally. Due to this, several 
prospective interviewees either cancelled or refused to answer some questions they deemed 
too sensitive or potentially detrimental to their own safety and security. A minority of 
interviewees included in the studied requested anonymity. 
Furthermore, the 2016 death of Cambridge PhD student Giulio Regeni, while conducting his 
fieldwork on labor movements in Egypt has raised numerous red flags about studying 
potentially sensitive topics in the country. The Italian government suspected Regeni was 
tortured and killed by Egyptian security forces who had him detained for an interrogation 
over his research. His death sent shock waves among the academic community, and as a 
result many researchers were warned against actively engaging in research that could be 
politically sensitive in Egypt during this period. Materially, this manifested in an active 





while in Cairo. It also meant that the choice of interviewees was subject to the added scrutiny 
of assessing the security risk attached, while attempting to minimize the risk when possible.  
v. Why traditional mass media in the age of digital? 
This thesis revolves around politically-sensitive audio-visual broadcast and daily print 
newspapers, while consciously excluding social media-focused outlets from its scope. This 
decision was partially due to the fact that the history of both media forms allow for a more 
active “political economy” approach that does not hinge too heavily on technological factors. 
Furthermore, TV is seen as the most trusted form of media in the country7, while print has the 
longest history and the richest basis to elaborate on the theme of “transition.” The 
transformative role of digital media in the sector is acknowledged throughout the thesis, 
especially in the context of how they affected developments in broadcast and print.  
vi. Original Contribution 
This thesis takes a critical look at the transition from an entirely state-run media within a state 
capitalist system8 to a more open one, in a more liberal economy that still exhibits many of 
the same characteristics of a nation where the state apparatus continues to exact control over 
civil society. Egypt’s transition has been analyzed extensively with reference to the country’s 
general political economy and some major economic sectors such as finance, manufacturing, 
some services etc. However, media have not received a similar treatment. After privatization, 
mass media were still seen mostly through their roles pertaining to the changing “public 
sphere” within the realm of culture, politics and society, which are indeed profoundly 
enlightening approaches in their own rights. However, the political economy of media has 
also become one of the critical features of the sector in Egypt especially with the continued 
presence of a heavy-handed state that perhaps still sees media primarily as a tool for 
development and nation-building9 or at least as an item for distraction and venting of 
grievances10, but never to challenge the status quo.  
 
Media and journalism in post-Mubarak Egypt have certainly received their fair share of 
academic and journalistic treatment vis-à-vis the ongoing and historical shifting regulatory 
																																								 																				
7 Allam (2018) 
8 Cooper (1983) 
9 Lahlahi (2011) 





framework of Egyptian media systems and major trends.11 They importantly analyze media 
regulations, output, discourse, consumption patterns, censorship levels, freedom of speech 
and major developments in private media. These studies are all important and will help 
inform the background for this thesis, but this research aims to build on some of the work of 
other media scholars12 who have either briefly touched on the political economy angle, or 
have engaged with this approach more profoundly -as is the case in Naomi Sakr’s work. 
This study attempts to give in-depth research and analysis that highlights the line private 
mass media tread between politics, economics and development amid prolonged transition.  
During the course of this research, much had changed both in the country’s political situation 
and in the structure of its media system. This “live PhD” aspect presented a challenge since 
many of the major changes that occurred over the course of this project directly affected the 
material at the core of this study. They would at times bring to light new angles and themes 
that required attention. At the same time, it was useful to discuss transitions in political 
economy and in media systems, while the country was in the midst of major transition. The 
developments, more often than not, confirmed the hypotheses and conclusions of this 
research.  
Mohamed Gohar, one of Egypt’s earliest private t.v. broadcast media entrepreneurs, thought 
the sector needed a more incisive analysis to be thoroughly understood. Gohar, who had 
entered the sector as “Sadat’s Photographer” (and went on to become a key producer and 
television station developer) believed the top-down approach only told a fraction of the story:   
“Studying the economics of this market will unlock many of its secrets and allow a 
different kind of understanding that is not well known yet, but is crucial to knowing 









11 Khamis (2011); Attalah & Rizk, (2011); El Issawi (2015); AlShaer (2015); Webb (2014); Sakr, (2013); 
Abdallah (2011); Abdulla (2014); Iskandar (2013) 
12 Naomi Sakr, Fatime El-Issawi, Rasha Abdullah, Mirette Mabrook, John Alterman, Adel Iskandar, to name a 
few. 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
After nearly three decades of either direct government control, or minimal (political and 
economic) liberalization, Egypt entered a phase of neoliberalization (which intensified in 
1991) where theoretically, along with economic reforms, the country was to undergo a 
process of increased freedoms and openness. Among other reforms, this meant that the media 
sector would be liberalized both economically and politically. However, instead of being 
fully liberalized, the state negotiated with the private sector a tacit agreement and middle 
ground between liberalization and control, independence and subservience. This process 
began to take shape in 2000-2005. The eruption of the 25 January 2011 uprisings and the 
ouster of President Hosni Mubarak raised more questions on the nature of the media, since 
they played a major role in forming public opinion and have had varying relationships with 
the state in the tumultuous period since then. The political transitions following Mubarak’s 
ouster and the corresponding iterations of the private media showed that the state’s 
underlying approach to the sector as a matter of “national security” had not changed. Rather 
than changing the façade of the country’s media system as had been done in the past,14 the 
successive regimes sought to employ other means to ensure compliance, be it through 
regulation, oversight from the security establishment, or coercion using the outlet owners’ 
other business interests as leverage.  
 
This inspired questions around the process of calibration of media freedoms/liberalization 
and state control in a context where the entire country has been undergoing similar structural 
transformations or at least facing existential questions regarding the parameters of state-
society or state-economy relations. The relationship between the sector and the successive 
political regimes as well as the country’s security complex, lie at the heart of the 
transformations that are dissected.15  
 
Mass media outlets are generally not independent of social, political and economic realities 
where they are formed. They take on the “form and coloration of social and political 
structures.”16 This study presumes the margins and borders within which media markets exist 
directly inform how they would conform and act.    
 
																																								 																				
14 For example: Gamal Abdel-Nasser completely nationalized media outlets in 1960 & Mubarak developed 
infrastructure to support the creation of private broadcast.  
15 The security complex here is defined as the military, Ministry of Interior and Intelligence services.  





Media scholars that have endeavored to study the political economy of other media systems 
have often focused on the ownership of means of production, the role of the state, hierarchies 
and structures within the sector as well as a broad array of power dynamics (media-state, 
media-society, internally within the media system etc.). Different economic and political 
systems will entail varying levels of interaction between different power centers. Therefore, 
theories of the political economy of communications in Western countries are difficult to 
apply in broad terms. They still offer important tools that could be applied in context. Robert 
McChesney, one of the foremost political economists of media and communications, 
acknowledged that his work may be region-specific (to the US), but emphasized the 
discipline’s universal potential: 
Humanity is now beginning a process of experimentation in democratic and social 
structures that has not been witnessed for generations… There is a crucial role for 
political economists of media in this process, as communications systems lies at the 
heart of both developing economies and communications systems17.  
Egyptian media also take on regional dimensions. The development of the Arab region’s 
media landscape is inextricably linked to the development of Egypt’s national media, 
especially in commercial, regulatory and operational elements of broadcast media. While this 
study is not comparative, it does delve into the role Arab media played in nudging Egypt 
towards opening private sector.   
 
1) The political economy of media: theories and applications  
Researching the political economy of media goes beyond studying the effects of media on 
society; it looks forward to understanding how the media function starting from a deeper, 
foundational context and how they are essentially geared towards creating or propagating 
specific social constructs of reality18 especially with regards to politics, economic ideology or 
society. While the role of mass media as a central conduit of information may suffice to 
illustrate its importance to power, the difference in the conceptual role of media information 
in each case study sets it apart from the others. For example, in the case of Egypt, after the 
2011 uprising, the absence of strong political parties with grassroots support meant that the 
media essentially filled the political void19, whereas during the nation-building period of the 
1950s and 1960s media information was predominantly used to promote development 
policies and the state in general. Each scenario carries important implications regarding the 
structure of the media establishment. Without delving too far into media sociology, 
																																								 																				
17 McChesney (2008) p. 17 
18 Couldry et al (2007) 





understanding the media’s “power to construct social reality”20 is a prerequisite to 
understanding the political and socio-economic considerations that may affect the political 
economy of a media system and its composition. This “power” will be directly assessed 
within the context of Egypt and the broader world Arab media in their respective sections.  
 
The remainder of this section will discuss pertinent theoretical backgrounds in the field such 
as the Propaganda Model, corporatism, media system formations and 
globalization/regionalization. The theories based on these concepts have strong explanatory 
capabilities in the context of Egyptian media. They also have limitations stemming from the 
fact that, for the most part, they were formed in different structural contexts.  
The existing literature on the subject of political economy of media is both diverse and 
slightly speculative in its assumptions. The subject’s raison-d’etre “as a response to social 
changes, [such as] the development of media as a business”21 led to the adoption of theories 
that were based on existing observable behavior. Mosco defines the political economy of 
media as “the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually 
constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources”. McChesney argues 
that the political economy approach to media must inherently focus critically on class 
relations, modes of intellectual domination and modes of production playing an important 
role in mass media.22 
 
The plethora of potential themes and sub-themes lends itself to varying outlooks and 
approaches in studies focusing on different regions.23 Bu at their core, there tends to be a 
common interest in the analysis of the specific historical circumstances under which new 
media and communication products and services are produced within increasingly capitalist 
constructs that involve changing patterns of media consumption. There has always been a 
struggle both between and among conflicting social groups over the control of the means of 
communication, and historically -with the exception of the US- the state has played the main 
role in its regulation and development.24 Scholarship on trends of US mass media provides 
useful analysis of a capitalist-driven model operating under the auspices of a democratic 
political oligarchy. Its political economy developments have been well documented and 
																																								 																				
20 Bourdieu (1990) p. 66 
21 Mosco (2009) p. 81 
22 McChesney (2008) 
23 Mansell (2004) 





analyzed. Despite the distinct American history and reality that ultimately led to media 
markets forming as they did, scholarship surrounding US media have useful– albeit 
somewhat limited – applications to other kinds of markets.  
 
Frameworks of political economy of media below have been incredibly useful in crystallizing 
an approach for tackling similar questions in Egypt within this research.  
 
Information Control: Herman and Chomsky’s “Propaganda Model” 
Between 2013 and 2020, private Egyptian media outlets slowly came to cluster under 
networks or media conglomerates. Starting from June 2013, when the military regained 
political supremacy from the Muslim Brotherhood, the media have been arguably entirely 
behind the new military-led regime. This has occurred through a combined process of overt 
coercion25 and a self-preserving approach by remaining mass media outlets that contributed 
to the mode of acquiescence to the new regime. It had seemingly been a bilateral effort of 
manufactured and coerced consent in the media. 
 
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s seminal 1988 book, Manufacturing Consent gives a 
piercing analysis on the ways in which media and information are controlled and 
disseminated. The book argues that through a set of five specific filters, US media, which are 
mostly owned by conglomerates, have been able to marginalize any points of view that do not 
conform to the mainstream, and essentially use the ostensibly “democratized” mass media, to 
convey messages that assert value-system policies or actions that fall within the corporate or 
state axis of interests. These interests tend to overlap frequently and the authors grouped the 
combined capitalist classes and the ruling elite as forming the proverbial “mainstream” of 
socio-economic interactions. The expression itself, “manufacturing consent” aptly describes 
the main hypothesis. It is derived from Walter Lippman’s26 view that “manufacturing consent” 
is important within a democracy “to bring about agreement on the part of the public for things 
that they didn't want by the new techniques of propaganda.27” This argument is predicated on 
the notion that common interest tends to elude public opinion and that the media have a moral 
imperative to understand – and sometimes define – this common interest and act upon it. This 
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is not an unfamiliar notion in the Egyptian context since Gamal Abdel-Nasser ascended to 
power and Egypt became a republic. Media tended to follow the state’s lead in how to define 
and act-upon the state’s own definition of “National Interest.” Private media outlets were not 
immune from this, and for the most part did not stray from this tendency.   
 
McChesney believes that, as the American New Left receded after the peak of its activities 
and influence (1960s-early 1980s), US mass media ceased to be subject to different levels of 
content “framing,” converging to a more-or-less uniform mainstream. He thought this had a 
palpable effect of narrowing the scope of general public consciousness. The Propaganda 
Model of Hermann and Chomsky thoroughly assesses ways in which the dominant elite 
exploit their position and the relative inequality within society through the use of mass media 
on different levels to ultimately manipulate public perception of their own interests and 
choices in ways that conform to this elite power structure. They do not contend that this is the 
only function of mass media systems, but that it is a dominant feature for most of them.   
 
The significance of this work to the field and the research at hand cannot be understated.  It 
“introduced an entire generation of progressives to a critical position regarding the 
mainstream media.28” Instead of focusing solely on corporate, government or economic 
concerns, it attempts to analyze where these areas intersect and collude to ultimately affect 
the output of media. The work offers more comprehensive depth to the notion of “political 
economy of media” by attempting to group issues such as state ideology and capitalist 
interests as cogs of the same machine that attempt to “manufacture” an acquiescent populace.  
Through a mostly institutional imperative, the Propaganda Model assumes that media 
messaging ultimately occurs through a filtered self-censorship mechanism with minimal 
coercion, which is very difficult to measure or correctly follow.29 It has been critiqued most 
heavily for those very reasons. Despite offering thorough and systematic postulations, the 
model tends to be marginalized academically. What the Propaganda Model offers is a starting 
point for assessing structural mechanisms that lead to unified media messaging, outside the 
scope of the state. In the case of Egypt, this model provides a useful lens to analyze the 
private media systems at times when collusion of the power centers was a more dominant 
feature, than coercion of the state.  
The Corporate Model: the role of ownership and “liberalization” 
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The Propaganda Model is also predicated on the existence of social classes where economic 
power is the main enabler of social and political power and where the alliance of the state and 
capitalist classes forms the major fulcrum of decision making.30  This caveat does not hold as 
succinctly for cases where the state has the upper-hand vis-à-vis the capitalist class. When 
private media was introduced in Egypt, the country was trending towards an enhanced role of 
corporations and private owners in society and politics. These private entities’ interests were 
one and the same with the state’s given the dependency of this cohort on the state for the 
access they needed allowing them to accumulate their wealth. This group is “a bourgeoisie 
deriving its economic power from the state, while functioning as private capitalists,” or a 
“state bourgeoisie”.31  
 
Many models of political economies of media are also based on this relationship, including 
the Corporate Model. It provides a way of analyzing and understanding tendencies of media 
markets when operating under certain liberalized conditions. While this model is based on 
observations in mostly Western-style democracies (mostly in the US), it may help in 
describing some tendencies in Egypt and the Arab World while going through their own 
liberalization drives. Egypt’s neoliberal-inspired economic transition and the removal of 
some institutional barriers to participation in mass media32 have yielded some superficially 
similar observations to those made about the American media establishment, notwithstanding 
the differing political and economic contexts.  
 
Many, including Chomsky, Hermann, McChesney, Mosco, Schiller and Smythe have 
observed the tendency of media companies to form conglomerates and empires that 
ultimately control the media in one way or another. The trend starts with the early US model 
of media conglomeration. In the late 1970s American media experienced a complete 
institutional shift after welfarist restrictions on communication systems were lifted.33 Schiller 
found these conditions to be the catalyst for the US media market to transform and adopt a 
more corporate-commercial structure. The system of commercial advertising quickly grew 
along with the communications systems in general. Once rules were loosened that limited 
media concentration, cross-ownership, and control by non-media companies, many media 
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organizations attempted to integrate operations.34 At that time, despite the existence of 
thousands of newspapers, magazines, television outlets and radio stations, over half of the 
market was controlled by the top 29 firms. These “constitute(d) a new Private Ministry of 
Information and Culture35”. Winseck and Jin suggest that in Western capitalist mass media 
establishments (US, Canada, UK, Germany, and even Japan) the top firm usually owns just 
under one quarter of the entire market followed by a handful of others who own around 10% 
each. 36  Regardless of the specific figures, there is a strong tendency of media systems to 
form oligopolies and conglomerations. In terms of forms of control within the industry, we 
follow Golding and Murdock’s distinction between “allocative and operational37” control. 
Allocative control entails a power to define overall goals and deployment of resources within 
an organization, while operational control defines the role of managers and their agency in 
controlling how to use what resources within the parameters they were allocated. In a 
privatized media market, if the state maintains a strict hold on one of the forms of controls 
(usually allocative), the result tends to be a tacit partnership between the state and the private 
owners.  
 
Ownership structures may differ, and authorities may use different means of exclusion or 
inclusion into this market. They may price out new entrants as Herman and Chomsky 
describe, or directly curb their ability to participate by requiring vetting from internal security 
sources, as has been the case in Egypt.38 Whatever the means, once a small minority of 
similarly interested entities control the media, the effect is tantamount to creating a space 
where similarly interested business owners can control a fair share of public discourse, at 
least the part of it that is directed by media.  
 
The corporatist model, as a way to exert control over media content may be inapplicable in 
the age of new media. Compaine is especially critical, calling this perspective a myth. 39 He 
goes so far as to claim that McChesney and others foment an “irrational fear” of private 
media, citing decreasing viewership of the largest cable networks since the 60’s and also 
citing the internet as evidence that viewers have more diverse options of viewership to choose 
from than ever before. Compaine maybe too dismissive of the early political economy 
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schools, however his criticisms are helpful in that they highlight the need to look beyond 
economics to understand media trends, even when the sector seems to be liberalizing. 
 
Mass media and communications provide ample incentive and economic rationale for 
expansion, diversification and conglomeration. Moving from the printing press and television 
to New Media40, costs of reproduction of information and multimedia have been shrinking at 
a pace far exceeding most outlets’ ability to adapt. Rapid technological advancement has also 
allowed media outlets to increase audience sizes rather quickly across borders and across 
mediums. This trend became a major driver in allowing mass media companies to expand 
horizontally and vertically, achieving high-levels of concentration, internationalization and 
cross-media ownership in the culture industries.41 Large organizations are able to buy off 
smaller ones and extend their content to new audiences and across different media platforms. 
For example, a television broadcaster could purchase a newspaper and be able to share both 
the print and audio-visual content on the same online platform. After the initial infrastructure 
and costs of production are set in place for one form of media production (audio-visual, print 
or others), much of the costs of expansion involves buying audiences and viewership.  
 
Technological advancement has helped transform a majority of media content into a public 
good.  In order for a good to be considered “public” it must satisfy two main criteria: very 
few (or no) additional costs of adding users; and the impossibility of excluding users from 
consumption.42 Public goods in unregulated environments experience monopolies or at least 
concentration of ownership since marginal costs of reproduction are so low that competition 
may be rooted out at the initial production phase. In applying this to free-to-air broadcasting, 
once a program is aired on television, without incurring any additional costs, a broadcaster 
may air the same content again on the internet or another television channel, or on the same 
television channel, but at a later date. Similarly, others may record and reproduce the same 
program online with ease, and if necessary, without. Maximizing audiences is one of the 
ways media owners curtail the downside of trading in a “public good”43. In fact, maximizing 
audiences is essential for mass-media owners who are primarily interested in wealth 
accumulation.  
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The above characterization of media content is key in the case of post-privatization Egypt, 
when new television stations dominated the mass media landscape. With the proliferation of 
cable and free-to-air channels, public access to these private stations became universal. The 
internet has also greatly facilitated access to both print and audiovisual content via the outlets’ 
own websites, and social media tools.  
The allocative function of capital within media is a model that has its roots in the very origins 
of the political economy approach towards media. Besides providing media content as units 
of value, media outlets must also provide audience to the advertisers in order to sell. In order 
to be profitable, they must provide large enough audiences to advertisers. Essentially the size 
of an audience is a commodity that most media outlets must strive for.44 Given the low 
marginal costs of adding new users, and the high costs of initial production, market players 
have incentives to conglomerate and grow. This was certainly the case in the US in the 1990s 
when a law was passed allowing for studios to both produce and distribute content (they were 
previously limited to one or the other) led to a frenzy of mergers and acquisitions within the 
market to produce such mega companies as Disney and ABC, Time-Warner and Turner 
Communications.45 The US experienced 557 acquisitions within the media industry between 
1990 and 1995, which is about the same as during the entire period between 1960 and1989.46  
Trends such as these would have not been replicated in other parts of the world, not least the 
Middle East, if for nothing else then the grand disparity in the scale of private media between 
the Arab World and the US. Still, these trends may draw attention to some similarities with 
general media trends in the Arab World. During the early 1990’s many Arab countries 
decided to undergo Economic Restructuring and increased integration into Western 
economies, opening the media establishment to similar movements. Issues of media 
ownership are far from being merely academic or in isolation from the public consciousness. 
A BBC Globescan survey of citizens from 14 countries showed that 59% of the respondents 
considered media ownership to be a major political issue.47 Rightly so, since private media 
owners have had a major role to play in the regulation of their industries.48  
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Many of the concepts that rely on capitalist contexts for validity may be used in other 
contexts of neoliberal systems with limited access and political freedoms, such as modern-
day Egypt. Mass media have historically played the role of “gatekeepers” of information and 
culture.49 The overall effects of this role largely depends on the way information outlets are 
controlled or regulated. ‘Gatekeeping’ in Communication Theory is the process by which 
news/information pass through “gates” that decide, consciously or unconsciously, which 
pieces of information sift through to the public and which don’t.50 While it is considered to be 
a simple and almost intuitive idea, it offers an important framework through which one may 
analyze the process and factors that could go into media production. Gatekeeping theory now 
widely accepts five levels (gates) which news pass through: the individual level, based on 
personal preferences or biases; routines of communication work, a pre-established or 
generalized agreement on how the work is done; the organizational level, where individuals 
may be hired and fired by an organization if they do not follow the agreed upon method of 
gatekeeping; social and institutional, where a host of external factors play a role (advertising, 
security forces, state structure, local laws); and societal, based on broad trends, acceptability 
and availability of those media systems works.  
Whether capitalist classes limit access to the markets by monopolies, conglomerates and like-
minded interest groups or the state limits access to specific socio-economic groups by 
economic or red-tape barriers to entry; at some point in both cases, allocative functions of the 
market and local politics interact to form more nuanced and adaptive features of the 
“gatekeepers.”  
This research will investigate this gatekeeper role in the era of privatized media. Do they 
speak for the owners, or do they speak for the state? Where are the lines drawn between the 
state and the cohort of media owners and how is that line maintained?  
Comparative Models: Different Media Systems, Different Contexts 
The outlook of most political economists of media is that understanding structures, policies 
and institutions of media is indispensable to understanding other facets of the sector (cultural 
production, discourse analysis, audiences etc.). As such, it is also important to note that 
understanding the political and economic environment enveloping a media system has a 
direct bearing on the political economy of the media establishment and its functioning. This 
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research includes an assessment of the market forces of production involved with different 
media. Political economy of media tends to be associated with the left because of “its critical 
stance towards the market”51 and the role it may play enhancing an oligarchy within a nation. 
One issue this study found was that many theories refer to more static systems and contexts, 
whereas Egypt has been in a near constant state of transition for nearly three decades. This 
makes the process of applying theories quite indirect.  
A first essential step in this direction of figuring out how to apply some of the existing 
theories in the Egyptian context is to understand the structures that dictate the allocation of 
power. According to Bertrand Russell52 the desire for power and the means to attain/maintain 
it are fundamental components of any social science, “in the same sense in which energy is 
the fundamental concept in physics.53” Power, here is defined as “the capacity of persons to 
affect…what is thought, felt, said or done by other persons, subject to that capacity deriving 
from possession of institutional, not personal attributes.54” These structures, according to the 
same author could be reduced to three kinds of power: economic, ideological and coercive, 
which translate to “means of production, means of persuasion and means of coercion.55” 
Political economists who work in the institutionalist, socialist or Marxist traditions are also 
concerned with identifying links between political economy and the broader social and 
cultural field.  There’s an embedded nature of economic activities within the wider socio-
cultural political framework that structurally have a profound effect on media systems.56 
Once that is decided, a more in-depth look at the media system internally and elements of its 
own political economy are necessary. Hallin and Mancini57 made an important contribution 
in their influential analysis and description of media systems, in their book, Comparing 
Media Systems. They provide a framework that is divided into four areas of inquiry: 1) 
understanding how media markets developed; 2) assessing the political parallelism between 
media and political parties or the state; 3) the development of journalistic professionalism; 4) 
the degree of state intervention within media. Sarah El-Richani excellently deploys this 
theory in her analysis of the Lebanese media58. She not only examines the Lebanese media 
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system from within all four points of inquiry, but acknowledges the contextual limitations of 
this study by engaging with scholarship from within the region. El-Richani built on Hallin 
and Mancini’s model by proposing that state size and prevalence of crises be added as 
elements within the theoretical framework of such a study.  
This study also agrees with Hallin and Mancini’s perspective that the nation-state presents an 
ideal unit of analysis for media systems, given its operative nature and role in society. But 
analysis within the temporal scope of this study must extend beyond their model. 
Egypt experienced private ownership within media markets for the first time in the modern 
era in the 1990s and 2000s.59 The state created frameworks within which most media markets 
worked; the concepts of journalistic professionalism were developed along those general 
lines. Most adopted media guidelines developed in the UK’s BBC tradition, what is known as 
the Professional Model.60 Political allegiances of media owners and state intervention then 
both played important roles in tempering the application of these concepts and ultimately 
altering the practice in their institutions as a whole.  
In order to analyze how institutional factors affect the notion of human agency and activity 
within an organization it is important to understand how relations within organizations work. 
Anthony Giddens provides a useful tool for this in his theory of ‘Structuration’.61 This theory 
would help crystallize manners in which professionalism in journalism developed. 
‘Structuration’ views human agency and social structures as interactive elements in a 
relationship that together affect action. It rejects the notion that human agency is exclusively 
the direct result of the structures and institutions imposed upon it. This research views ideas 
of professionalism in journalism in Egypt to have developed in such a manner in the 
privatization era. For example, even though the state in Egypt had continued to directly 
intervene in privatized news media, media executives and practitioners still managed to play 
a role as independent agents that contributed to the norms and practices of journalistic 
professionalism.  
In assessing a media system from a political economic approach, all of the aforementioned 
tools could play important explanatory roles in to help understand what will ultimately affect 
outcomes. Undoubtedly, there will be a need for differing theories and understanding of 
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different structural underpinnings of communications generally. Curran and Park think that a 
“De-Westernization of media studies” was needed due to the “self-absorption” and 
“parochialism” of much of Western media theory. 62 One element they criticize is the reliance 
of these theories made by non-regionally-specialized researchers who do not necessarily have 
a grasp on the underpinning elements within each context. This thesis makes use of books 
written by practitioners and academics from within the Arab world, writing in both Arabic 
and English.  
Instead of assessing local contexts from within, political theorists of media have had the 
tendency to attribute much of the changes in local media development of the less developed 
economies to globalization. “Globalization Theory” falls out of the scope of a study such as 
this due mainly to the fact that it generally implies the state is becoming marginalized with 
reference to the technological, cultural and financial interconnectedness of the world, 
especially in the context of liberalized systems.63 It would entail that technology’s effect is to 
“weaken the nation” when it comes to controlling media content; and while Globalization 
Theory is very relevant in other media systems, nations do play a controlling role64 in most 
media systems in Egypt and the broader Arab context. Globalization Theory gained traction 
in a political economy sense when neoliberalism and the expansion and interconnection of 
global financial markets increased, causing international markets, technology transfers and 
multinational companies to rise dramatically in prominence. Unsurprisingly, this same period 
saw a spike in the amount of academic literature on globalization and the media.65 In fact, the 
overall contribution of the largest global media conglomerates is negligible compared to what 
is actually involved in the global outreach of media. Critics such as Hafez view that whole 
idea of media globalization to be an inherent falsehood. He writes in his book, The Myth of 
Media Globalization, "Media capital's lack of global reach is, [due to] the political 
persistence of the nation-state and the major differences that mark the media discourses of the 
world's nation-states or cultural area…66”. 
That is not to say that globalization is irrelevant. One can argue that were it not for 
globalization and increased integration into the Western global financial system and its 
ideology, Arab countries would have been much less likely to privatize segments of their 
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media systems to begin with. The international technology transfer that preceded every 
development in media is a crucial and palpable manifestation of the trend. However, 
globalization as a vehicle towards economic and political liberalization (which normally 
would include allowing for independent and free press/media) never materialized fully.  
Western political thought took it for granted that economic liberalization was a precursor and 
guarantor of political liberalization. Instead, Egypt’s expanding private capital and global 
financial integration, (however limited) did not coincide with comparable levels of political 
liberalization. The new class of entrepreneurs that benefitted from global economic 
integration were focused on their direct interests and rarely used their newly found status and 
global access to further causes that may challenge the prevailing status quo: a single party, 
neo-patrimonial state governed with the aid of a heavy-handed security apparatus.67 
Some scholars suggest “regionalization” as a more apt way of looking at the 
interconnectedness of transnational media and the effects it has on the media development in 
certain countries.68 This outlook is more pertinent to the example of Egypt’s media system 
insofar as it related to the Arab countries. 
2) Media systems in The Arab World: relevance to Egypt 
Analysis of Arab media development here is relevant for this thesis on two levels: first, trends 
in the political economy of Arab Media overlapped and influenced Egyptian media; secondly, 
scholarship on recent Arab media trends will offer valid points of reference for this study, 
given the preponderance of research on the political economy of Arab media relative to 
similar research specifically pertaining to Egypt. Chapter 2 will take a deeper look into these 
factors. 
 
Media in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are almost organically 
interconnected due mostly to shared language, religion and culture. Importantly, a crucial 
area of intersection between Egyptian local private media and the pan-Arab context is the fact 
that in most Arab countries private broadcasting is confined to satellite transmission69, which 
could be viewed worldwide and is generally seen by diaspora communities in the West and 
the entire Arab region. Regional developments also offer apt grounds for comparison in 
assessing levels of parallelism between political economy within states (i.e. pluralism, 
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competition, liberalization, etc.) and media systems in a region that has a number of 
similarities in local power dynamics.  
 
Regionalism, “Glocalisation” and Localization 
Since the early 1990s Arab media systems have been experiencing a set of seismic changes 
on many different fronts. The proliferation of technology with satellite, cable television, and 
the internet has opened the doors for audiences to engage with a wide variety of 
programming worldwide. The Gulf War in 1991 was the first time Arab audiences 
experienced a televised war. It also marked the introduction of 24-hour news channels. 
Millions tuned in to CNN to follow the developments of the war on an hourly basis. The 
period after the war also involved important milestones for the political economy of different 
states within the region, with increased economic restructuring and liberalization taking 
place.70  
 
Mass media, which before this period had been exclusive monopolies for governments in the 
majority of the region, were somewhat liberalized and became inclusive of the private sector. 
News that had previously been siphoned through state-sanctioned outlets started to be on 
offer by non-government outlets. Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen and Morocco were forerunners in 
this respect, especially Lebanon, which has had private and diversely politicized print and 
media outlets long before most of its neighbors.71 The general development of Pan-Arab 
media was a precursor to the establishment of private Egyptian stations. Saudi and Lebanese-
owned private stations were already well established before the first outlets out of Egypt. 
Their programming and content helped provide templates that many Egyptian stations would 
follow.  
 
Political and economic shifts in the region would be another factor linking MENA countries 
and would help explain some of the parallels in media beyond cultural and religious factors. 
Most of the region experienced nation-building and Pan-Arabism simultaneously in the 
1960’s while also undergoing IFI-inspired economic liberalization almost in-tandem during 
the late 1980s. However, some underlying institutional political and economic factors did 
diverge among the countries as well, allowing for a more controlled comparison. Hallin and 
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Mancini72 argue that comparative studies allow the researcher to verify assumptions 
regarding aspects of media systems that are assumed to be "natural" or so familiar that they 
are not perceived at all. While this research does not intend to embark on a comparative 
narrative (the focus remains firmly on Egypt), there will be a need to provide benchmarks and 
regional context in order to offer depth to the research and analysis on Egypt, especially since 
the sector in question was affected by regional and global trends.  
To be sure, the region does exhibit highly varying social, political and economic realities. 
There still exist traditionally centralized states, where the centers of power monopolize both 
the use of force and access to economic opportunity, which are used to maintain control of 
society (such as KSA and other Arab Monarchies). Other states had autocratic rulers, who 
maintained control by distributing privileges to their clients, surrogates and sometimes, rivals. 
Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia have been prime examples, although the so-called Arab Spring 
helped briefly redistribute power dynamics. The application of economic restructuring and 
neoliberal policies has been most potent in these countries, as they had exhibited the most 
notable trends in privatization and shifting polities. Lebanon perhaps presents a special case 
with a political oligopoly operating in a “Mafia-like” manner in turns.73  
This research examines parallels between political distribution of power and distribution of 
market power within the media. The disparity between Arab countries’ political systems 
allows for a clearer crystallization of these parallels.  
At the same time, many similarities exist. Most Arab mass media systems were originally 
developed primarily to represent the state and the ruling class of each country. Media in the 
Arab world initially had goals of promoting Arab Nationalism, and sow the seeds of 
cooperation between media authorities in different states.74 Cooperation in this field began 
with the Permanent Committee for Arab Media in 1959 and continued through to the Arab 
League’s obsolete body: The Committee for Arab Media Ministers, formed in 1994.75 This 
Committee was meant to form pan-Arab Media policies to regulate the region’s media. It 
came at a time when private and satellite media were growing and locally produced outlets 
could be easily accessed regionally and internationally. As with many Arab League initiatives, 
true cooperation on the topic never materialized. However, common language, religion and 
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political concerns along with technological breakthroughs in ICT meant that cross-border 
activity would continue. Two years later, representatives of the major newspapers from 17 
Arab states signed the Sanaa’ Declaration.76 This was intended to be a UN-led, regional pact 
pushing for the creation of independent and pluralistic press. It happened to occur during the 
proliferation of private media in some parts of the region. Its direct effects, if any, were 
undetectable. The document is still the only ratified international document on Arab media 
freedom.  
The next regional effort to coordinate media efforts was in the 2008 Arab Media Charter. The 
charter, ratified in Cairo by 22 Arab Information Ministers (with the notable absence of Qatar 
and less notably, Iraq) aimed to put limits on what could be broadcast on Arab airwaves. 
Member states agreed to forbid content that had a "negative influence on social peace and 
national unity and public order and decency" and would be "in contradiction with the 
principles of Arab solidarity".77 Qatar’s absence could be explained by the editorial policies 
of its 24-hour news station, Al Jazeera. Hosting members of opposition groups, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and constantly offering critical reporting on Arab governments (with 
the notable exception of Qatar) made the network a constant thorn in the side of most Arab 
regimes.78 It also meant that Qatar was never likely to be a signatory to such a Charter, which 
was aimed at private satellite channels that were becoming overly critical of the very same 
regimes. The Charter also attempted to steer towards regulating satellite television stations 
(especially if they were free-to-air) that had been quickly growing with very few guiding 
principles and increasing viewership.79 It called for banning the production or display of 
content that runs “counter to norms and values of standards of Arab Society,” a very common 
clause in most countries in the region. In defense of the charter, media scholar, Hussein 
Amin80 says: 
By basing the Charter on the best practices of television broadcasting 
regulation in the West and adapting these regulations for Arab society, it is 
hoped that this Charter will provide a foundation for developing a vibrant, 
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diverse satellite television environment that broadcasts programs meeting 
world-class standards of journalism, entertainment, and public affairs.81 
Amin qualifies his position by stipulating that the success of the charter would depend on how 
every country implements it. He very generously compared the Charter to the FCC in the US, 
which regulates the type of content that may be broadcast (he mentions the FCC when 
referring to “best practices of television broadcasting regulation in the West”). This is an 
inaccurate comparison as bodies such as the FCC or Ofcom (in the UK) are completely 
independent and locally run. The regional nature of this charter points to a supra-juridical 
attitude that seems to uphold the status-quo of regimes, more than that of the laws, which 
differ among most Arab countries.  The charter does bring to light the general attitude of Arab 
states towards private broadcasting and its view that they must fall in line with a vaguely 
defined notion of “society” and “social norms.”  
Developments in Arab media were interconnected due to the common market, but also highly 
local. Many argue that mass media in the Arab World may best be understood and analyzed in 
the context of what has been termed "glocalization," a combination of local and global 
political, economic, technological and cultural processes. Hafez argues the the Middle East is 
is a prime example of another trend, “Neo-Regionalism,”82 where geo-linguistic sub-regions 
have been using new networked societies while incorporating Western influences to generate 
new national cultural products. This trend is thought to have democratizing effects (and more 
open access to information), which can be observed in areas such as South Asia and Latin 
America, but perhaps not as much in the Arab World.83  
Nonetheless, increasing amounts of news coverage, in-depth reporting and talk shows have 
provided unprecedented access to opposition perspectives for Arab audiences. Much of this 
programming was influenced by the “AlJazeera Effect” which helped spur demand for more 
informed and critical media, transforming current affairs coverage region-wide.84 While this 
research will not deny the transformative role of AlJazeera, it will focus more on the 
development and political economy of private, politically sensitive, national media, and in the 
case of Egypt will discuss this “effect” only in reference to professionalization in the sector or 
the changes it prompted in the early days of private media in the country.  
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Developments in Arab Media  
For decades most Arab governments proclaimed an absolute monopoly on all broadcast 
media and most print. The period of Arab Nationalism saw the formation of nation states and 
attempts at local and regional power consolidation. The oil boom in the 1970s allowed most 
of these states’ additional rents to be used both for economic and political development. 
Rentierism became the most notable feature of MENA economies.85 Resource-poor countries 
had to look towards diversifying their economies while the oil-rich states maintained their 
near absolute grip on their countries’ economies. The region by-and-large joined the 
Western-led neoliberalization trend. Some such as Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia embarked on a 
path of neoliberalization spearheaded by the International Financial Institutions (IFI) in order 
to encourage foreign funding that would help plug the budget gaps.  
Hafez86 notices that hard authoritarian nations -where ties between media and opposition 
groups or civil society are low and the degree of repression is high- tend to maintain both 
their system of governance and a relatively closed state of private internal media. Often, as 
was the case in the majority of Arab nations, patronage networks built around political 
alliances or economic interest (also linked to the state) form the fulcrum of media systems 
that exhibit close degrees of parallels with the general power structures of the countries in 
which they exist. This was the case in the early days of American journalism, when political 
parties were necessary patrons to media.87 Despite the changing landscape of Arab media, it 
has yet to be proven that this has also changed the nature of patronage networks in the region. 
“There is some agreement among Arab analysts that the arrival of satellite channels did not in 
itself rupture the relations of patronage that had previously dominated the region's television 
output.88” The introduction of this changing system of ownership, where ownership was at 
least nominally private, did not immediately hand market powers to consumers or to cultural 
producers and professionals. Some observers claim that these so-called 'new' Arab media “are 
still effectively dealing with one consumer”, namely the head of state, and that they are 
“appendages of the ruling political and economic order in the Arab World, not challenges to 
it.89”  
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Changes in traditional Arab mass media seem to follow patterns that see them ebb and flow 
around the same axis of political and economic patronage. The start of the proliferation of 
satellite television began by a royal imperative. Saudi Arabia was responsible for the first 
emissions of privately owned Arab satellite television stations with Middle East Broadcasting 
Center (MBC).90 The owners of the station were both in-laws to the Al-Sauds. The other two 
“private” Saudi owned satellite television conglomerates, ART and Orbit, were more directly 
owned by princes of The Kingdom. All these Saudi-owned stations are also Pan-Arab 
satellite stations. MBC especially began the trend of in-depth news analysis on regional 
topics. However, these stations were noticeably light on airing stories or issues having to do 
with internal Saudi politics or criticizing the ruling family. Chapter 2 discusses with more 
detail the development of private mass media in the Arab world, including Lebanon, one of 
the more vibrant countries in this sector, which developed a long-standing pluralist media. 
The Chapter will also consider the effects of heavy investment in regional media since the 
mid 90’s from the oil-rich Gulf Countries.   It will explore with more depth the relationship 
between Egyptian private mass media growth and regional developments.  
3) State Capitalism and Neoliberalism: Theoretical underpinnings  
The media system transformations under investigation in this thesis occur mostly within the 
context of a broader shift in political-economic and commercial policies that directly played-
into developments in the sector. The shift this study will most often refer to is from a system 
predominantly characterized as pushing from “state-capitalism,” to a policy framework that is 
more “neoliberal” in nature. They are both terms that have wide-ranging applications, and so 
it is important to define them more clearly in the context of this study. 
Egypt’s rulers described their policies differently. Gamal Abdel-Nasser often referred to his 
doctrine as “Arab Socialism,” especially in the latter phase of his rule. His era would be 
defined by nationalization of industry, sweeping welfare policies, high levels of 
protectionism and import substitution, and state control of the means of production. The 
Nasserite developmentalist model is often described by scholars as more closely resembling 
“state capitalism,” rather than socialism, mainly due to the fact that many of the production 
and consumption patterns remained in tact after the revolution against the monarchy in 1952; 
but according to Cooper the level of dependence on the state was the main differentiator for 
most Egyptians.91 The state would not only have a new ruling class, but it would mostly be a 
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direct replacement of existing power structures, or as Achcar put it, “the Nasserite paradigm 
carried the substitution of the executive for the really existing bourgeoisie [it] replaced the 
bourgeoisie on the economic plane as well, subjecting it to extensive expropriations.”92 
 
 This transition is broadly viewed as a gradual move towards a more neoliberal framework 
after Nasser’s death in 1970, but in a much more accelerated manner during the second half 
of Mubarak’s presidency. Finding a definitive, current and universal description of 
neoliberalism and what it pertains to from an ideological and policy perspective can be 
difficult, despite it being such a widely employed concept. It is the subject of broad 
discussion and debate, the true breadth of which transcends the parameters and purpose of 
this study. Many have avoided defining the term on a theoretical basis. One study puts this 
down to neoliberalism not exhibiting “a clearly defined set of invariant features, as may be 
expected in studies of ‘feudalism’ or ‘capitalism.’”93 The term can admittedly be somewhat 
elusive and seem to straddle a wide range of political, economic and even social phenomena; 
opening it to many usages, in a somewhat “catch-all” manner.94  
 
However, this study aims to clearly employ the term to describe some of the more basic 
features of the transition in Egypt around the time the media system was being opened to the 
private sector. Most notably the term reflects, “the systematic use of state power to impose 
(financial) market imperatives, in a domestic process that is replicated internationally by 
globalization.”95 One of the ways neoliberalism is distinguished from other forms of ‘liberal’ 
thought, is that despite calling for ‘deregulation’ of markets, it is ultimately used as 
justification of broad state intervention and-almost paradoxically- higher regulation. Most 
states going through a neoliberal transformation exhibit a centrally-mandated and enforced 
reallocation of resources in a manner that is “based on the prominence of finance, 
international elite integration, subordination of the poor… and universal compliance with U.S. 
interests.96” Modern neoliberalism is closely linked with the (mostly Washington-based) 
International Financial Institutions97 that were often directly responsible for the propagation 
of the mode of thinking through the structural reforms imposed on their loan recipients. 
David Harvey argues that despite neoliberal states’ general stated support of individual 
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freedom and liberties, authoritarianism and state coercion still often came hand-in-hand with 
the enforcement of neoliberal policies, given the states’ central and prioritized role of 
reflecting and protecting the rights of businesses, multinational corporations and foreign 
capital. Harvey ultimately sees neoliberalism as being necessarily a political project first and 
foremost, one that is underpinned by some modalities of liberal economic and social 
thought.98 In the case of Egypt, especially during the second half of Mubarak’s presidency, 
the regime strove towards implementing a system that had many of the characteristics 
described above. The degree to which the successive Mubarak governments at the time 
implemented the liberalization policies varied, although it was most intensified in the decade 
preceding the 2011 uprising that ended with Mubarak’s ouster.   
 
Regime vs government 
 
This research also refers to the ‘state’ as well as the ‘regime’ and sometimes the ‘government,’ 
when pointing towards the entities executing or deciding on certain policies or acts that 
involve the use of resources at the the disposal of the central authority. In terms of Egyptian 
polity, the ‘government’ often includes the cabinets, and the entities under control of the 
Prime Minister, of whom there were seven under Mubarak. The term is therefore employed in 
this specific context. 
The ‘state’ in this study will refer to the organizations at the center of public life, through 
which one can distinguish: the allocation of control and oversight over public institutions; 
directing the flow of property and resources, as well as the financial and fiduciary obligations 
within government; the symbolic, cultural and visible signs pertaining to state-making.99 
Many of Egypt’s public institutions are referred to as “state-owned” since they are official 
under the auspices of the public systems, and not tied to specific regimes or governments. 
Similarly, governments and regimes tend to act on behalf of “the state.” The term ‘regime’ 
will be used in reference to the power structure surrounding the particular president who 
represented the nucleus and absolute focal point for most of the ruling structures in 
referenced in this study. This did not hold true for some isolated moments in history. For 
example, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was not seen as the focal point and the 
center of power while he was president in 2012 and 2013. This study therefore does not refer 
to a “Morsi regime.” Similarly, there’s no reference to a “Naguib regime” when he was made 
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president in 1953 and 1954, especially since Gamal Abdel-Nasser was seen as the de-facto 
leader among the Free Officers after the 1952 Revolution. 
 
4) Methodology: Analysis and reflection on interviews and documents 
Mass media as a sector has often been considered a sensitive subject in Egypt. Ruling 
regimes conferred upon it a “National Security” status, facilitating the regulation and control 
of many outlets. This also meant that many of the interviewees would be skeptical or hesitant 
to respond to questions from a researcher. Figenschou, encountered a similar issue when 
interviewing some of the highest level employees at AlJazeera, where she describes there to 
have been a climate of relative skepticism towards outsiders looking to dissect the Qatari-
owned outlet.100 Many of the media professionals interviewed in the scope of this study were 
either currently employed, and often anxious to avoid jeopardizing their careers in Egypt by 
divulging compromising information, or indeed having the “wrong” opinion on the state of 
affairs. Others had exited the field in Egypt, and were keen to give their side of the story, 
knowing the story of this sector in Egypt is not often told. Some had retired and were in a 
highly reflexive state regarding the topics at hand. From the researchers perspective, when 
reflecting on these conversations “after the interview101,” these aspects would have to be 
considered when deciding on the relevance of the interview to different areas of the study. 
Understanding the social and professional interactions (including power relations) that may 
influence the approach and outlook of some of the subjects would also play an important role 
in considering the context of the experience they relay from their time in media.102 A similar 
process would have to go into assessing authors of the many documents cited and analyzed 
throughout this study.  
 
Despite all interviewees being fully aware of the purposes and uses of their interviews, the 
potential safety and security implications (for both the interviewer and interviewee) also 
created some additional ethical considerations including deciding when to press on with a 
certain line of questioning, when to conduct an in-person interview, and when to pass-on 
potential interviews that may carry a higher level of risk. Ultimately, the interviews that were 
selected and conducted proved to have provided a sufficient amount of information and 
insight for the conclusion of this study. 
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The interviewees were chosen for both their unique insights and positionality in Egypt’s 
media system. For the most part, a semi-structured interview was necessary in order to obtain 
adequate and un-forced answers. Many interviewees were interested in telling their stories 
rather than answering questions, and so as one other researcher observed in his reflections on 
interviews: some were developed “from an original conservation, as simultaneously a search 
for understanding and as creative writing.103” Furthermore, practitioners from the field in 
Egypt would often be overlooked by researchers looking at the broader trends of the sector in 
Egypt, where the spotlight tends to be on content, ownership and regulation. The study took 
the approach that interviews from the sometimes understudied practitioners’ perspective 
could be used to weave together some of the narratives needed to understand how the sector 
was structurally and operationally impacted by some of the broader transitions in the country.  
 
Choosing a method to present the interviews became central to the composition of this thesis 
in general, given how central the interviews were to the findings. It was important to reflect 
on the role of each interview in the areas of the thesis where they were used, a common 
consideration for interview-driven theses,104 especially for studies where there is almost too 
much content and “not enough information.105” In Chapters 4 and 5 the interviews are used to 
help reinforce the overall narrative and analysis regarding shifts in the sector. However, for 
the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7, some of the key interviews form the basis around which 
the chapters are written. The “narratives” presented are formed almost entirely from the key 
interviews.  My own positionality vis-a-vis the topic at hand is reflected in Chapter 6, which 
is a case study about a newspaper where I had worked for two years. 
 
5) Egypt: Context and Media  
This thesis analyses mainly the correlation between the political economy of Egypt’s private 
media and the political economy of the country. The history of media development in Egypt 
prior to the more recent proliferation of private broadcasting and newspapers will fall under 
this analysis due to a belief that the legacy of the country’s historical experiences in media 
development has a direct bearing on modern day attitudes towards media and the flow of 
information in the country more broadly.  
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Chapter 3 will breakdown the genesis of print and broadcast mass media in the country, and 
how their histories significantly merge with the the broader state of government and society. 
Private print journalism especially played a critical role in nationalist movements, partisan 
politics, and state propaganda going back to the monarchy in the late 19th century. Broadcast 
media on the other hand was introduced to the country by Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1960, 
essentially as a tool to promote his regime regionally, as well as his brand of socialism, which 
involved highly centralized planning, near total state-capitalism and launching of numerous 
“national projects” that were meant to hold the promise of harnessing and accelerating 
development. That chapter will follow the country’s shift towards a more nominally 
pluralized polity and liberalized economy that was still severely restricted by a stifling 
state.121 Regional and global developments in media and technology and economic 
liberalization meant that Egyptian media, despite all existent restrictions within them, were 
liberalized much more quickly than the country’s politics, creating a paradox or friction with 
the state.122 Similarly, since Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s presidency (1952-1970) and until the 
early years of the Mubarak era, the sector transitioned from being exclusively a tool of the 
regime in power to be deployed at will, to being a sector faced with an ambivalent attitude 
from the state who’s main pre-occupation with the sector was to maintain red-lines and 
restrictions, while periodically deploying the sector as a tool to advance its priorities.123 
Against this backdrop, the private media sector developed under an aspiring neoliberal 
framework (from 1991). Chapter 4 will delve into developments that led to print and 
broadcast media being opened to independent, private ownership for the first time on a large 
scale.  
 
Background on political economy and historical context 
By 1986 the overall dismal performance of the Egyptian economy, and the government’s 
need for additional funding became critical. Oil prices halved and the government’s mounting 
debts were beginning to mature. The need for external aid and economic restructuring led to 
the International Financial Institutions imposing fundamental changes, politically and 
economically.124 The accepted idea behind these reforms at the time was that economic 
liberalization would be followed by political liberalization. Wealth was supposed to increase 
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the potential of popular engagement in the public sphere, even though the experience of 
Eastern European countries suggest that it would be the other way around, ie. political 
liberalization would be a beneficial aid for economic reform and the best way to ensure 
public support for it.125  
In reality, Egypt experienced marginal increases in entrepreneurial activities and nominal 
increases in democratic tendencies. The emergent (and small) entrepreneurial class during 
this period were perhaps among the most important supporters of the government’s policies 
at the time.126 This was mostly the same group from which came some of the larger mass 
media television and print outlets. Members of this cohort also came to occupy many 
important ministerial appointments as well as sensitive positions in the National Democratic 
Party (NDP). Understanding the emergence of this group and the process of privatization is 
key to understanding the political economy of Egypt during this period.  
Mubarak’s regime promoted the transitions described above, but it did not attempt to erase 
some of the institutional foundations put in place when Egypt became a republic. In terms of 
media, Gamal Abdel Nasser created an approach that would reverberate across the different 
ruling regimes incorporated within this study. Nasser had at his disposal a tool never before 
used by Egyptian rulers, broadcast television. He oversaw the opening of the iconic Maspero 
building, the new television headquarters in 1960 and thought of the nascent state broadcast 
as an integral part of his development plans. Broadcast television was introduced to 
Egyptians as a tool for development and promoting national unity and “the greater good”, 
whereas print media had already experienced private ownership and political diversity.127 
Nasser recognized that print was previously run by political parties and that they contained a 
potential to massively mobilize the public; and so he nationalized the press, including all 
privately owned papers. All state-owned papers were also monitored to weed out dissent. His 
regime did not allow dissent from official policy in any of the mass media, all of which were 
publicly owned.128  
Despite easing restrictions on the private sector during the infitah (Open Door) period in the 
1970s under Sadat, the state remained responsible for the vast majority of both investment 
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and employment.129 Sadat had failed to establish an effective alternative to the public sector, 
statist formula of Nasser, and he left Mubarak with an economic crisis.130  
Sadat’s abolition of Nasser’s one-party system was accompanied by a nominal ease on 
freedom of expression. He had officially removed state censorship. To be more precise, he 
removed the kind of spot censors that were meant to act as providing constant and consistent 
instruction and oversight into any opinion or sensitive angle published in the mainstream 
media.131 Instead, he resorted to informal measures that utilized political pressure and 
security-based restrictions (endangering public safety etc), or drowning out certain voices in 
print with overwhelming state policies and propaganda on the still nationalized radio and 
television. Sadat felt that the 1973 War – touted as an astounding victory internally – should 
have legitimized his regime enough to ensure the approval of the general public and the 
loyalty of a more open and diverse media. Instead, he chided journalists for highlighting less 
flattering aspects of his rule such as corruption or state negligence. He gave critical Egyptian 
reporters abroad an ultimatum, to return to the country or lose their passports.132 It was not 
the open journalistic forum as was envisioned. To top it off, economic missteps lead to social 
disquiet and so the state under Sadat had their own reasons to fear open debate and frank 
public discussions. Still, he opened the country for more freedom in publishing. Ownership 
and operation of the four main publishing houses133 transferred from the Arab Socialist Union 
(dissolved in 1978) to the Supreme Press Council, a quasi-independent entity responsible for 
oversight of the press.134 Non-state publications would also be allowed, but only in 
partnership with the Supreme Press Council who would own a 49% share.135 This move was 
seen to be the pre-cursor to the publishing boom, that occurred mostly after Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981.  
The Mubarak administration did encourage opposition papers to open newspapers in the first 
half of his presidency (1981-1997), however a lack of political openness and democratic 
process left these papers without a true base of popular support.136  
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A neoliberal transition 
 
The “dismal137” state of the public sector and government finances between 1986 and 1990 
preceded profound and vital change in the political economy of the country. “Change” in 
some form was seen as needed to ensure the long-term viability of the Egyptian economy.138 
Mubarak’s government saw neoliberal reform as the only way forward. Theoretically, the 
market would reign supreme.  
Privatization of industries and the opening up new markets to new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs were thought to decrease the burden on public finances, which had routinely 
been injecting the enterprises with the necessary finances to maintain their functioning and 
pay off their wage bills.  
Similarly, attempts to maintain control over communication and information dissemination 
was proving too costly and unfeasible with the proliferation of private television and the 
introduction of internet in the country in 1993. At the same time, the government was 
cautious with loosening up restrictions on mass media. Decreased public spending and the 
removal of some social safety nets created discontent that could be amplified via these outlets. 
Meanwhile, international programming was permeating the country’s airwaves and news 
stands, placing pressure on local media that were needing to compete with the more 
compelling programming and higher production values from abroad.139  
The promise of further easing of the foreign debt vis-à-vis a combination of debt forgiveness 
and aid in exchange for Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War was the precursor for continued 
cooperation with the West, and the instigator of a liberalization process that would soon 
reflect on the media system.140 The IMF and World Bank agreements followed in May 1991. 
Despite political liberalization forming a portion of IFI141 conditions, they were more 
interested in enforcing economic liberalization.142 Matters of freedom of speech and opening 
up the “public sphere” initially had to wait. When political changes did start to take shape, the 
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eventual “liberalization” of the media and the open elections were often perceived to be items 
of democratic window-dressing.143  
Despite the changes occurring in the political economy of Egypt, the underpinning principles 
of power by both the regime and other power centers (be they political, economic or social) 
continued to be understood through the same lens as before. The regime remained 
“neopatrimonial” in the sense that it was an institutionalized form of republican 
authoritarianism where distributing privileges through nepotism and cronyism to maintain 
political and economic power became increasingly important.144  Neopatrimonialism was a 
major factor in shaping the media system amid private sector expansion. Chapters 4 and 5 
will discuss the ways under which the state would continue to position itself vis-à-vis the 
media in a way that preserved its ability to utilize media to promote its priorities when the 
push for privatization was most palpable.  
Webb145 argued that the different Egyptian regimes managed to find different uses for the 
media (both pre and post-privatization), and they tended to all revolve around maintaining 
power of the central state.  Nasser used the media directly for mobilizing the population, 
while Mubarak saw it more as a means of demobilizing the population.  
 
The term tanfis or “safety valve” helps summarize Mubarak’s attitude towards the media. 
With rising and inescapable social and economic ills, mass media became venues where the 
public could diffuse frustrations by seeing their grievances expressed on the airwaves or in 
the newspapers.146 
 
Broadcasting from outside the state: an experiment 
Until 2014 Egyptian audiovisual media were run directly through ministerial cabinets. Under 
Nasser and Sadat this Ministry was called, The Ministry of National Guidance, later 
becoming the Ministry of Information (MOI).147 The Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
(ERTU) charter regulated broadcasting based on its original draft in 1979 and its 1989 
amendments. It is the closest Egypt came to having a public broadcaster, but as media scholar 
Rasha Abdullah remarks, “its allegiance remains to the state rather than to the people.148” All 
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matters “audio-visual” passed through the Maspero building, a megalith of State Capitalism 
that has come to symbolize the Nasser era of large projects and mediocre material output. At 
its peak, it housed 43,000 employees who collectively ran the country’s broadcast media.149 
Established in 1960 (along with the first television stations), it was considered a centerpiece, 
and the state’s microphone and loudspeaker to the public for decades.  "The promise of 
television as a powerful tool of communication seems to have motivated Arab governments 
to keep it as a state controlled operation. President Nasser's effective use of radio to promote 
pan-Arabist ideology seems to have bolstering a growing conviction that television would 
potentially be an indispensable tool of political mobilization150". Perhaps one of the most 
telling instances of this building’s importance was immediately after the January 2011 
uprising and sit-in, when the army quickly secured the Maspero building much more quickly 
than some other symbolic or important government venues.  
 
By the mid-1990s the concept of public service broadcasting was losing traction as it was not 
able to remain viable or attractive to viewers, since exposure to satellite television was 
increasing. A massive expansion project around that time by the ERTU did not bear fruit 
commercially or politically, helping highlight the need for another dimension in local mass 
media if Egypt were to remain a symbolic epicenter for the sector regionally.  
In 2000, broadcast journalism in Egypt would experience a structural shift when Decree 411 
of that year allowed licenses for private satellite stations to broadcast from within Egypt for 
the first time. These stations would emit exclusively from the newly created Media 
Production City (MPC), which was run by the ERTU.151 In 2001 Dream TV was established, 
as the first privately owned satellite station. Its main shareholder was Ahmed Bahgat, a 
prominent businessman who enjoyed close ties to the state and the president’s family. 
Bahgat’s business interests varied, but he became known for launching a massive suburban 
development project, Dreamland. He was joined by many other wealthy businessmen along 
with the ERTU itself as a minority shareholder. The second Egyptian-owned satellite station 
to broadcast from Egypt was also partly owned by the ERTU and a friend/business associate 
of the Mubarak’s. A handful of stations followed, revolving around current affairs, 
entertainment, sports, or even religious channels, some of which would later play a political 
role in 2011-2013.  
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The idea of the MPC was that it was meant to provide affordable studio space and facilities to 
encourage television and cinema production. It also placed an enclosure around the stations 
allowing for easy supervision as the they were not officially regulated along with the public 
broadcasters before it. The sector was not offered a concise regulatory system to operate 
under. The private sector nevertheless came to life in the media system only through satellite 
and cable television, while the state never seriously entertained relinquishing absolute control 
over the more easily accessible, terrestrial broadcasting. Privately owned outlets were mostly 
regulated as commercial entities. Like other companies that operate in free trade zones, these 
companies received their licensing from the General Authority for Investments and Free 
Zones (GAFI).  
The rise of private satellite stations coincided with the rise of Gamal Mubarak, and the 
beginning of the “hereditary project” meant to put him in power. It also coincided with the 
emergence of a clan of businessmen around him that came to eventually symbolize the 
clientelist state supporting the younger Mubarak, which is often referenced as a major reason 
leading up to the 25 January Revolution that ousted his father. These outlets were  not only 
viewed used as window-dressing for the regime in the eyes of the West, but also window-
dressing Gamal Mubarak in the eyes of the Egyptian public.152 The prevailing thought within 
the sector was that station owners were not interested in making profit through television, but 
in the political and auxiliary business benefits from owning a chunk of mass media. Bahgat, 
for example was able to promote Dreamland through the eponymous network, while Naguib 
Sawiris, the founder of OnTV stations was an international telecommunications tycoon 
known for harboring expansive business and political ambitions.153 
Licenses initially dolled out for these stations seemed to be exclusive for regime allies; 
satellite channels knew their “red lines‟ of criticism and topical coverage; but, satellite 
stations’ positions tended to fall directly in line with the regime’s perspective, especially with 
reference to economic policy and the neoliberal transition, a priority of the state at the time. 
Besides the political barriers of launching a broadcasting outlet, the financial barrier was also 
considerable given the large upfront capital needed, as well as the underdeveloped 
advertising and commercial markets for the sector. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore some of 
these factors in more depth. 
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Egypt’s Nilesat, which carries a majority of satellite television stations to the region, was 
launched in 1998. By 2015, it was emitting around 500 stations (over 70% of which are free 
to air). Many of these stations broadcast from outside of Egypt, and the majority of them are 
specialized TV stations. AlAyary154 estimates that around 25% of the stations were private 
news or general (which hold a news broadcasting element). These are the outlets that fall 
under the scope of this research, as they deal with current affairs.  
Many regulatory matters have created barriers from entry to this market, but access to the 
MPC is one of the major ones. In light of the restrictions set by the government and perceived 
limitations to freedom of speech the mere formation of private media systems seems to be 
counterintuitive. This study attempts to assess the motivation and mechanisms behind 
launching media outlet under this context.  
 
The press and its complicated equation 
Since the days of Anwar Sadat, Egypt has had partisan newspapers that created a sense of 
plurality within the medium. It was not until 2004, when AlMasry AlYoum was produced that 
Egypt experienced a truly private newspaper, which operated at relatively high standards 
(albeit at times by practitioners who came from a state-press background). Despite competing 
with a near century-long legacy of public newspaper giants AlAhram and AlAkhbar, by 2011 
AlMasry AlYoum became the most read newspaper in Egypt.155 It had also become the first to 
place a major focus on its digital platform, developing one of the most widely read Arabic 
online newspapers and one of the first multimedia productions by an Egyptian newspaper.156  
Online platforms became one of the major offerings for private newspapers who appealed to 
the educated and more computer-literate. Internet penetration grew between 2005-2011 from 
12.3% to 33.3%. 157  By 2012 the state ran a total of 54 out of a total of 567 newspapers (up 
from 142 in 2010), 33 of which were dailies.158 The growth in actual overall readership was 
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much slower than the publishing expansion.159 Nevertheless, changes in Egyptian print media 
were integral to overall developments in mass media. 
A 1998 law allowed joint stock companies to print private papers as long as they received the 
Prime Minister’s approval.160 AlMasry AlYoum was the first of them, followed by others such 
as AlDostour (hitherto published in Cyprus), AlShorouk, ElBadil and a few more after the 25 
January Revolution. The Supreme Council of the Press regulated all newspapers. Private 
journalists could join the Journalist’s Syndicate161 and claim its benefits. Freedom of 
expression was guaranteed by law and most papers had not been subject to systematic and 
daily censorship.162 However, vaguely worded & broad “crimes of publication” laws coupled 
with the application of anti-terrorism and emergency laws during the entire Mubarak and 
Sadat presidencies meant that the government could censor any form of information with 
impunity.  
The economic and security barriers to entry into this market as well as the known difficulties 
of turning a profit with daily newspapers, meant that participation in this sector would be 
limited to political aspirants, or businessmen who may not care about profit as intently. For 
example, AlMasry AlYoum’s main original shareholders were oil tycoon, Salah Diab, along 
with Naguib Sawiris.  
Most mass-circulated private papers maintained good relations with the government as they 
needed access to government publishing houses in order to ensure mass circulation. In fact, 
much of the laws seem to aim directly at encouraging self-censorship by threats of legal 
action or reminders of their general vulnerability. Expressions of displeasure or “polite 
calls163” from the government went a long way in convincing editors to exert self-censorship 
before printing certain stories. Financial threats or actual business attacks were at times taken 
against other businesses owned by the media owner as a means of coercion as well.164 Given 
the all-pervasive presence of the Egyptian State in nearly every market, this was a powerful 
and effective means of controlling the media. In some cases, interventions were made directly 
in the media business as this UNESCO report gives cites:  
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AlDostour newspaper was bought shortly before the revolution by a major 
businessman with close links to the Mubarak regime, who then changed the 
editorial line, resulting in the editor-in-chief, Ibrahim Eissa, leaving. Many 
commentators believe the government promoted this result because it felt that 
the newspaper had become too critical. Eissa and a dozen journalists retained 
control of the website, calling it the Original Dostour. 
Another UNESCO anecdote tells of a broadcaster who, some months before the November 
2010 parliamentary elections, had been told by the General Authority for Investment and Free 
Zones (GAFI), to stop broadcasting news and current affairs programming. “When the 
broadcaster persistently refused to do so, they were pointedly reminded by GAFI that their 
license was up for renewal.” After the ouster of Mubarak in 2011, it became almost 
inconceivable (albeit for a short period) for a broadcaster to refrain from news and current 
affairs. Sixteen broadcasting licenses were handed out during that first year.  
 
Post-Mubarak tumult 
During the 25 January Revolution, private newspapers played a crucial role in conveying the 
ongoing developments. While government newspapers showed empty streets, some private 
newspapers were seemingly defiant, covering the protests in full force. On January 28, the 
government showed the extent of its control over newspapers and publication, cutting off all 
internet access, but most newspapers were able to produce content through Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) that used satellite internet connections.  The period of the 18 uprising days 
(January 25-February 11, 2011) represented an interesting flashpoint on the status of the 
media, since, in the utter confusion of much of both the state and society, most media outlets 
were acting on instinct, they were driven by fear, enthusiasm, patriotism etc. The period 
following the first wave of the 25 January revolution represents a time of profound and rapid 
transformations in media. The changes during this period had come to define (while also 
emanating from) the broader socio-political and economic transformations over the same 
timeframe. Private media took on a more cavalier role and “the gulf between state and private 
media [had] never been wider as it had been between April and December 2011,165”.  In the 
months preceding the revolution, dozens of media licenses were revoked due to “code of 
ethics violations.” By contrast, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which was 
																																								 																				





in charge at the time, formed a new regulatory body and looked to expand the private media 
arena.166  
The result was -for a time- a vastly diverse media. When the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Mohamed Morsi won the 2012 presidential elections, private mass media seemed split 
between his supporters and his detractors. The situation devolved into media wars until, in 
one of his last speeches as president, Morsi spoke out in public against the opposition of 
privately-owned mass media.  
After 2011, the golden year for media freedoms and journalism in Egypt, Egyptian media 
started falling back into old ways. Journalist salaries were not enhanced to offer sustainable 
workloads. Webb167 believes that this was a tacit form of control over the media and the 
quality of some editorial teams. As broadcast developed, many print journalists worked two 
jobs, one in print media, and the other in broadcasting. Not only were media owners 
diversifying, but so were practitioners. Between the interlocking world of media owners and 
employees the mass media sector experienced higher levels of integration.  
Mass media in the post-25 January period had been widely observed but rarely systematically 
and profoundly analyzed, insofar as their structures, operations, and state relations are 
concerned. Much of the writing on the topic has been in the context of analyzing the roles of 
social media, talk shows and the role of Al Jazeera, as well as describing the scene after the 
so-called Arab Spring.  
Developments under present AbdelFattah El-Sisi (president since 2014) created more drastic, 
structural changes in Egyptian media. These changes occurred on Constitutional, Regulatory, 
and media ownership levels. The shifts on ownership looked to be directly linked to the 
political composition of the country at the time, with power centers in the country 
representing the security establishment playing a major, and unambiguous role in reshaping 
the sector. This will be explored further in Chapter 5.   
El-Sisi had initially shown his keen interest in media developments during the first year of his 
presidency as he met with the cohort of media personalities (excluding press conferences) 
more than any other single non-military cohort in Egypt. He counts the media sector as a 
major “national institution,” whose goals must align with the state. During his second term as 
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president the lines between public and private media were once again blurred. Military 
figures were at the helm of nearly every government institution. Similarly, private businesses 
with ties to the military and the broader security establishment embarked on a process of 
control and consolidation of the media that resulted in a near total and direct cooption of 
nominally privatized areas of the system.  
This thesis will analyze how the nuanced shifts in political leadership and economic policy 
since the advent of private broadcast and print media translated to the manner the sector was 
formed and how further developments were acutely sensitive the changes in these broader 
factors as they occurred. It theorizes that the uneven, inconsistent and volatile pace of 
transition in both areas will have contributed greatly to the inability of the sector to grow in 
any linear way. The constant state of transition will change the composition of the media 
system, but many of the underlying aspects and approaches towards the sector, have 



















Chapter 2: Arab Media Development: Regional Media and its Effects on 
Local Systems 
 
Developments in Egyptian media systems and those in the surrounding Arab-speaking region 
have been inter-linked for many of reasons extending beyond their unified language and 
overlapping cultural values. A common Pan-Arab media market helped tie the trajectories of 
their media developments, despite the major differences born out of high variance in 
economic systems and political power structures.  
 
This chapter aims to offer a brief survey of selected areas of development in local and Pan-
Arab media with reference to direct or indirect effects they may have had on the Egyptian 
context. The overlap in regional media system developments could be attributed partially to 
identity politics, shared audiences, resources and capital, economic trends, as well as 
cooperation on legislative, regulatory and media policy matters. As a result, some key trends 
and phenomena within the sector are observed to either have been shared or parroted across 
the region at similar time periods. 
 
Power dynamics as well as economic realities have transformed across the Arab World, since 
the middle of the 20th century. The role of the private sector in the region had been expanding 
since the 1980s, directly correlated with a period of declining liquidity for the states due 
largely to declining oil prices.168 For the most part, Arab states’ governments and ruling 
cohorts had maintained a highly active role in shaping the expansion of the private sector.169 
Major centers of economic and political power were closely-knit and these relationships 
played crucial roles in regional media development.  
 
Technology, had been expanding beyond the absolute control of the mostly autocratic region. 
The role of traditional mass media tended to readjust along with political and economic 
shifts, owing largely to how the power structures controlling the sector attempted to 
manipulate it. Media development in many Arab countries occurred both collectively and in 
parallel. From the governments’ perspectives, technology had created porous boundaries for 
the spread of ideologies and various modes of thought. Investing in media helped promote the 
status quo. Hafez saw it as “a balancing power to the other great mobilizing force of the last 
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decade: political Islam (networking, rigor, politics).”170 Many states resorted to relying on 
media as a mobilizing device, as opposed to other apparatuses such as political parties. 
 
Regionalism (as opposed to globalism) has been a useful approach towards helping 
understand media in the Arab region. The valuable work of many such as Sakr, Ayish, 
Kraidy, Boyd, Hafez, Dajani and others, all help qualify this notion by highlighting the 
confluence of economics, culture, politics and religion as deciding factors. Lebanon presents 
a regional anomaly with regards to the structural development of its media, yet it remains of 
particular interest, having experienced the first and most sustained instance of pluralistic 
audio-visual mass media ownership and a system that allowed for multiple centers of power 
within the media systems.  
 
Another useful approach has been a purely “geolinguistic” one, which sees how shared 
languages and cultures can manifest as market forces driving towards cross-border 
integration.171  This concept sees markets as causal factors behind the growth of some global 
media industries. It views language as a tool for empire and expansion, especially 
economically. While this methodology helps to partially shed light on the expansion of Pan-
Arab media, it is inadequate in describing the nuances and multitude of other variables that 
may be as impactful, but outside the scope of that approach.  
 
On a whole, in assessing media policy, output and economies in the Arab world, local factors 
still play a more superior role in affecting perceptions. Hafez and Skinner172 attempted to 
debunk the notion that news media have become truly globalized due to resistance caused by 
the structural make-up of local societies: 
Media capital's lack of global reach is, alongside the political persistence of the nation-
state  and the major differences that mark the media discourses of the world's nation-
states or cultural area, the key reason why the globalization of the media today is taking 
place to a far more modest degree and at a far slower pace than is generally assumed.173 
 
The thought that media would revolve around global power centers that would easily 
spearhead the charge of a new cultural imperialism is slowly giving way to the notion that 
that global media would be more pluralized and cater to increasingly niche viewers. That 
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does not discount the cross-border implications of regional and global phenomena. Aside 
from the broader Pan-Arab media, the diverse and impactful experiences out of Lebanon and 
Saudi Arabia had especially direct implications on Egypt and the rest of the region.  
 
1) Pan-Arab Media: a role in nation-building 
In the identity-forming, nation-building, post-colonial era, Arab identity was invoked and 
pan-Arabism flourished as part of attempts by some ruling cohorts  as both a sentimental and 
pragmatic mobilizing tool in nation-building efforts.174 The Free Officers of Egypt established 
a region-wide broadcasting outlet for that very reason with the Sawt EL-Arab (Voice of the 
Arabs) radio station that would become a vehicle for Arab independence. This experiment 
took an inherited notion of Arab sameness, and transformed it into a battle cry.175 With the 
scene set from the 1950’s, the elevated role of pan-Arabism and the promotion of Arab 
identity would help place media at center stage as a major means of supporting this idea.   
 
Aside from leading state-building efforts across the region, the emerging rulers were also 
considered to be the main drivers of economic development, and so they valued the use of 
media176 especially as a means to promote their developmentalist policies, which often 
revolved around grand projects and broader economic nationalization. Numerous laws and 
stated policies reflect a pervasive regional perspective that media must be centrally directed 
as a cultural institution and weapon of soft power.177 As the states underwent varying 
transitions, media outlets became key vehicles to convey the governments’ desired shift 
(secular/Islamic/liberal/socialist/democratic/authoritarian). The economic realities of each 
country often reflected on their media systems, whether they were located within national 
borders, or funded by nationals of that country.   
 
The role of mass media in nation-building and creating group identity in modern history is 
not specific to the Arab World. Rather it is a symptom of many transitional moments in 
recent history worldwide. The most notorious example of this would be the role of the 
Ministry of Propaganda in Nazi Germany. Media in Hitler’s state were deployed as one of the 
main “controllers of the hearts and minds of citizens that had to be kept in submission and 
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obedience.”178 Methods and goals of Arab regimes certainly may have differed from this, but 
the way many governments had initially viewed media was similar.  
 
The Arab national expansion phase (1976-1990) saw Arab governments boosting their 
broadcasting capabilities through local training, pooling inter-Arab state resources and 
attempting to cover all national territories. They collectively formed the Arab States 
Broadcasting Union.179 The role of television especially was highly valued by leaders that 
thought it could be an important political tool.180 Even as the private sector grew in many 
Arab countries, by the 1980s television was perceived as a symbol of national identity that 
may not be shared with the profit-driven ethos of the private sector: 
The individuality of the citizen (in Arab Media) was absent in most cases, and 
that is why the term “mass media” was introduced. This task has been repeated 
in the building up of the independent Arabs in which its mass media has 
become a symbol of sovereignty, along with the flag, the national airlines and 
others. Above all this, mass media served as a tool for forging perception 
associated with its geography, history, and perhaps legitimacy181. 
 
Individualism and the ego-driven nature of consumerist media would not be compatible with 
the centrally-planned media aimed at reinforcing group identity during this period. Aside 
from leading to the nationalization of broadcast media outlets, this incompatibility would also 
be observed when private audio-visual outlets appeared more broadly in the 1990s, as the 
cloud of government censure, red tape or narrowing of competition would not allow for a 
liberalized sector, as will be shown in the case of Egypt in later chapters. The trend mirrors 
the difficulties countries like Egypt and Tunisia found in delivering on both economic and 
political liberalization. The will for provisioning for an economic transformation was not 
matched by proclivity to opening up the public sphere for more freedom of political 
expression and social ideation.  As a result, attempting allow for broader ownership and 
participation in media systems that were traditionally part of government institutions was a 
complicated exercise. 
 
The commercial allure of television as a tool with as much potential potency in marketing as 
it did in political communication did not factor into states’ plans for the media development 
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until the 1990s.182 With relatively higher access than many other areas of the world, Arab 
radio and television was the express form of communicating with the masses, while the press 
remained a medium for the elite until the end of the 20th century.183 
 
Broadcasting did not always begin by centrally-planned government initiatives, however by 
the 1980’s, most Arab states exhibited government monopolies in the sector. In 1971 the 
Kuwaiti government took over television broadcasting by subordinating it to government 
control. In the post independence period, Moroccan TV was reined-in under the Postal 
Ministry. Radiodiffusion-Television Marocaine (RTM) then came into being in 1962 as part 
of the Ministry of Information. SudanTV was started in 1961 after funding came in as a token 
of goodwill from Germany. Following the British public service model of broadcasting, 
media systems in the Arabian Gulf region were established as government-run operations 
mostly, with the UAE starting in 1969.  Networks in Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Yemen were 
established in 1975.  
 
Arab governments generally attempted to model their national broadcasting around 
centralized Western European examples. This was due to the high value placed on having a 
government-controlled broadcasting system as a tool of national development. The business-
led American system was less appealing at the time, despite harnessing the potential for 
greater revenue generation. Political ferment in the region in the mid-1950s and in the 
1960s created heightened tensions that afforded the ruling cohorts public support for their 
plans, including government control of television to ensure homogeneity in broadcasting.184  
 
2) Early trends in private television and Pan-Arab Satellite Broadcasting 
 
During the latter decades of the 20th century, rapid technological development along with 
shifting political sands contributed to the proliferation of a region-wide spurt of Arab satellite 
broadcasting. Governments were looking beyond consolidating their local positions into 
engaging with media audiences both regionally and globally, seeing the potential of audio-
visual media as a trans-national political and cultural force. Egypt was already at the helm in 
this as the region’s main producer of audio-visual content. It was the first country to have 
effectively breached borders in its mass communication with the Voice of the Arabs radio 
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station. Latter phases of region-wide expansion would ultimately be more relevant to growth 
of Pan-Arab media at the turn of the 21st century. It would also be heavily influenced by 
phenomena that have greatly affected the economic dynamics of the region such as the 
nationalization of oil companies in the Gulf, and attempts to liberalize economies. Satellite 
television marked one of the earlier attempts for private agents to engage in a region-wide 
market place employing regional communications.   
 
Furthermore, governments began to understand the difficulties associated with completely 
rejecting developments in the sector while appearing to promote liberal markets, and 
inclusive politics. Most public programs had been lacking creativity and were losing their 
viewership amid rapidly advancing global technologies. They would attempt to regain 
audiences lost to foreign media through developing high quality national program output that 
aimed to stave off competition from outside broadcasters.185 
 
Sakr186 noted that some of the earliest significant factors influencing  regional media came 
into play in the mid 1970s after the explosion of oil prices and the early attempts by Saudi 
Arabia to aim towards using television to assert its role as a regional leader. States in the 
Arab League had also agreed in 1976 to launch the Arab Satellite Communications 
Organization (Arabsat), with Saudi Arabia playing the most prominent role and owning 
29.9% of the company’s shares. The next biggest shareholders would be Kuwait (11.9%), 
Libya (9.2%), Iraq (8.3%), Qatar (8%) and Egypt (5.2%).187 Egypt had the most to offer in 
terms of expertise and a wealth of content, and so when it was also removed from Arabsat  as 
a consequence of its suspension from the Arab League in 1979, it created a major gap in the 
project, as it was the major source of technical knowhow. This meant that for the first few 
years of the launch of the first satellite in 1985, it was an immensely underused resource.188 
 
Another watershed moment for regional media outlet proliferation was the Gulf War. It had 
brought 24-hour news to the MENA region, at a time when only CNN provided consistent 
news and the demand for distinctly Arab voices in the news grew. Operating from outside the 
Middle East, it enjoyed more political license than domestic channels. Many Arab media 
scholars look to this as a moment that “triggered a series of developments that lead to the 
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establishment of private television in Arab countries.”189 The Egyptian Satellite Channel 
(state owned) had launched in the wake of the Gulf War, starting a trend over the subsequent 
years for both private and government-owned satellite stations going on air.190 
 
With the notable exception of Lebanese media191, private television had mostly been confined 
to satellite television in the Arab region. The first of these outlets was The Middle East 
Broadcasting Corporations (MBC), launched in 1991 out of London. Started by Saudi 
investor, Walid Al-Ibrahim, MBC was to be the first privately-owned Arab broadcasting 
network offering free-to-air non-stop programming. Although, many have doubted whether it 
was ever truly privately-owned as Al-Ibrahim was the brother-in-law of the late King Fahad. 
Thus, from the outset, the first privately-owned station in the region would in fact be a 
testament to the blurred lines between private and public ownership.192 Commercially, the 
idea was to capitalize on the vast audience satellite television provides, including the 
potential for higher advertisement revenue.  
 
This station, which began as a variety outlet blending news and entertainment (a template that 
would be replicated in subsequent outlets) was supposed to branch into a network of 
specialized channels relatively quickly. Falling oil revenue was reportedly the reason behind 
a revision of this strategy postponing its expansion.193 The plans did eventually materialize 
with the launch of AlArabiya news channel in 2002 under the MBC umbrella in the build-up 
to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. By 2018, MBC had 18 stations under its umbrella.  
 
Before MBC expanded in such a way, Al-Ibrahim’s original partner in MBC, Saleh Kamel 
had established the first network of specialized stations under the Arab Radio and Television 
Network (ART) in 1993. Unlike MBC, ART became the first pay-tv service, relying on a 
completely different business model. However, as Kamel was not directly related to royalty, 
many viewed his partnership with Saudi Prince AlWalid Bin Talal in ART as one of the main 
guarantees of the success of his endeavor.194 
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Another area of differentiation between the two media moguls, is the degree to which 
Kamel’s media venture could be seen to compliment his other businesses, notably a vast 
network of Islamic Banks under Al-Baraka Group: 
… when setting up ART he deliberately rejected the idea of broadcasting 
news bulletins because of the potential such an activity would have for 
damaging his relations with those in power… [his motives] may have less to 
do with personal vanity and positioning than with his economic interests, 
including Islamic finance.”195  
 
One of ART’s most popular and well-funded stations was a religious station called Iqraa, 
which was dominated by programs promoting Islamic values, including in the world of 
finance. Giving credence to the theory that ART was primarily a compliment to Kamel’s core 
businesses, he sold-off the ART’s very popular sports network in 2009 to AlJazeera Network 
due to declining profitability, despite its owning the rights to broadcasting many exclusive 
events, and being one of the rare examples of sustainable (and potential) growth in Arab pay-
tv at the time. 
 
AlJazeera, had originally started as the first specialized news channel in the Arab World in 
1996. Despite attempts to portray itself as privately owned, the Qatari state’s ownership and 
ultimate sway over the network was never in doubt. The network began with a $150 million 
loan from the Qatari government and has enjoyed subsidies and further financing from the 
state ever since.196 Still, for the majority of the first 15 years of its existence, it gained a 
reputation as being the first Western-style, independently-run news station due to its 
maverick coverage of regional events and extensive airtime given to opposition 
movements.197 Nonetheless, the Qatari state’s use of AlJazeera conformed to a growing trend 
of politicized media ownership, while also fitting into the Arab template of being controlled 
and directed by the state, who in this case acts both as the financial and political patron.198 
 
The network’s type of programming and quality of production were a first-of-its-kind in the 
region. It proved to be immensely popular, having played a role in changing political 
perceptions, while also creating popular programming templates that others looked to 
emulate. The network had introduced content and production that would change the way 
news and politics would be discussed and broadcast regionally, forcing many local and Pan-
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Arab stations to find ways to compete on a similar playing field.  “AlJazeera has brought 
noteworthy innovations to Arab broadcasting and reporting, airing hard-hitting programs, 
bold uncensored news coverage, passionate political debates, and on-the-ground reporting.”199 
 
One of its more popular programs, Sirri lilGhaya (Top Secret) launched in 1998. It consisted 
of long-form investigative reports by broadcaster Yosri Foda, who had started by making a 
name for himself working for the BBC’s World service. His investigative reports, crossed 
borders and highlighted sensitive topics in an investigative format never before seen by an 
Arab outlet. Foda, who would later become the host of a top-ranked Egyptian talk show, 
delved deep into many issues, such as the inner workings of Al-Qaeda. His show was a 
regional phenomenon, and Foda himself was conscious of the novelty of his show.  “We were 
able to pioneer [Arab] investigative reporting. I was honestly given quite a lot of freedom 
financially and editorially and was able to do do what I wanted. Our reporting was no less 
than much of what had come from legendary investigative reporters in the West.”200   
 
Foda, and other programs benefited from the financial backing of the state of Qatar, and their 
goal to expand above all else. This often came at the expense of relations with other rulers in 
the Arab world. Resultant local restrictions on the station’s content contributed to the 
network’s inability to realize its intentions for financial independence. Countries in the region 
who were wary of AlJazeera also attempted to punish the government-owned outlet by 
pulling advertising from it. This had a palpable effect on the station and caused it to be 
continuously dependent on government subsidies, loans and cash injections. As a result the 
station was free from the pressures of advertisers and of most markets in general.201 Many 
advertisers steered clear from AlJazeera, so as not to anger countries that took issue with its 
reporting such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Meanwhile in Saudi, a de-facto advertising ban on 
the Qatari outlet was put into place less than a decade into its existence.202  
 
Nonetheless, its programming proved to be a massive success among Arab speakers, and it 
quickly became a primary source of news for the region.203 Relative to other regional outlets, 
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its news coverage was observed to be more objective.204 Its regional reach had been translated 
in international success as evidenced by a survey in 2005 that found the AlJazeera brand to be 
the fifth most successful globally.205 By the time the Arab Spring came around in 2011, 
AlJazeera was seen to have played a part in transforming Arab consciousness and creating 
conditions contributing to the uprisings, while notably avoiding any criticism of Qatar, whose 
interests were undoubtedly promoted via the station.206 
 
Shifting consumer cross-border trends 
 
Technological developments were crucial in helping AlJazeera have the impact it did, with 
the number of people able watch the stations growing greatly during its early years. 
According to Jon Alterman, by 1998 10%-15% of Arab households had access to satellite 
television. Alterman wrote a prescient and often-cited study of the changing nature of Arab 
news media and information technology that same year, predicting major changes in the 
region’s relationship with media and information. The three major transformations he cited 
were: the declining efficacy of censorship; the emergence of a new kind of Arab identity due 
to the unifying nature of satellite television; increased sophistication in public interpretation of 
the news due to the high volume of information being circulated.207 
 
In time, the effects Alterman spoke of in his analysis would be amplified by the proliferation 
of satellite and internet. A 2012 report by the Dubai Press Club reported that between 2006 
and 2011 access to Free to Air (FTA) satellite television increased from 59% to 70% within 
Arab households.  The number of FTA channels dramatically increased over the same period 
from 218 to 538.208 Although as the report states, “audience fragmentation [did] not seem to 
be threatening the position of the top players in the market…there has been a consolidation of 
the position of the top FTA broadcasters (ie. MBC, Rotana [music], AlJazeera Network, 
ADM and DMI), and a dilution of the smaller channels.”209 By contrast, over the same period, 
with the exception of Egypt, the region did not see a significant increase in newspaper 
circulation. Most major stations also extended their broadcasting via online platforms, which 
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has the same trans-national reach. By 2017 internet penetration reached around 64.5% of the 
Middle East’s population.210 
 
Many scholars writing about the sector in the early days of regional mass media growth also 
predicted a democratizing effect, however the sector was never allowed to grow in that 
manner, largely because of the “feudalistic” nature of ownership within the larger outlets.211 
Expansions with the liberalization of media spaces happened incrementally- but never fully- 
as licensing and ownership were severely restricted. The role of national politics tended to 
dominate the underlying narrative of any developments in Arab Media.212 These entities that 
grew in the 1990’s and 2000’s were to become pan-Arab stations aiming to cast a wider net 
of viewership and influence. They would contribute to growing and shifting political 
discourse and would influence social and political movements in profound ways, such as the 
support for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution in 2005, or the 
knock-on effects of popular protests or uprisings in 2006213 or most notably during the Arab 
Spring in 2011.  
 
3) Media Cities  
 
One of the major byproducts of the concerted efforts towards media expansion had been the 
creation of media cities, both as a means towards realizing the economic gains of cluster 
economies, and to control broadcast media output. The Arab world is unique in its 
development of special media zones, akin to free trade zones.214 They created areas where 
both production and broadcasting infrastructure would be developed and available for 
prospective investors. These zones would be justified through the potential they held for 
economics of scale and common infrastructure spending. Jordan Media City (JMC), Dubai 
Media City (DMC) and the Egyptian Media Production City (EMPC) are national projects 
that are public/private partnerships born out of an era of growing private sectors, and stated 
inclinations (by the respective governments) towards knowledge-based economic 
development: 
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In these three master-planned communities the vision is that media, 
business, government, technology, and finance will become inexorably 
linked and that the synergy will provide jobs for thousands.215  
 
Jordan had spearheaded the prospect of a Media City in 1978 with a large facility that housed 
the Jordan Production Company. After launching in 1982, it had only survived for 9-years, 
with little impact. However, Saleh Kamel resurrected JMC in 2001, purchasing the area 
through his Dellah Media Company, refurbishing it for $140 million and making it a hub for 
ART after the network relocated from Rome.  By 2018, it had become home to over 46 
television and radio outlets.216 While the project continued as a joint venture between the 
Kingdom and Kamel’s company, JMC remained the least politicized of the projects, as the 
majority of its clients provided mainly social and religious programming.  
 
The DMC on the other hand, was started in 2000 as one of the landmark projects of Dubai’s 
ruler, Mohammed Bin Rashed Al-Maktoom. It became a major marker for his grand plans to 
transform Dubai into a global business epicenter. He kept a firm grip on the city, as one study 
declares: “DMC is really run and operated for the benefit of the Al-Maktoum family and its 
business friends.217” The city offered financial and operational incentives that weren’t 
available elsewhere. It was the most ambitious project, and by 2006 hosted 50 regional and 
international broadcasting outlets. The DMC has since been operating on the concept of 
attracting big names such as CNN and Reuters as “anchor tenants,” in order to draw others in 
its quest to become one of a handful of truely global media hubs.218 
 
EMPCA was also started by the Egyptian government as a public project run by the quasi-
governmental Egyptian Radio and Television Union. Its developments will be discussed in 
further chapters pertaining to the proliferation of private satellite in Egypt, of which the 
EMPCA was a critical element. The development of the other two media cities is critical in 
explaining why Egypt’s project had never taken off in the way it was designed. 
 
The media cities all claimed to harbor ambitions of becoming international media hubs. 
Despite sharing this goal that they all would essentially look to serve the same Pan-Arab 
market, there had not been a real sense of competition among them, as much as there was a 
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division of labor. DMC is acknowledged to be at the top of their hierarchy having come 
closest to achieving the expansion goals of its first CEO Saeed Al-Muntafiq, to be one of a 
few globally-recognized regional hubs. Any sense of competition among these cities had 
been undermined by their common approach to restrictions on the content that broadcasters 
have been permitted to transmit. The licensing process for media free zone tenants would not 
be explicitly protected under local laws ensuring freedom of thought and expression. And 
transgressions that can put a license holder at risk of closure or censure are vaguely defined 
from the literature available on these zones.  
 
In practice, media free zones in Arab countries were implicated in existing ownership 
patterns and regulatory structures in so far as they limited choice.219 To operate outside these 
cities (if allowed) effectively meant automatically incurring relatively higher operating costs 
by forgoing the tax incentives and infrastructural capabilities. Operating within the cities, 
gave the state a more efficient means of monitoring media content and playing a more 
intimate role in the core operations of any private media company, but the companies 
benefited from the savings associated from operating within the confines of these cities.  
 
4) Coordinated and uncoordinated legislation 
 
Early agreements on the role of media during the nation-building phase led to coordinated 
efforts to institutionalize media regulation within the Arab League. Since its inception, the 
Arab League had espoused a secondary goal of promoting Arab Nationalism via multi-lateral 
institutional regional cooperation (including media), starting with the Permanent Committee 
for Arab Media (est. 1959). As the future of regional media was starting to become more of a 
palpable reality, the Committee for Arab Media Ministers was formed in 1994 in order to 
create more coordinated legislation.220 This Committee was meant to form policies to regulate 
Pan-Arab media and international media emanating from the region. As with many Arab 
League initiatives; true cooperation on the topic had never seemed to materialize 
operationally.  
 
Two years later, representatives of the major papers from 17 Arab states signed the Sanaa’ 
Declaration.221 This UN-led, regional pact pushing for the creation of independent and 
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pluralistic press is still the only ratified international document on Arab media freedom, as it 
was adopted by the UNESCO the following year. Its actual impact on the sector in the region 
has been at best, questionable. 
 
The most well-documented regional effort to coordinate media regulation came in, 2008 with 
the Arab States’ ‘Charter for Satellite Broadcasting.’ Ratified in Cairo by the 22 members of 
the Council of Arab Information Ministers (with the notable abstention of Qatar222 and the 
opposition of Lebanon), the charter aimed to put limits on what could be broadcast on Arab 
airwaves in a way that would be pleasing to all. Member states agreed to forbid content that 
had a "negative influence on social peace, national unity, public order and decency,” as well 
on content that would be "in contradiction with the principles of Arab solidarity.”223 Pan-Arab 
media, by then had reached a level of maturation with private outlets having gained a large 
share of the airwaves and marginally larger operational independence. The charter was thus 
aimed at private satellite channels that were becoming overly critical of the Arab regimes.224 
It also attempted to regulate the proliferation of satellite television, which had been sprouting 
tens of stations of every ilk, under very few guiding principles. Furthermore, the charter also 
called for forbidding the ‘glorification of criminals’ and for producing content that runs 
counter to ‘norms and values of standards’ of Arab Society. In defense of the charter, media 
scholar Hussein Amin said: 
The Charter seeks to develop the quality of Arab satellite programming by 
prohibiting yellow journalism, opinion pieces disguised as news, violations 
of intellectual property rights, programs that promote terrorism, violence, 
hatred, or superstition, and other substandard practices. By basing the 
Charter on the best practices of television broadcasting regulation in the 
West and adapting these regulations for Arab society, it is hoped that this 
Charter will provide a foundation for developing a vibrant, diverse satellite 
television environment that broadcasts programs meeting world-class 
standards of journalism, entertainment, and public affairs.225 
 
Amin - who is also one of the authors of the Charter- qualifies his words by stipulating that 
its success would have depended on how every country attempts to implement it. The charter 
was presented to the world as being akin to many attempts globally to regulate broadcast 
media such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US, which regulates 
the type of content that may be broadcast. However, as Amin himself acknowledges, it is also 
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a reflection of “values and culture of Arab society.”226 As is the case in most of the region’s 
constitutions, the Charter also sanctifies the region’s rulers, by including clauses banning 
criticism of “cultural symbols or leaders of States” and for reflect a very narrow definition of 
‘Arab values’ in ways that seemingly conform more to the desires of the authoritarian 
regimes in power.227 The regional nature of this charter points to a supra- juridical attitude 
that seems to uphold the status-quo of regimes, more than that of the laws, which differ 
among most Arab countries.  
 
Organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists that have a first hand perspective 
of the nuances of such agreements, viewed the charter as a regional understanding whereby 
Arab governments give each other the authority to “sanction satellite channels which threaten 
national security, attack Arab leaders or broadcast material deemed socially unacceptable.228” 
The specter of AlJazeera’s critical news programs and variety of talk shows spreading to the 
Arab World played a large role in this legislation. Its Director General at the time, Waddah 
Khanfar, used it as an opportunity to pit his outlet as representing journalistic professionalism 
and media independence against a backdrop of authoritarian-led broadcasting.229 
 
The charter brought to light the general attitude of Arab states towards private broadcasting 
and its view that they must fall in line with a vaguely defined notion of “society” and “social 
norms.” These points are a common preamble for media policy in the region and are the 
source of commonalities among the differing media systems in the Arab World. The norms 
indicated-and how to implement them- would mostly be decided by the state and 
institutionalized in ways that would affect how practitioners within the field would operate. 
 
With numerous regional and local legislative and structural restraints looming above the 
heads of media practitioners, self-censorship would become a de-facto reality for those media 
outlets that continued to be tolerated by Arab regimes. Amin believed that while power 
structures play a roll in encouraging self-censorship, normative factors also play a role in the 
phenomenon:  
This pervasive fear of the political system enhances self-censorship, yet there 
is another factor involved, as well. Journalists seldom take full advantage of 
the marginal freedom provided by democratic change and the increasing 
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tolerance of the government. This almost cultural norm of protecting the 
government and the public through withholding information has contributed to 
a near inability of journalists to formulate a sustained political critique or 
opinion even if they wanted to.230 
 
As will be explored more thoroughly in the case of Egypt, legislation did play a major role in 
media development in the Arab world, however more importantly was the manner in which 
private media became institutionalized under the framework of the overall political economy 
in the country. These influenced what would be considered norms of the sector and where 
exactly the ‘red-lines’ that would not be crossed lay. The larger developments in each country 
would tacitly help nudge the sector in the direction the governments would approve 
organically when legislation was not in place to enforce these directions. The case of Lebanon 
as both a major influence over media in the region, while also being a structural anomaly 
helps highlight the role general context plays in the development of media systems.  
 
5) Lebanon’s exceptional and influential case in media developments 
 
Before the proliferation of satellite television, increased privatization and the expansion of 
neoliberal ideology across the Middle East, Lebanon had one of the earliest experiments with 
commercial television as well as a media system with diverse ownership, mostly owing to its 
particular political structure. “Up to the mid 1990s, except in Lebanon, the very notion of 
private television in the Arab World seemed no more than a figment of the business sector's 
imagination.231” This experience would factor into regional developments, especially through 
the transfer of expertise. Aside from their qualitative effect on regional media, the unique 
context of the Lebanese experience, provides an adequate control in proving the notion that in 
the Arab World, media is viewed as a crucial tool of power and that the development of 
media systems is directly informed by political and economic developments.  
 
Lebanon’s political power structure and make-up differed from the majority of other Arab 
countries since it had experienced a more pluralist political system, akin to a “political 
oligopoly.”232 The country’s 1943 National Pact enshrines pluralism, mostly between 
religious groups that are constitutionally granted predetermined representation in political 
office. A more dispersed and diverse power structure meant that the media systems would in 
turn form differently, creating a regional anomaly: 
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Lebanese media institutions do not fit the model of the third world (public 
sector ownership, usually by a government agency) or the West. Lebanese 
broadcasting has been at least partially owned and operated by government.233 
 
Lebanon became a space where media systems and outlets could experiment with different 
operational and editorial structures, albeit in a way that is still confined to the political power 
structure.   
 
The major daily newspapers were defined by both political and religious orientation.234 Mass 
media’s legacy in the country has been based on either business or politics, with the state 
generally pandering to these spaces, rather than attempting to control them outright. Media 
and power tend to converge in Lebanon with the state oligarchy constantly exerting its 
influence.235 Whereas “power” with reference to the press tended to mean political power, in 
broadcast television, individual economic power also became significant. 
 
Lebanon had been establishing private stations before any other Arabic speaking country had 
taken any major steps towards that goal. Two operating stations began particularly early: 
Compagnie de Television du Liban et du Proche Orient (CLT est. 1956) and Tele-orient (est. 
1959). CLT was initiated by two businessmen who proposed the establishment of a station 
financed by advertisement. Wissam Izzedine and Alex Arida, submitted an application that 
was granted after some trepidation. The government decided against allowing them a 
monopoly as the applicants had requested. CLT thus was the first commercial television 
station in the Arab world.236 
 
During Lebanon’s civil war, circumstances differed and the state decided that television was 
too important a symbol of national unity to remain in private hands. Civil war had also led to 
the shutting down of all television stations. By 1977 the state interfered directly for the first 
time in order to set-up Tele-Liban station. During the 1980’s warring factions began setting 
up their own pirate stations, with the tacit encouragement of the government.237 At the same 
time, newspaper distribution was greatly suppressed for the relatively well-educated 
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population, while radio and television would be able to bypass some of the issues that print 
faced.  
 
Prime Minister Rafiq ElHariri set a post-war, regional precedent by lifting the government's 
monopoly over programming and allowing for private terrestrial television ownership.238 The 
Civil War ended with the agreement in the Saudi town of Taif (The Taif Agreement) in 1991, 
which further institutionalized the consociational system agreed upon in the National Pact. 
Calls were made at this point to offer television licensing as a right, especially for the existing 
stations. As a result, businessmen and political groups hurried to legalize their stations, 
leading to a chaotic situation where 46 licensing applications for in for consideration.  
 
Private Sector Media Ownership and the Nexus of Lebanese Power 
The media oligarchy that formed reflected the relationship between the political oligarchy 
and the economic elite. By 1996 only four licenses were granted. They were to: The 
Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI, formerly LBC), which represented the 
Maronite Christians and whose shareholders included prominent members of the government; 
Future Television, representing the Sunni Muslims and owned by the then Prime Minister; 
Murr Television (MTV), representing the Greek Orthodox Christians and owned by the 
family of the Minister of Interior at the time; and The National Broadcasting Network 
(NBN), representing the Shiite Muslims and owned by the family and supporters of the 
Speaker of the House of Parliament.239 
   
In Lebanon Nabih Berri (speaker of the parliament at the time) acknowledged that television 
had been "monopolized" by members of the regime.240 At this moment in Lebanon, the media 
system was regulated as a sector containing clear commercial interests for its stake-holders, 
while maintaining its value as a tool for political factions to exert their influence.  
 
A 1994 media law had been newly introduced with the goal of regulating the sector from the 
licensing of outlets down to the output of content. It was to ostensibly limit any one person or 
group for gaining a disproportionate share of the market. The law restricted licenses to 
Lebanese nationals while also deeming that heads of news departments would also be locals, 
																																								 																				
238 Sakr (2007) 
239 Dajani (2001) 





out of fear of excessive influence from neighboring countries on local media.241 An owner’s 
share according to the law would be limited to 10% of the entire company. Spouses and 
direct family members were not allowed to separately buy out these shares. Individuals would 
not be allowed to own shares in other outlets. And as if they were running for public office, 
shareholders in national outlets would need to not have been convicted of crimes in the past. 
The law also regulated capital formation, revenue sources, financial viability and any transfer 
of ownership.242 
 
An independent regulatory body was to be formed in order to oversee the entire sector, called 
National Audio-Visual Media Committee (NAMC). The inspiration for this body came from 
its European counterparts such as the French Conseil Superieur de l’Audiovisuel. However, 
the independence of the NAMC was brought into question since the location of its main 
offices were to be in the Ministry of Information building. The manner in which members 
were appointed also raised doubts with five of the ten members of the NAMC being 
appointed by cabinet ministers and the other five are chosen by Parliament.243 
 
The Law did not prevent members of the same group from pooling their resources and start 
up the same stations together, hence the confessional layout of the media system244. Minority 
shareholders of an outlet who are of a different religious or political background to the 
majority owners do exist. However, they have been found to be ineffective in the overall 
outcome of the station, and are usually associates or business partners of the majority 
shareholding group.245  
 
Along with adhering to legal parameters set for permissible content, outlets tried to steer clear 
of red lines involving topics such as the military, foreign policy, Syrian influence/occupation 
in Lebanon and harsh criticism of individuals holding the highest political offices in the land. 
The NAMC tended to regulate and limit crossings of these lines, but Nötzold shows that 
some of the lines were crossed when the station had the backing of important political 
figures.246 
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Media systems for most countries in the region would exhibit private terrestrial stations as 
Lebanon did, but enduring traces of Lebanese media legislation could be found across the 
region, including Egypt. Furthermore, while most stations were clearly established as a 
means of soft-power influence for some groups, the audience-led spirit of many of its 
programming including news (but especially in entertainment) would serve as a guide for not 
only what is desirable, but what may be successful in a commercialized atmosphere.  
 
6) New markets and commercial opportunities 
 
Lebanon’s media system development had numerous spillovers in neighboring countries, this 
importantly includes a commercial model that would be highly influential in the development 
of new private media markets.  
 
Prior to the proliferation of private media across the around world, under the parameters of 
state-owned Arab media that Rugh called the mobilization press, media outlets found it 
difficult to generate revenue due to the constraints placed on them by existing in smaller, 
local markets as well as the constraints resulting from operating as sub-optimal government 
agencies. Jon Alterman believed in 1999 that with the expanding private and Pan-Arab 
media, market forces, rather than government policies would be more likely to define 
television development in the Arab World.247 This market itself seems to depend on a 
continued shift toward higher per-capita incomes and expanded patterns of consumption. As 
Alterman noted, if the media market grows, outlets would continue to experiment with 
content to draw more viewers. Arab viewers would likely see more sensational content, and 
political coverage would likely grow more daring, at least in the near and intermediate 
term.248 
 
One of the central figures in the Lebanese media market was Antoine Choueiri who saw the 
potential in broadcast and print media advertising. His advertising empire, the Choueiri 
Group which began in Lebanon and France (where he migrated to at the outbreak of the civil 
war in 1975) would see him later expand to a prime position in Lebanon and the Arab region. 
He would ultimately be seen as someone who single-handedly controlled the Arab world’s 
																																								 																				






advertising market for over 35 years.249  
 
Choueiri’s empire rested on the relations he had cultivated, especially within Saudi and 
Lebanese political circles, affording him access to contracts such as that of LBC Group and 
MBC. At its peak, the Choeiri group was representing nearly 26 satellite stations, 15 print 
titles and 9 radio stations.250 His means of monopolizing advertising markets and the great 
control that gave him over those markets, provided a model that would be emulated 
throughout the region, both pushing advertisers to control a significant portion of content and 
revenue. The group was constantly criticized for having a role –albeit undefined- in 
manipulating viewership numbers through the one source of media statistics in Lebanon at 
the time, Stat Ipsos, a company that was also based in France. Choueiri ultimately made his 
way to Egypt where he made an immediate impact, taking over AlHayat Network’s ads in 
2012. Such was the perceived impact of advertising agencies, that the AlHayat contract was 
attacked by many, including in an article by Youm7 newspaper (known for its ties to 
intelligence agencies) that pointed to Choueiri (a foreigner) as a having an unacceptable 
degree of influence, constituting a threat to the media sector and –implicitly- to national 
security:  
At a time when Egyptian satellite stations should be standing shoulder to shoulder 
with Egyptian advertising and marketing companies to face foreign companies 
attempting to invade Egyptian media, Sigma Media (the owner of Hayat Network) 
signed a contract with the Lebanese Choueiri Group, founded by its deceased 
owner Antoine Choueiri and run by his son Pierre.251  
 
This contract would be annulled in 2014, although the Group would remain in Egypt through 
other (Saudi-owned/funded) outlets. Choueiri’s clout in the private media industry afforded 
him a much larger role than that of a mere ad-salesman. Through his model of monopolizing 
media spaces, he offered states a means by which to manipulate media output indirectly 
through a third-party, the advertising agency.252 Antoine Choueiri seemingly didn’t shy away 
from his influence, apparently preferring to refer to himself as a “regulator” of the market and 
a crucial middleman.253  
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Choueiri Group and others like it undoubtedly entered the markets with the profit motive 
squarely in mind in such a potentially large Pan-Arab media market. However, Sakr, believed 
that despite the intuitive and rational prospect of the Arab region as a potentially highly 
profitable dynamic market, its full potential could not be realized due to the inability or lack 
of desire to allow for a better integration of the markets: 
The transnational pan-Arab market should be profitable for media by virtue 
of its size, but instead operates as a collection of disparate and sometimes 
obstructive national markets, several of whose governments are powerful 
enough to make their own unwritten political and legal demands on content 
that is intended to cross borders.254  
 
Ultimately, Arab media’s historic emphasis on political goals ahead of profit-making was 
shown to have continued into the satellite era in many cases. Furthermore, Pan-Arab private 
broadcasting also saw the introduction of media moguls, who despite their political 
allegiances and connections, did attempt to capitalize on the potential of these markets and 
introduced the concept of commercial media. This potential rested on the expanded ability for 
media to deliver audiences (by pooling from the entire region) for advertisers as a major 
function, rather than providing content and programming for the audience.255 
 
7) Effects on Egypt 
Arab and Pan-Arab media systems development are inextricable from developments with the 
private broadcasting media sector in Egypt.  Whereas Egypt’s printing presses and regional 
radio broadcasts have been on the vanguard of regional efforts, one could argue that the 
relationship was reversed with the proliferation of Arab satellite television stations in the 
1990’s given the profound effect it had on the subsequent development of Egyptian satellite 
stations. Politically, Arab regional private media development (including Egypt) were all 
somewhat dependent on the relationship between media owners and the central rulers. The 
advent of private Pan-Arab media outlets was accompanied by the emergence of these media 
owners, who would themselves come to symbolize the relationship between autocratic rulers, 
and the so-called independent media.  
 
The Egyptian market would see an influx of Arab media influence. Outlets initially recruited 
journalists and television hosts from these stations. Many of the individuals who went on to 
lay the foundations of private, satellite broadcasting would have gained their early experience 
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in one of the early Pan-Arab satellite broadcasters such as the MBC (Middle East 
Broadcasting Company), ART (Arab Radio and Television), AlJazeera News etc., usually to 
complement experience from within the ERTU. For those brought in to work in Egypt from 
one of the Pan-Arab companies based outside of the region, they were both welcomed for 
their experiences, but also perhaps ultimately hampered by them. As television talk-show 
host Liliane Daoud explans about her arrival to Cairo from years in London working with 
Arab News Network (ANN) and BBC Arabic.  
We were able to work in environments that were mostly removed from the 
pressures of working in the Arab World, despite sometimes being attached 
to stations with their own agendas. This led to many of us being able to 
develop professionally as journalists without that burden. In my case and 
others like me and Yosry (Foda)256 for example, it gave us an advantage. It 
also ended up being a slight culture shock when I did go work in Egypt.257 
 
Egyptian private satellite station proliferation came after the earlier Arab wave of the early 
and mid-1990s and as further chapters will show, the newer outlets out of Egypt would be 
influenced by its more established regional peers structurally, legislatively, commercially and 


















256 Foda hosted a program on OnTV, where Daoud worked.  





Chapter 3- Mass Media and Power in Modern Egypt (1798-1999) 
 
1) Introduction 
Throughout its recent history, political pragmatism has been the corner stone of the ruling 
regimes’ relationship with mass information mechanisms. Media systems were also affected 
by economic policy and performance, especially when it came to the ownership of outlets, or 
in the most common goals behind the establishment of outlets (commercial, political etc.). 
From a regulatory and administrative perspective, the priorities of each ruling cohort at 
different points in time directly reflect on the resultant structure of the sector. At times, these 
systems were developed and utilized primarily as tools for propaganda and political 
communication. The state often saw to it that institutions governing the sector would be 
dictated in a centralized manner out of necessity.  
 
Since the introduction of print newspapers in the late 1800’s, Egypt’s press has been 
imprinted with a legacy of attitudes and practices that resonated for at least the following 
century. Similarly, the introduction of audio-visual broadcast in 1960 has left its own 
indelible mark. Egypt’s mass media systems have been historicized by scholars and 
practitioners, but they typically have not delved deep analyzing the relationship between 
changes in the country’s political economy and media system developments. This chapter 
explores this history and concludes with the transformations in regulation and policy that set 
the scene for the proliferation of privately owned media at the turn of the 21st century amidst 
a general transition towards neoliberal policies, while remaining politically autocratic for the 
most part.  
 
Developments highlighted in this section do not constitute an exhaustive analysis of these 
manifestations as such, rather they provide reference points of major trends to aid in 
understanding media developments amid the growth of private media outlined in further 
sections.  
 
The status of Egypt’s political economy has arguably been in transition ever since The Free 
Officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952. During the long reigns of presidents Gamel Abdel-
Nasser (1956-1970), Anwar El-Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), 





republic have not followed clear, long-term visions. Economic policies had shifted greatly on 
more than one occasion as differing regimes ascribed to varied political ideologies. Some 
developmental policies and transitions within key institutions and organizations formed the 
building blocks of a more cohesive strategy, but more often than not they were byproducts of 
general modalities of governance and self-preservation associated with each regime. Policies 
were also consistently launched or repurposed to ensure regime sustainability.258 Economic 
agendas, were inconsistent as they also tended to be affected by various variables presented 
to successive governments; even if initially rooted in a foundational ideology or vision. In 
retrospect, since the dawn of the Egyptian republic, from a policy perspective, there have 
been very few constants, especially across regimes, something which had a heavy stamp on 
developments in the media systems. Still, some institutional factors did persevere.  
 
Media systems and major changes  
Media systems in Egypt have historically been either completely monopolized by the state or 
at the very least directed by it. A quick glance at the surrounding political-economic climate 
at different moments since the country’s turn to modernism, illuminate reasons behind these 
developments. As much as any other institution (and more so than most), mass media 
provided a near direct representation of the nature of each successive regime at its different 
stages. 
 
Webb notes that the modern sector in Egypt, cannot be isolated from its history: “Just as 
Russia's present-day media system might be characterized as being in some way "post-
Soviet" or perhaps "neo-Soviet", so should Egypt's post-2011 media be considered very tied 
to its past,”259. Going back to the birth of modern Egypt260, information dissemination 
mechanisms had been generally under the auspices of the central government, and were 
introduced to further their aims.  
 
In time, and after Egypt would become a republic, with military rules firmly in control, the 
attitude towards media would expand, as governments would see them as a soft power tool in 
regional politics. They would also begin treating the regulation of the sector as a whole as a 
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matter of national security. The nation moved from being under a highly centralized 
government and near total state-capitalism to a more nominally pluralized polity and 
liberalized economy that was still severely restricted by an autocratic mode of rule towards 
the end of the 20th century.261 Regional and global developments in media, technology and 
economic liberalization meant that Egyptian media, despite all existent restrictions within 
them, were liberalized much more quickly than the country’s politics, creating a paradox or 
friction with the state.262 Similarly, since Gamal Abdel-Nasser and until the early years of the 
Mubarak era, the sector also moved from being a tool of the state to be deployed at will to 
being a sector faced with an ambivalent attitude from the state that only resolved to curb its 
ability to rouse opposition sentiment.263 Against this backdrop, the private media sector 
developed under an aspiring neoliberal framework (from 1991 onwards). Print and broadcast 
media were opened to independent, private ownership at that point for the first time on a 
large scale.  
 
Private ownership at the time was a first for television, which was introduced in 1960 as a 
purely publicly-owned endeavor. Print on the other hand, had been around for much longer in 
Egypt, and enjoys a more diverse history, in terms of both ownership and structure, along 
with the role it played in society. Its history as a medium under the monarchy has noteworthy 
bearings on how print media progressed since Egypt became a republic. Unlike many media 
systems in the West, Egyptian media tended to operate within a meta-narrative of lofty goals. 
They were being consciously administered as purveyors of nationalistic sentiments. The 
“mission” of journalism was summarily conveyed as not just being a conduit of facts, but as a 
political pulpit. During periods of major transition, outlets were primed to shape public 
opinion by actively engaging in matters of public interest on behalf of the citizen, rather than 
in aid of the citizenry, conforming to Lippman’s view that in modern societies, journalists 
would be the watchdogs and generators of public opinion.264  This view has been consistent 
and pervasive in Egyptian media even as media systems differed in their constitution and 
regulation.  
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The following section will survey and analyze the political economy of mass media systems 
since the birth of “modern Egypt”. The long history of the press before the establishment of 
the Republic is something that was found to influence both state policy and attitudes towards 
the sector. Rugh notes that, “journalism is a fairly well respected profession in Egypt because 
of its long tradition and the fact that talented writers have devoted part or all of their careers 
to the press.” 265 
 
This tradition has been affected by political conditions that have rarely been static for long 
periods of time, and political economies that have also been constantly shifting. Along with 
it, the shape of media systems transformed, especially the press, ever since it appeared in the 
19th century.      
 
2) Print under the monarchy 
Over the past century, there have been very few instances of Egypt briefly experiencing a 
liberal or democratized wave, two characteristics of that are needed for the sustainable 
operation of critical and incisive print journalism. Yet for the most part, the expansion of 
print journalism during different periods in the country’s history were not as much 
byproducts of a planned liberalization of the press or a strengthening of democratic 
institutions, as much as they tended to come about as a result of momentary lapses in central 
governments’ absolute grips on society.  
 
Since emerging onto the public sphere for some of the first times in the 19th century, officially 
recognized news publications in the country have generally maintained a close relationship 
with politics and prevailing power dynamics by operating mostly within the framework of 
what would be deemed “patriotic” and in-line with broad goals set by the state. There were, 
however, moments when print journalism did veer from that maxim, largely due to shifting 
power dynamics.  
 
Literacy rates in Egypt were estimated to have been lower than 20% up until the 1952 
revolution, according to a 1947 census.266 Even with the introduction of the modern printing 
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press during the Napoleonic era,267 printed literature was thought to be something read and 
distributed among a restricted class of learned individuals, who tended to be better off 
economically. The rules that governed the elite classes, were thus mirrored in the rules that 
governed newspapers.  
 
The genesis of the first newspapers were within the halls of power. After invading Egypt in 
1798, Napoleon Bonaparte himself oversaw the first publications meant for relatively broad 
distribution, albeit in French: Courrier de l’Egypte a political journal that carried news to 
French troops around the country, and La Décade Egyptienne, a monthly social and scientific 
journal that published findings from an institute founded by the French the same year. 
Napoleon’s printing presses were fitted with Arabic letters and are thought to be behind the 
publication of the first Arabic print publication in 1800, AlTanbih, started by Ismail Khashab-
a renowned judge and scholar (d. 1815)- aiming to publish news of the Dawawin, or small 
arbitration courts. Despite being put in place by the French, Khashab is thought to be the first 
modern newsman in Egypt.268 
 
“The Necessary Magazines” 
AlTanbih lasted three years, with very limited impact. It wasn’t until modern Egypt had been 
established under the Albanian ruler Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-1847) that the concept of 
publishing news as an exercise in power, became prevalent. On 3 December 1828, AlWaqai’ 
(The Facts) became the first Egyptian paper269, as a periodical to be distributed “to all 
people,” containing major decisions and reports from the ruler. Realistically, it only reached 
powerful individuals, hand-picked for their influence as only around one-hundred copies 
were printed.  
 
Modern-day Egyptian governments continue to produce their versions of AlWaqai’ to 
announce presidential decrees and official changes in the law. It became the oldest running 
Arabic publication and was the real beginning of the Egyptian press as a mass medium. 
Ali’s immediate successors were not fond of the idea of a public press. Although, further 
down the line, Khedive Ismail270 (1863-1879), who had stated ambitions of turning Cairo and 
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Alexandria into European cities, felt more of a need to be accommodating to the concept due 
to the changes he intended to implement. In attempting to endear himself to his European 
benefactors by not resisting the emergence of mass media publications, Khedive Ismail 
opened a floodgate of opposition literature which included the dissemination of very critical 
news about his opulence and the corruption surrounding him. He had also created the first 
modern Egyptian representative assembly in 1866, the Shura Council of Representatives. 
This council was also the scene of great dissent against Ismail.271 
 
Ismail placed significant resources into AlWaqai’, ordering its editors to transform it into a 
more distinguished publication. He also sanctioned a further contingent of periodicals to 
focus on issues such as education, science and the military. Privately published newspapers 
were also sanctioned to be printed. Most of these aimed to promote the Khedive and his 
ambitions. 
 
At the time, a crumbling agricultural sector and suffering public finances and increasing 
foreign influence internally put the Khedive on dubious grounds, even amongst the country’s 
elite. In order to solve public debt, he allowed for more foreign control over Egypt’s finances, 
a trend punctuated by the appointment of River Wilson- a British economic advisor- to the 
position of Finance Minister in 1878. Just three years earlier, the British and the French 
signed the Cave Commission, allowing them dual control over Egypt. Ismail’s power was 
slipping, as he was seen to be complicit in what was the precursor to the 1882 British 
occupation of Egypt.272   
 
The precipitation of publications under him turned out to be a double-edged sword for Ismail. 
Around the same time, the concept of the “popular press” began to emerge, from outside his 
direct control. Three factors led to this phenomenon: 1) A dissatisfied Egyptian elite; 2) The 
introduction of the concept of media and the press as an active form of critique; 3) Reactive 
intellectual activity and identity-building.273 
 
The most famous of these publications was Abu Nazarah Zarqa, an illustrated satirical 
periodical published by theatre impresario Yacoub Sanu’. It focused on criticizing the 
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Khedive and condemning corruption, foreign intervention, and the oppressive taxes being 
levied against the poor at the time, especially the peasants. Sanu’ was an Italian-educated 
playwright, whose father served as an advisor to members of the royal family. Concerned 
with promoting nationalist ideas amid increased foreign intervention, he was often at odds 
with the status quo. After having a play shut down for that very reason, and after consulting 
with figures such as Jamal ElDin Al-Afghani274, he turned to the press in 1878.  
 
Sanu’ was printing at one point 3,300 copies of his periodical, when the more popular 
publications were rarely printing over 1,000. He used it as a mouthpiece, not only for himself, 
but for other like-minded people. Media historian Ibrahim Abdo called publications such as 
this, majallat aldaroora (necessary magazines), bred from the turmoil and upheaval of the 
moment.275 Abdo was also referring to the sudden increase in publications. Nationalist, 
Islamist and liberal thinkers decided to use the power of the press as a means to cement their 
concept of nationhood, patriotism and identity at a time when both the state and society were 
undergoing major transformations. Between the looming European presence, the still 
palpable Ottoman past, and local leaders sensing shifting power dynamics, the press was the 
ideal platform for a constant exchange and proliferation of these ideas276.  
 
Only the rich, and the emerging bourgeoisie were able to bankroll these papers and gain 
access to the presses. Financing was down mostly to the whims of funders and whether or not 
they were able to charge for their publications, which rarely exceeded a few pages. Selling 
advertisements, or building sustainable business models for papers were uncommon.277 
 
This period also saw the founding of AlAhram newspaper in 1876 by the the Takla Brothers, 
who were Lebanese immigrants.278 Unlike the majority of the other papers printed at the time, 
AlAhram was not selling a specific ideology. Rather it was run as a newspaper concerned 
with public interest stories, and society pages such as the obituaries.279 AlAhram was a 
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pioneer in creating a more sustainable business model, incorporating ad sales as well as issue 
sales into its revenue stream. As the second oldest running news publication in the Arab 
World (the first being AlWaqa’) it became iconic. Its longevity was perhaps due to its 
relatively benign and uncontroversial nature early on, followed by politically astute 
transformations later in its future. Egyptian novelist Tawfiq ElHakim once quipped that 
“AlAhram’s life, is in fact Egypt’s life.” While the writer may have been referring to the 
content and archival value of the paper, its structural and editorial transformations through 
the years also reveal a fair amount about the political and societal shifts that have occurred 
during the period of its existence. Its beginnings certainly coincided with a rare period of 
emergent, diverse press. 
 
The end of Khedive Ismail’s reign also marked the end of a more open atmosphere for 
publications and the beginning of an often predictable trend of media regulation as well 
expanded caveats governing the overall relationship between journalism and the Egyptian 
state across different regimes. 
 
Press Wars 
After Ismail’s abdication (at the behest of the British) in 1879. His successor and son Tawfiq 
(1879-1892), seemingly learned the lesson and put in place the kind of regulatory atmosphere 
that would become commonplace in the future of Egyptian media systems.  
 
The first Publications Law was pronounced in 1881 stipulating that authorities had the right 
to close down or confiscate any paper if it violated the principles of “public order, religion or 
morals.280” Media regulations from then on would employ similarly vague laws, allowing for 
an elastic interpretation by the ruling cohort.  
 
Despite this regulatory first, it would be difficult to rein back the forward momentum of 
critical journalism, especially with the emergence of the Urabi281 revolt. The press was front 
and center as a tool of pro-revolution forces. After the British occupation became a fait-
accompli in 1882, Ahmed Urabi was exiled along with many of the revolutionary newspaper 
editors, including Sanu’ and Abdullah Alnadeem, whose paper AlTai’f became a potent 
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mouthpiece for nationalist forces. Those that were not shutdown, were subject to censures, 
fines, and security crackdowns282. AlAhram, after becoming vested in the anti-occupation 
movement, became one of the only important nationalist papers remaining on the scene in the 
mid-1880s.283  
 
During this period, newspaper publications were relatively accurate reflections of political 
and intellectual activity. When activism on these fronts experienced a notable lull in the early 
stages of the British occupation, press censorship became less stringent. Historian Ahmed 
Hamroush summarized this notion poignantly: 
The shock from ‘the occupation’ after the Urabi revolt led to a sharp decrease in 
popular and effective political activity, as well as the isolation of the intellectuals 
and the draw back of political struggles… And so, Lord Dufferin was no longer 
interested in shackling the press.284 
 
Perhaps as a result of the subversive effects of the press in the previous period and seeing the 
effects of mass media on public opinion and the proliferation of nationalist ideals, many 
papers continued to print, with a focus on societal issues-especially education- and in 
attempts to reinforce issues of local identity. This was in direct response to the British 
Occupation, which according to historians attempted to dilute the notion of “Egyptianness.” 
Lord Cromer285 had reportedly suggested cancelling the Egyptian citizenship requirement for 
legislation while also forming a local representative council that allowed non-Egyptian 
participation.286 Besides the cultural effect of the press, a few political activists tried to revive 
the revolutionary effect of a nationalist press. With this in mind, Moustafa Kamel Pasha, a 
lawyer, aristocrat and activist who lead anti-occupation movements in the early 20th century 
solicited funding to start a more aggressive, short-lived political newspaper, AlLiwa.287 
 
Ironically, the British occupation also helped spur the development of journalism and the 
press as an industry. Cromer himself is often quoted by Egyptian and Arab historians288 as 
arguing for increased press freedom by saying, “If you placed the lid on a boiler it is bound to 
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explode, however if you let the steam free, the boiler is guaranteed to remain intact.289”  
 
Capital was increasingly important. Businessmen understood the utility of newspapers as a 
tool of influence. With their capital new technologies were introduced such as the rotary 
press. New forms of graphic design were brought in as well-especially by AlAhram- in the 
early 20th century leading to the emergence of excessively large, eye-grabbing headlines and 
attractive production.  AlLiwa and AlAhram were the first to register as shareholding 
companies in 1906, around which time, the journalistic profession was rapidly developing.290 
 
One of the more interesting phenomena of this period was the emergence of political parties 
from within the press establishment, rather than the other way around. From Al-Liwa, Kamel 
launched his National Party; AlJareedah, was founded by another nationalist leader and 
revolutionary, Ahmed Lotfi ElSayyed who was also a founder of the Ummah Party.291 While 
there are other examples, the general trend pointed to the profound importance of the press at 
this point as the vanguard for political and social ideology as well as being an important 
battleground in the anti-occupation struggle. The British colonial administration saw the 
importance of the press during this period. After several unsuccessful attempts to co-opt 
existing publications such as AlAhram to cast a positive light on their policies, they were able 
to encourage the publishers of existing scientific and literature journals, to create 
AlMuqattam292, a daily political newspaper that would become the unofficial mouthpiece of 
the British occupation in the Egyptian public sphere. It was their way of “fighting journalism 
with journalism.”293 
 
After World War I, many of the surviving papers that were still critical of British Occupation 
were ultimately shut down in the aftermath of the war and the outburst of the 1919 revolution 
led by Saad Zaghloul, a leader of the Wafd political party. Martial  Law was declared at this 
time and print publications were largely limited. 
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In 1922 Egypt’s status as a British protectorate ended, and the following year, the 1923 
Constitution came about allowing for more broad political participation as well as for a free 
press. Political parties began to once again expand and competing ideologies emerged, 
spanning various political and religious views. Each cohort of the polity began to publish 
their own newspapers, many of which were highly critical of the status quo.  
 
Between 1931 and 1935, new strict regulations were put in effect294, reinstating the 1881 law 
and placing old restrictions requiring an official permit for activity, rather than merely 
notifying of a new publication.  The revised laws also set restrictively high fees to obtain the 
permit, creating a precedent that would be replicated again the next time private, independent 
press was allowed nearly 70 years later.  
 
Despite martial law being announced once again during WWII, the period following the war 
witnessed another era of press proliferation, with almost 100 privately funded newspapers 
and magazines in circulation.295 Public opinion at the time was stimulated by a plethora of 
local and regional issues that drove sentiment and caused a stir in political and social 
activism, which will be discussed below. Akhbar AlYoum (est. 1944) was established around 
then. It was similar to AlAhram in that it was also founded by consummate “newsmen,” 
Moustafa and Ali Amin. Rather than focusing solely on editorializing their content, they also 
focused on providing news. Unlike many in the business, the Amin brothers were also 
concerned with maintaining a sustainable and commercially viable paper.296  During that 
volatile period, they understood the importance of putting forth politicized nationalistic 
discourse that would make their publication more relevant. Like AlAhram, the paper would 
be one of the few brands in the press to survive the political and social vicissitudes in the 
decades to come. 
 
The development of “journalism” 
Developments in market infrastructure helped create an environment that allowed for the 
journalistic profession to develop. Audiences had grown to the point where career journalists 
could dedicate more time to their craft. Nuances of the market dynamics itself had shifted in 
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ways that would see the sector transition into being more mature and established.297 The 
institutionalization of print media as an industry that may be regulated by the state, but not 
necessarily owned by it would resonate in the sector’s future and factor into discourse 
surrounding the fate mass media through future processes of both nationalization and 
privatization.  
 
The Journalists Syndicate298, which was first convened in 1941 was growing in stature, 
creating differing problems for governments attempting to protect the monarchy.  For 
decades it would enjoy an aura of perceived power, and at times perceived autonomy. 
Journalists’ jobs were of increasing importance, not merely in so far as they pertained to 
political and ideological propaganda, but in providing actual news that informed, rather than 
being pure propaganda pieces.  Furthermore, the government decided to play an active role in 
production of certain publications by subsidizing printing paper imported from Italy that was 
to be used for newspapers.  
 
Some of the newspapers established in the period between the bookends of the the 1923 
Constitution and the 1952 Revolution maintained their presence in the Egyptian mediascape, 
even after the press was completely nationalized. During this era, journalism was once again 
galvanized, following the crackdown preceding the constitutional changes. Politics and the 
thought-leading role of journalists, as well as a more robust market infrastructure both 
contributed to this, along with the sustained calls for decreased foreign influence in the 
country generally.299 A deteriorating economy and disillusionment with the integrity of party 
politics and the monarchy helped maintain the critical posture of many journalism 
professionals. Along with a rejuvenation of journalists, these factors also sparked the 
mobilization of many political cohorts to take action. Notably orthodox Islamic movements 
as well as Marxist-inspired leftist writers were highly visible in this front. Egypt’s military 
involvement in Palestine (1948) in response to the announcement of the creation of an Israeli 
state had provided an opportune moment for a rallying call, which ultimately provided for a 
watershed moment for mass media in October 1950. Rose Al-Yousif300-a weekly paper 
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established by the eponymous actress in 1925 that had become a leading political publication- 
broke news of faulty weapons being supplied to Egyptian troops during the ‘Arab-Jewish 
War’, explaining the Egyptian defeat. Ehsan AbdelKudous, the paper’s editor-and-chief put 
the news out himself.  
 
The veracity of the so-called “arms scandal” was later questioned with AbdelKudous 
reportedly admitting that he had embellished the story to galvanize the troops as the only 
viable unifier within the country at a moment of low morale for them.301 Yet this story has 
been credited for doing just that, as well as playing a major part in the internecine political 
struggles that weakened the Wafd Party-dominated government and parliament and the 
already weakened palace.  
 
Attempts by the ruling cohort to stifle the press had also intensified. In 1950, Prime Minister 
Ismail Sirag El-Din proposed a law allowing him to censure journalists for the mere suspicion 
of political opposition (and bias).302 This was to no avail and journalists continued to play a 
pivotal role in stoking the flames of public opinion against the ruling party and the palace, 
while having substantial lobbying influence on politicians’ attempts to pass laws and engage 
in international treaties.303  
 
It was also most probably the moment in the history of modern Egyptian mass media, when 
the security establishment, (which had eventually come into power in 1952 through the 
military) understood most palpably the role media could play in mobilizing the country to 
change in a powerful and profound way. The ruling establishment would from then on 
provide a place of particular importance on how they regulated mass media and utilized them 
as tools, in ways that was more nuanced than “censorship vs press freedom.”  
 
Starting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, governing regimes learned lessons of suppression and 
censorship and tethered it to the need to control the means of production and ownership 
structure in ways that would best serve the regime.  
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Broadcasting before the Republic 
Television had not yet been introduced to the Egyptian markets before The Free Officers 
came to power in 1952. However, for nearly three decades, radio broadcasting had already 
played a significant factor in the country’s mediascape. Like television, radio provided a 
more direct and efficient mode of accessing the masses, be it for political or commercial 
purposes. It was also a way of direct communication to a population that until the mid-20th 
century had a population that was roughly 80% illiterate.304 These characteristics, and radio’s 
legacy greatly informed the way the Free Officers would approach audio-visual mass media.  
 
Radio was initially introduced in 1923, mostly by non-Egyptians for commercial purposes. 
They had benefited from the relatively lax approach the British had towards mass-media 
production in general. At the same time, the novelty of Radio in local markets meant that the 
state was also ill-prepared to immediately tackle the regulatory issues posed by the new 
technology.  
 
Until 1931, Radio broadcasts were run as small, competing commercial operations, when 
private broadcasting was banned.305 The Minister of Communications then was able to reach 
an agreement to reintroduce radio broadcasting based on a deal with the British Marconi 
Company for Wireless and Telegraph, granting it a ten-year monopoly license and 60% 
entitlement of licensing fees. The Egyptian Broadcasting Service began emissions in 1934, as 
a national, apolitical service. British domination of the airwaves was reflected in the 
prohibition of any criticism of Great Britain during World War II. Radio service out of Egypt 
was essentially run both as part of British colonial services as well as local broadcasting.306 
Calls to “Egyptianize” radio in the press ran parallel to growing nationalistic sentiments. 
Parliament passed a law in 1949 delegating control over broadcast media to the President of 
the council of ministers. The law also banned broadcasting political controversies, while 
requiring broadcasts to focus on national pride, traditions, education, entertainment and 
providing news.307 
 
The 1952 coup by the Free Officers that removed the monarchy, provided the real impetus for 
the expansion of radio as a government tool. As the state had already come to control the 
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means of radio production and broadcast, the Free  Officers had almost immediately 
identified the utility of radio in their endeavor and repurposed it as a means to speak to the 
masses and consolidate their victory in as far-reaching a manner as possible.308 Radio would 
become one of Nasser’s most potent tools, not only locally, but in furthering his regional 
ambitions. When television broadcast was introduced eight years later, radio would have 
provided the blueprint upon which it would be regulated.  
 
3) Nasser and the Free Officers: Switching mindsets and institutions 
Adapting and engineering a new reality 
The legacy of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Free Officers exhibited especially enduring 
characteristics and institutions that would define the future of the Republic in various areas, 
media system development was no exception. The implementation of his political and 
economic agendas could still be felt over half a century after his death. “Nasser laid down the 
foundation of the patron state. His successors could not change them even if they wished, 
without risking their political survival.”309 Ultimately, the mode of governance created by the 
Free Officers was integrative, holistic, and deeply centralized. It was also wrought with built-
in inefficiencies, that would manifest during the latter years of Nasser’s rule. Power dynamics 
in the military would shift and devolve into direct conflict as a direct consequence of his 
policies. Meanwhile, Nasser’s developmentalist policies, built on State Capitalism with 
massive infrastructure projects and overly ambitious military expansion, would lead to 
crippling public debt. 
The Free Officers were able to execute a well-organized coup to depose the monarchy in July 
1952. However, they were left with the dilemma of governing a country in transition. This 
transition was not merely political- from a monarchy to a republic- but it involved a 
reorganization of society, anchored by a shift in economic policy. Nasser was at the helm of 
the massive societal and institutional shifts that would help define the republic for decades. 
The Free Officers had a broad idea of the kind of society they wanted, but were often 
criticized for lacking a clear vision as to the specific techniques and policies needed to 
achieve these ideas in the long term.310  
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When it came to an economic agenda, they introduced one of the most consistent caveats 
throughout the country’s modern history: the state will always play an active and dominant 
and nearly autocratic role in society and in economic development.311 Efforts to introduce a 
state-led industrialization drive prior to 1952 were thwarted due to the divergent interests of 
the landed elite, large landowners, and the British with their continued military presence after 
Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922.312 Restructuring of Egypt’s political and 
economic power structures opened the door to the ruling regimes becoming the primary agent 
within the country for decades.  
The 1952 coup occurred on the backdrop of an armed forces that grew in political stature, as 
the parliamentary system along with the monarchy were proving unable to convincingly steer 
the country in the direction of either economic prosperity or enhanced political sovereignty. 
The end of the monarchy prompted the ushering in of a new era in Egypt where political 
supremacy lay squarely in the hands of the military establishment, and mass media became -
in the eyes of the state- a matter of “national security” as much as anything.  
Broadcast journalist and TV host, Yosri Foda believes the principles set forth by Gamal 
Abdel-Nasser outlining how the Egyptian state views the media continued to prevail in the 
subsequent decades despite the differing economic and political policies in the country and 
the transforming political economy of media systems since that era. “The state always saw 
the media as a means through which it could exert its control over the people. The militaristic 
attitude towards the media always underpinned the state’s attitude towards them”.313 Foda 
pointed to the Nasser era as the progenitor of government apparatuses and norms that would 
place the institutions of mass media as de-facto arms of the state, “facilitating their rule.” He 
continued to feel the direct effects of this approach while working in private Egyptian 
broadcasting in the 2010’s.  
When the Free Officers took control they did not seem to have an immediate plan for mass 
media, especially the press. Martial Law had been introduced on 26 January of the same year 
when riots lead to the Great Cairo Fire, which was marked by the burning and looting of over 
750 buildings. The events of the day were sparked by the killing of Egyptian policemen by 
British troops. Despite Martial Law being in effect, the instability of both the monarchy and 
the government meant that the press was also experiencing a period of uncertainty. Although, 
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by the time the 23 July 1952 Coup had taken place, the military (represented by The Free 
Officers) were generally portrayed as being Egypt’s only hope by a press corps that had its 
fair share of anti-palace and anti-British operatives.314 
Nationalization of the press was not high on the list of priorities, as it was a sector that was 
already favorably inclined to the country’s new rulers. Furthermore, the British-imposed 
martial law of 1939 already gave Nasser a functioning mechanism to censor the press at will. 
As the de facto leader of the Free Officers, he provided the most push back for democratizing 
initiatives. In the years following the Coup, Nasser believed that “at [that] stage democracy 
can create economic problems.”315 
The institutional legacy of this era would remain quite potent for decades to come. In some 
areas, it was ever-present and superseded any ideological or methodical differences 
successive regimes may have had with The Officers, and Nasser specifically. Most notably, it 
created a securitized state allowing the military leadership to directly and autocratically push 
forth with its goals, with minimal reference to public opinion or to representatives of the 
population at large or the constituents in reference. The monarchy, on the other hand, needed 
to contend with some civilian and global factions. Nasser believed others were to blame for 
the autocracy of the Free Officers. In his memoir Falsafat Althawra (Philosophy of the 
Revolution), he simultaneously called for popular inclusivity in governance and structures of 
power, while lamenting the lack of a unified voice. He goes on to insinuate that it was the 
inaction of the civilian factions and centers of social and political leadership that led to “the 
Officers” remaining at the helm of the revolutionary process as the “vanguards of progress” 
after the initial drive of 23 July, 1952. It was a process that had grand regional and local 
aspirations.  
Media and structures of control 
Policies of The Free Officers in governance suggested a clear preference for military brass 
and a tentative (often distrustful) view towards civilians, as evidenced by the  placement of 
officers at the helm of the most crucial positions.316 However, in order to implement the 
social transformation they sought, agencies and institutions would have to be created and/or 
altered in ways that would not only reshape the social contract, but also help garner 
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consensus and public fanfare for highly ambitious plans. The way the new rulers created their 
structures of societal control had a direct bearing on how media would ultimately be 
structured, organized, and regulated in the way they came to be.  
After the dissolution of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in 1956, the National 
Union was formed in order to create a structure through which citizens participate directly 
towards achieving the revolution’s goals. It was in fact, an attempt to create a populist front 
(rather than a party) through which the state could reach the citizenry and mobilize them 
quickly.317 All Egyptians would be required to take part. The NU would be replaced by the  
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962, Nasser’s most enduring attempt to create a popular 
political packaging system. Its establishment coincided with the earnest launching of a 
“socialist” transformation.318 The ASU, would be an omnipresent political force to contain all 
of society and coax them into specific action. It was also charged with mobilization and 
catering to state goals generally. Many of the state’s politicization attempts were 
characterized by acute efforts at mass mobilization and control of society, especially by 
annexing the role and functionality of interest groups to be contained within the state’s 
patronage. Ayubi described the ASU as a “bureaucratization of political and associational life 
(the ‘political party’, the trade unions, the professional syndicates, the Islamic ‘clergy’, 
etc.).319”   
Similarly, information and mass media were bureaucratized. Rather than regulating this space 
with laws alone, the Free Officers established The Ministry of National Guidance to organize 
communication issues in 1952. This was a precursor to the Ministry of Culture and National 
Guidance, established in 1958 with the more pointed aim of organizing informational 
campaigns in the internal and external spheres and pulling together scattered committees and 
special administrations for art, radio, information and publishing.320 
In 1954, the Free Officers had briefly lifted the press censorship policy imposed in 1939, only 
to re-impose it one month later, after the first major confrontation between Nasser and 
members of the press. Many journalists had criticized the regime’s policies out of their 
disillusionment with the seemingly undemocratic direction the country was taking in the 
context of the struggle between Mohamed Naguib, the highly decorated figurehead and elder 
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statesman of the Free Officers, and Nasser who was the group’s actual leader and founder, 
pulling the strings with authority behind the scenes. Naguib supported a swift return to 
civilian rule under democratic institutions, while Nasser and the majority of the Free Officers 
feared for the fate of the revolution, opting to remain in power for a longer interim period.321 
Ultimately, 1954 was the first post-revolutionary watershed moment, not just for the Free 
Officers, but for institutions such as the country’s media system, which had yet to be 
addressed with a massive plan.  
Journalists at that time were warned against “spreading suspicion and doubts about the 
Revolution.”322 One such case was that of Mahmoud Abul-Fatah, publisher of the Wafdist 
paper, AlMisri. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison (in absentia), while the license for 
his paper was revoked. Abul-Fatah had been openly calling for a return to a parliamentary 
system and party politics, although Nasser-confidant, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal says that 
his criticism of the president could be traced back to the latter’s refusal to grant him massive 
arms and transportation contracts.323 Curiously, on March 7 of 1954 (before censorship was 
re-imposed and before Abul-Fatah received a verdict in this case), Nasser raised concerns that 
the prosecution of Abul-Fatah may evoke questions over freedom of the press, in a meeting 
recounted in the memoirs of Abdullatif Al-Baghdadi324 (a member of the Free Officers). 
According to the memoirs, Nasser genuinely believed in a free press until that point.   
Initially, the charges against Abul-Fatah had been restricted to allegations that he had 
committed fraud in obtaining additional subsidies to print illegally. The sentence, doled out 
by a revolutionary tribunal had at first been restricted to fines.  At that specific moment in 
time, at the height of the 1954 crisis and for a brief period, Nasser had still planned on 
utilizing private newspaper owners to further his own aims, which may explain why he 
negotiated a relaxed payment scheme for Abul-fatah, despite protests from within the 
Revolutionary Council.325 Abul-Fatah himself had been prominent in the development of 
modern journalism in Egypt as the first head of the Journalists Syndicate as well as being a 
prominent politician.326 
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On the same day that Nasser negotiated on his behalf (7 March 1954), he held a press 
conference to remind journalists “that the Armed Forces has become a principal factor in 
affecting politics in the country.”327 He had also instructed these journalists to steer clear of 
mentioning the discord from within the Revolutionary Council. Briefly during that year, it 
seemed as if the relationship between Nasser and a private press would be viable. But it 
would have to be predicated on their loyalty and obedience to the would-be president, as 
Abul-Fatah would later find out when choosing to side with Naguib.328  
The end of the 1954 crisis, and the triumph of the Nasserite wing of the Free Officers, 
marked another watershed moment for the future of mass media in Egypt. It would be a 
departure in a direction that would take hold for decades to come. Military leaders who would 
end up at the helm of the country’s politics would consistently adhere to the belief that the 
Egyptian people would not be ready for “freedoms” in the broader sense, and were always 
skeptical, or hostile of a media system that they could not control.  
In a heated discussion about the length of a transitional period (of military rule) at the height 
of the 1954 crisis, Nasser said, “our people cannot correctly appreciate their own best interest 
immediately, and maybe three years (transition) is not enough. Our people cannot withstand 
the burdens of freedom.329” The real result of such a perspective is that since 1952, Egypt had 
been in a constant state of “transition,” having rarely had a period of five or more years free 
from shape-shifting turmoil whether due to internal or external factors. Between 1967 and 
2011 Egypt had almost constantly been under “emergency law,” which allowed for the 
official suspension of many constitutional rights while facilitating censorship on all levels. 
Whether the Free Officers saw mass media as a tool that should be indentured to the state at 
all times, or as a security threat that must be heavily monitored and kept on a tight leash, the 
media system in place was seen as one that would require a specifically nuanced approach. 
Over the backdrop of a relatively rich history of both subversion and obsequiousness, the 
press -and to a lesser extent the fledgling airwaves- provided the up and coming republic with 
both opportunities and challenges. The new Revolutionary Council acted quickly to establish 
its rule under its true figurehead Nasser. 330 However, the absence of a clear vision moving 
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forward made the regime all the more susceptible to the established subversive characteristics 
of Egyptian press.  
The state officially takes over 
Aside from enforcing direct censorship on papers, the regime initially took towards 
expanding government-run media in an attempt to control the narrative. Between 1952 and 
1957 new press organs emerged under these pretenses. AlTahrir magazine was issued in 1952 
by the Officers, although it was promptly closed down in 1953 after being deemed a failure 
for its inability to have the desired effect on society. AlGomhoriya, was soon thereafter 
launched on 7 December 1953. AlGomhoriya would be the most enduring of papers 
established at this time, remaining in circulation for decades, and growing to include its own 
publishing house and distribution services. AlShaab (another daily) and AlMasaa, an evening 
paper were also established in 1953 and 1956 respectively331. Despite the relative success of 
AlGomhoriya and AlMasaa, governmental support in establishing these papers was still not 
enough to allow them to compete with established, privately owned powerhouses such as 
AlAhram and AlAkhbar.  
 After consolidating his power as President and gaining immense popularity on the heels of 
the 1956 Tripartite aggression and Suez Canal Nationalization, under Nasser, the Free 
Officers’ power became absolute, and Nasser became a national symbol for public adulation. 
His regime instituted a more direct censorship system and created “The Office for Censorship 
over Publications” in the Ministry of National Guidance. Editors and Chief would be 
summoned to this office and given “advice” while being communicated to with regards to the 
government’s plans as well as how they should report them. Leading newspapers would not 
be immediately convinced to act as direct propaganda for the new revolutionary policies, 
which the Officers’ saw as a necessary precursor to the coming period of “socialist 
transformation” of 1960. This hesitance had a direct effect on the government’s decision of 
“reorganizing” the press. 
These developments would lay down the groundwork for the state’s ultimate decision to not 
only control media output, but completely annex the media establishment under its fold. Mass 
media would be conscripted to serve in furthering Nasser’s plans.  
 
																																								 																				





Media, mobilization and “freedom from the shackles of capitalism” 
Not only were the Free Officers and Nasser engaged in internal and external power struggles, 
but over this period Nasser had also begun to slowly create a more concrete foundation 
towards building a brand of socialism that would become a defining characteristic of his rule. 
The same belief that would feed the resistance to Naguib’s desire to transition more quickly 
from a state of revolution into a more established parliamentary democracy, would be the 
driving force behind this approach. Changing Egypt’s leadership would not be enough, rather 
what was sought was a profound transformation in both power relations and institutions. This 
was clear in the group’s early mission to upend the stranglehold of the landed bourgeoisie by 
implementing the first phase of Agrarian Reforms in 1952. These reforms limited land 
ownership with the goal of radically altering power relations in society.332 Despite the 
delayed actualization of his vision, it was clear from the outset that Nasser would be 
distrusting of the public to play an independent role in this transformation. 
 In “The Philosophy of the Revolution,” Nasser talks of his “shock” at the inaction of the 
general public after the announcement of the 1952 coup. He claims to have thought that after 
the military’s initial push in overthrowing the monarchy, there come a “Holy March” of  
unified society pushing together for a common, greater goal.333 Instead he speaks of 
“scattered” and “divided” groups that showed up, actually stalling hopes of achieving this 
“greater goal”.334  
Based on these memoirs, Nasser’s dismay at the lack of a uniform, working class public –
spoken of in militaristic terms as ‘brigades’- would justify his decisions, so long as they are 
part of a push towards his goals. “If peasants and workers were ever to serve as the lever for 
the regime to effect change, Nasser and his colleagues would have to build the vehicles to 
motivate and sustain their mobilization.”335 Attempts to overhaul institutions were piecemeal 
until 1960 as he was getting ready to launch his first Five Year Plan.  
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Despite his own success in consolidating political power, Nasser still felt constantly let down 
by the press. Even though it had been mostly censored, the press corps still avoided complete 
subservience.336 
A security-oriented ethos had come to dominate priorities in political decision-making as well 
as the overall power structure at the heart of the successive regimes ruling from Cairo.337 The 
government’s assessment of press corps performance and function would be made primarily 
with regard to its overall utility to the central authority’s plans. A secondary qualitative 
assessment of their roles in providing, information, analysis and cultural value would still 
factor in, to ensure the potency of this soft power tool. The relationship between mass media 
and the central authorities would begin shifting from one of regulation to outright control.   
“At this time, Nasser felt the press must be controlled to take part in the process of social and 
economic transformation and in liquidating the interests of privileged groups.”338 Ideas that 
had been percolating regarding socialism, centralized government and five-year plans began 
to manifest in more concrete terms as the state tightened its grip on society. Accordingly, the 
regime had also taken drastic decisions on what type of mass media would be allowed and 
how they could be organized. In his memoir Bayn AlSahafa w Al Siyasa (Between Journalism 
and Politics), Mohamed Hassanein Heikal recounts Nasser’s words on the day he told him of 
his intention to nationalize the media: 
We are approaching profound social transformations in Egypt and there is no 
alternative to public control over capital and factors of production… I cannot 
logically nor justly impose social control on the economy and let some 
individuals control the media…The coming phase of social transformation 
requires complete social mobilization.339 
Nasserist “Socialism” 
Egypt had almost completely transitioned into the Officers’ own brand of Socialism by 1963. 
This had come about after years of incremental measures and failed attempts to encourage 
private and foreign investment initially after the 1952 coup. During this period, the press 
would definitively become annexed under the state’s operational control, a long with many 
other sectors of production. 
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Economic planning was a mainstay of Nasserist ideology. It was inextricably tied to political 
goals as well. Land reform for example, one of the earliest implemented policies (and the 
most consistently applied), reduced the ceiling of land-ownership, thereby distributing control 
of land and empowering peasants. It also allowed the government to immediately neutralize 
the land-owning elite, whose share of total land ownership decreased from 20% to around 
6%.340  
By 1960 -when the first full five-year plan came into effect- the developmentalist model took 
on a more defined shape, especially in the non-agricultural sectors. After the first five-year 
plan (1960/1961-1964/1965), manufacturing was receiving more public funds than any other 
sector and its share of national output increased from 19% to nearly 22%.341 By then the 
public sector controlled over 90% of both total non-agricultural output domestically and gross 
domestic capital formation. The first five-year plan was also considered a success in creating 
over one million jobs and growing industry at 9% annually.  
Despite claims to socialism, the political-economic system employed by Nasser came to be 
defined by some as ‘state capitalism,’ which Cooper defines as: 
… a nationalistic reorientation of economic resources through moderate 
agrarian reform, nationalization of basic industries, centralization of finance, 
and an expansion of social services… Societies remain capitalistic, in spite of 
the expanding role of the state.342  
These characteristics, Cooper argued, were present in Egypt at the time when a domineering 
state-centered interest emerged. Society in-turn, had been shifted to rely more heavily on the 
state. Some social scientists and economists refuse this attribution mainly due to their belief 
that Egypt did not exhibit basic hallmarks of capitalistic economies, such as free competition 
or the profit motive.343  
However, state capitalism does provide the most apt designation of this period insofar as it 
describes the structural reorientation of the country’s political economy. Waterbury observed 
that there was no difference between socialist and capitalist management.344 Rather, the 
differences lie in the ownership of the means of the production and profits, which fell in the 
hands of the state.  
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“Socialization” of the Press 
On 24 May 1960, Nasser issued “The Press Organization Law,” a presidential decree, 
nationalizing the press. The announcement, would be among the most sweeping and 
impactful changes of this era, as it was also a de-facto declaration that public space would be 
dedicated to supporting the state’s goals.  
Press nationalization was touted as an attempt at “freeing the press from the shackles of 
capitalism.”345 The law forced the major publishing houses346 to surrender their press assets 
to the National Union (NU) and moving forward, any future newspaper licensing, would only 
come through the NU.   
Thus, the door was effectively shut in the face of differing opinions or perspectives in the 
Egyptian press. Nasser saw it fit to completely eliminate the possibility of being vulnerable to 
press wars that were commonplace in the country’s history before him. Yet Nasser believed 
that there was freedom of press in his time, as long as the press conformed to his vision.347 
This perspective was formalized in the explanatory note to the ruling, which said the role of 
the press was to be, “an authority whose function it is to guide the people to actively 
participate in building their society , exactly as does the National Assembly.”348 
Unlike other cases of nationalization, the press was given a special structural status. Heikal, 
who was then editor of AlAhram, counselled Nasser against outright state ownership of the 
press. They reached a compromise, allowing the NU to carry out its duties, while appointing 
a board of directors for each paper, who appointed the editors. At the same time the papers 
would be run as non-profits that still enjoyed surplus revenue, which would be distributed 
among the employees, or recycled back into the company. Thus the official narrative relayed 
a “socialization” of the press, rather than nationalization.349 Heikal called it a mere 
“reorganization” of the press into cooperatives, where only ownership was to be transferred, 
and held between the National Union’s “moral” and editorial guidance, and the people.350 
The official term adopted by the government was the same, tanzim alsahafa (organization of 
the press).  
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The NU and the ASU were not officially state organs; each being displayed more as a 
political party, which is why the state argued that even after the new law had passed, the 
press were not made to fall directly under the authority of the state. Most papers operated 
independently without losing money, with the exception of AlGomhoriyah, which habitually 
received government subsidies through to the late 1970s. Press budgets were mostly external 
to any government involvement.351 
The dominance of the government and its agencies over these cooperatives yielded a press 
that had all essentially become mouthpieces of the rulers.352 This model managed to 
marginally create a framework through which the tradition of the press in Egypt could still 
somehow be harnessed and maintained, through the insinuation that they were not direct arms 
of the government. It made for a relationship between the state and the press that could 
exhibit a certain degree of nuance in its practice, although with a very clear bottom-line, 
clearly delineated margins of freedom, and an official frame of reference for reporting on any 
sensitive topic: the state.  
Those who resisted, faced the brunt of the growing police state. One of the most glaring 
examples was that of the Amin brothers who, after losing their Akhbar AlYoum (AlAkhbar) 
empire, were forcibly transferred to work for another news publishing house (Dar AlHilal), 
and later faced charges of conspiring with the CIA to undermine the socialist movements. 
Moustafa Amin was sentenced to life in prison in 1965, while his brother Ali, who was 
abroad, chose to remain in exile.353 The brothers harbored an entrenched distaste for 
socialism and were known to oppose the sweeping reforms, not only vis-à-vis their business, 
but also in their general discourse and political dealings. Importantly, when the 1960 law was 
put in effect, AlAkhbar was the most important private paper to be transferred to the 
management of a series of military leaders starting from Amin Shaker moving on to Khaled 
Mohi-ElDin and Anwar El-Sadat (all from Nasser’s inner circle).354 
Print media, given its audience, was to become the main purveyor of intellectual thought and 
ideas, extolling virtues of socialism and helping control and disseminate the local narrative 
with regards to Nasser’s plans and performance.355 
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Yosri Foda called this general system and attitude towards the organization of media as 
“Nasser’s Mass Media State,” concluding that throughout the changes during post-monarchy 
Egypt, the legacy of this period continued(s) to bear its mark on the Egyptian media 
system.356 
Organized participation and controlled output 
Within the state parameters and shifting political red lines, journalists as a cohort initially 
pushed back slightly to retain glimpses of independence and an air of being removed from the 
state’s burgeoning propaganda machine. It was an uphill battle, to say the least. 
Through Nasser’s Presidency, the government attempted to permanently transition to a 
situation that reflects more accurately the authoritarian ideal that “information should be a 
government monopoly.”357 The press was also gradually playing a more entrenched role in 
the progressive entrenchment of Arab Socialism as journalists and intellectuals were expected 
to function with more editorial discretion (from within the confines of this role) rather than to 
follow the direct leadership of the RCC and ASU leadership.358 This happened through the 
reorganization of the country’s press under the ASU primarily, but more specifically under 
the Journalists Syndicate359, the Ministry of Information, and the Information Committee.  
Salah Salem, the Minister of National Guidance and a Free Officer, had immediately taken 
over the Journalists Syndicate in 1952, putting it under control of the RCC.360 Initially, 
membership of the syndicate was not necessary in order to be working within the press, 
although it was obligatory in order to be called a ‘journalist’. Membership became obligatory 
in 1955 (Law 185) for all those working within the profession of journalism.  Once Law 156 
was passed in 1960, journalists would only be allowed to pursue their careers after also 
gaining clearance from the National Union, functioning as a journalist without this permit 
would become outlawed.361 
The transformation of the Syndicate was complete by the end of Nasser’s presidency, 
when in 17 September 1970362 Law no. 76 replaced the 1955 law stating clearly in 
article 3 that the roles of the Syndicate are: 
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a) The propagation and deepening of socialist and nationalist thought among its 
members, as well as activating the call to support this thought in press organizations 
and among the reading public; in addition to activating press research and 
encouraging those undertake to carry out such research; as well as raising the 
scientific and intellectual level of its members.  
b) Raising the standard of the profession… 
c) Safeguarding the freedom of journalists… 
d) Trying to find work for unemployed members… 
e) Ensuring the observation of the traditions, morals and principles of the profession. 
f) Settling professional conflicts... 
g) Strengthening relations with the Union of Arab Journalists… 
h) Undertaking steps to achieve closeness between its members and the members of 
trade unions representing laborers working within the press.363 
These laws were widely criticized for greatly limiting the scope and ability of journalists to 
gain official recognition for their profession. The laws (especially Law 76) were also 
inconclusive regarding the financial independence of the Syndicate, which should ostensibly 
be funded entirely by membership dues, leading to the belief that the Syndicate would in fact 
be an arm of the government.364 Despite these limitations, the Syndicate would ultimately 
play a vibrant role in the future of Egyptian journalism and in the formation of a more robust 
journalist corps in the following decades. 
Arming the airwaves 
Broadcasting via radio had already been monopolized by the state by the time the Free 
Officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952. Its utility as a medium of communication was self-
evident and it became the most quickly deployed tool at the RCC’s disposal to campaign for 
public support. While the fledgling regime initially entertained the concept of a relatively free 
press, broadcasting on the airwaves was a different story from the outset. It was automatically 
deemed too valuable to leave in private hands. On 23 July 1952, radio studios and 
transmitters were quickly taken over by the Army as is common practice in the wake of coups. 
On 24 July 1952, the general public learned of the military takeover over the radio, in a 
communique read out by Nassser’s would-be successor, Anwar El-Sadat. Radio’s services 
expanded, and were focused on local and regional mobilization alike. Initially, radio came 
under direct control of the cabinet and the Minister of National Guidance. During the short-
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lived Egypt-Syria union under the United Arab Republic, the Egyptian Broadcasting service 
was directly under the auspices of the President.365 
Nasser seemed to realize more quickly than his counterparts in the region just how powerful a 
political weapon broadcasting could be. Orders were given to swiftly expand the reach of 
radio emissions across the country and the region. Its broadcasts were used to popularize 
government policies, spread the tenets of Arab Socialism and act as a potent tool in numerous 
regional struggles.366 Cutting through the region’s dismal literacy rates, radio emissions 
transmitted information to areas that would otherwise be cut off from day-to-day opinion-
forming information. The Voice of the Arabs program, dating back to 1953, became an 
internationally recognized force in fomenting liberation movements across the Arab 
World.367  
The period between the mid-1950’s and 1967 saw radical change in Arab society especially, 
and Radio Cairo was seen by the West to be at the epicenter of changes in both the attitudes 
of common people and as a motivator for freedom fighters everywhere from Algeria to Iraq. 
British and US intelligence reports conveyed this to be highly unsettling to their governments. 
Miles Copeland suggested the CIA had considered proposals as drastic as bombing Radio 
Cairo, or at least developing competing radio stations368. The rallying calls of Arab 
Nationalism and Pan-Arabism seemed to emanate primarily through the airwaves, especially 
after the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the ensuing so-called Tripartite aggression369 
in 1956. 
UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjöld had intervened with a request that Nasser “disarm” 
his radio. This attempted intervention only served to highlight the impact radio was having, 
and the resultant global concerns. Nasser received the request with indignation and 
effectively replied, “How can I reach my power base? My power lies with the Arab masses. 
The only way I can reach my people is by radio. If you ask me for radio disarmament, it 
means that you are asking me for complete disarmament.”370  
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The airwaves were a strong weapon as there was little any authority could do from it reaching 
individual radios in isolated locations on medium wave frequencies. Radio newscaster 
Ahmed Said, was the main broadcasting conduit through which Nasser’s words travelled 
between 1953 and 1967.371 Heikal, was his effectively his equivalent in the press. They both 
played important roles in Nasser’s attempts to speak more directly to the masses.  
The end of Said’s era coincided with one of the most important blunders in the short history 
of Egypt’s national media machines. During the 1967 Six-day war, when Israel had 
dumbfounded the Egyptian military by attacking the country, after a period of acute 
escalation in military tension, the Egyptian air force had been nearly obliterated within hours. 
Yet the Voice of the Arabs was reporting that Egypt had downed 86 Israeli aircraft. Egyptians 
ultimately learned of the defeat, and of its crushing effects and Said was the main media 
scapegoat, for the false narrative propagated on the day.372 BBC’s Jeremy Bowen had asked 
Ahmed Said why he had approved such lies and what he thought to gain from fake reports on 
an “imaginary victory”, and Said’s response was still defiant, “You're asking people to fight, 
not dance… we believed the broadcasts were our most powerful weapon… many of our 
listeners were illiterate, so radio was the most important way to reach them.”373 
Up until that moment, radio was effectively and efficiently weaponized, it seems. To bolster 
the potency of this weapon, Nasser ordered the distribution of transistor radios at times, 
depending on the state’s needs. For example, during Egypt’s participation in the Yemeni 
Civil War of the 1960’s, over 100,000 transistor radios were distributed among tribes 
occupying the space between Yemen and Oman.374 In Egypt, aside from installing radio sets 
in public areas across the country, tax on radio sets were abolished in 1960 with the 
government encouraging all citizens to acquire one.375 The regime’s push in advancing radio 
capabilities lead to it increasing its weekly broadcasting emissions from 100 to 477 hours 
between 1955 and 1965, ranking sixth internationally at that point behind the USSR (1,3440); 
China (937); Voice of America (873); The BBC (639) and West Germany (598).376 
Radio would be the first example of Egyptian governments looking at media space as a 
legitimate battlefield where there are winners and losers. It was a venue for propaganda 
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above all else, placed at the disposition of the state at war.   
 
Localizing narratives and news (The Middle East News Agency) 
Nasser not only wanted to directly control his own messaging system and the methods of 
their dissemination within society, he also wanted to control what news was being reported 
from the region. Local and Arab news outlets were almost entirely reliant on news agencies 
such as Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), the Associated Press and United Press for 
their news reporting. In 1956 government publishing houses decided to revive an idea that 
originated in 1948: to create an Arab news agency out of Egypt. The Middle East News 
Agency (MENA) was established that year with the stated intention of becoming an “internal 
news agency rivalling Reuters and the AP, and thus the news of Egypt would be properly 
reported abroad and not distorted by foreign agencies.377” 
Initially the idea for MENA was that it would be organized as a joint stock company, owned 
mainly by the large publishing houses at the time: AlAhram, AlAkhbar, Dar AlHilal, 
AlGomhoriyah, La Bourse Egyptienne and le Progrès Egyptienne. A majority of the agencies’ 
start-up capital of £20,000 was in the hands of a group of government-owned papers.378 This 
group was previously under an umbrella company called Société Orientale de Publicité, 
which was eventually bought by the Dar elTahrir Publishing House, the owner of 
AlGomhoriyah. Despite pretenses, the government was indirectly in control, especially as it 
fell to the oversight of Anwar El-Sadat, an integral member of the RCC and the director of 
Dar elTahrir Publishing House.379 But officially, MENA was run under the autonomous 
General Organization for News, Printing and Circulation. That continued to be the case until 
1966 when, after being sold off to the Arab Press Association, the Ministry of National 
Guidance itself was reorganized and took direct control of the Agency. 
The development of MENA was a step towards establishing authoritative mass media and 
news outlets from Egypt that helped guide the news agenda in general. As the only Arabic 
news agency with the resources, infrastructure and political backing to operate on a regional 
level and take a direct stake in forming the narrative of international news from the region, it 
was a tool that was first introduced by the first regime of the Republic, that ironically also 
commandeered MENA after establishing it. Rather than commercially compete with the 
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known international wire services and agencies, MENA was deployed more as a tool to 
enhance Egypt’s soft power. It still aimed to be a legitimate and robust service, providing 
normal news agency services of news gathering and dissemination, gauging trends and 
opinions, displaying analyses and offering general news services.  
As a revenue generating enterprise, MENA was able to more easily establish offices 
worldwide, and engage in high-profile exchanges of news material with the world’s major 
powers, as well as countries in Africa and the Arab world380, where Nasser enjoyed a special 
status as an anti-colonial figure.  
Introducing television 
The 1956 Constitution stated that national economic development would be based on central 
planning and that “capital should be at the service of the state.” It strove for a reconciliation 
of private and public economic activities.381 By 1960, the vast majority of capital formation 
came to be in the hands of the central authorities, and when the first Five-Year plan was to be 
implemented that same year, it became abundantly clear that this venture would be led almost 
exclusively by the state. One year into this plan, the introduction of television would appear, 
not only as a face of this plan, but also as a major building block in the developmentalist 
vision that had begun to take shape in a more robust and total manner. Media had always 
played such a role “since the revolution [as] the government has attempted to use the media 
to develop Egypt, as well as the Middle East, both politically and culturally.”382 
Television would become the only mass medium to emanate squarely from within the halls of 
power, differing from the examples of the press and radio. In the case of post-monarchy 
Egypt, radio had been co-opted by the state to become the state’s megaphone. In his study 
comparing radio as a tool for political persuasion in the era’s of Nasser and Sadat, Shalabieh 
concluded that during Nasser’s time, “it was a clear propaganda tool.”383 When the press was 
nationalized it was able to retain its role as the platform for opinion-forming information and 
analysis while also being expected to perform the function of ideological and political 
propaganda.  
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Television, on the other hand was both established and launched from the very command 
center that would launch The National Charter of 1962 with the economic and social concepts 
that would come to help define Nasser’s tenure. Structurally, it would be organized using 
some of the same principles that would help define the “State Capitalism” of the era.  
Initially the idea of launching television services from Egypt had begun floating around since 
the late 1940’s by mostly French companies interested in the venture for an initial capital of 
£200,000. By 1954 a concrete proposal had been approved by the Presidency, with idea that 
the ideal location to launch the facilities would be above the Moqattam Plateau in Cairo.384 
After the Suez Crisis had put the project on hold, the Egyptian government decided in 1959 
to accept an offer from the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to establish a television 
broadcast facility,385 an interesting choice, given Nasser’s intention to use it as a tool to 
counter post-colonial Western domination.   
It would become one of the more enduring government ventures and proved to be a 
pioneering move regionally. "The promise of television as a powerful tool of communication 
seem(ed) to have motivated Arab governments to keep it as a state controlled operation. 
Nasser's effective use of radio to promote pan-Arabist ideology seem(ed) to have been behind 
flourishing views of television as a potentially indispensable tool of political mobilization."386  
Due to the capital-intensive nature of television and the extensive infrastructural and 
operational capacities needed for its development, the fledgling nature of televised 
broadcasting made it acutely sensitive to political and economic circumstances.  On 21 July 
1960 the first television emissions began for three hours a day from Channel 1, followed by 
the addition of Channel 2 in 1961 and Channel 3 in 1962, with an increase in total hours of 
transmission to 20.387 Hours of transmission had reached an average of 25-30 hours by 1964, 
but decreased to 23 hours and 44 minutes in 1965 and then to 19 hours by 1970, ostensibly as 
a response to the economic performance of the country, and more specifically, the dismal 
performance of grand national projects in general.388 The changes coincided with the 
announced austerity measures taken by the government at different times, especially in the 
wake of the crushing 1967 defeat. Despite being structured to operate semi-autonomously, 
television operated within a system where the organization continued to be in-synch with 
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other state projects and tied to them financially.389 Like other major government projects at 
the time, a culture of financial indiscretion and operational inefficiency emerged as a result of 
the interdependency and the convoluted hierarchies.  
Information campaigns about Arab Socialism on television were rampant, especially on 
Channels 1 and 2 that included more social and political programming to complement 
entertainment390. The charisma that defined Nasser’s presidency and public persona could 
now be viewed much more intimately for a subsection of the middle and upper classes. 
Televised broadcasting tended in general to slightly veer towards the cultural and 
entertainment side of production. Through television, along with motion pictures, Nasser 
hoped to cement Egypt’s (and his) regional role beyond politics, into the realm of cultural 
production as well.391 It would be one of his most effective soft-power tools. 
Television sets in the country increased in number from 56,944 in 1961 to 442,129 in 1968 
and by some accounts in 1973 the figure went up to one million392. Viewership is said to have 
increased from 200,000 in 1960 to one million in 1963393 and six million by 1973394. 
However, the state dealt differently with the ownership of television sets than with radio 
(perhaps due to the high costs of production).  Television set ownership was subject to a 
system of controls and licensing, “similar to the ownership of weapons or ammunition.”395 
Television set owners were charged annual subscription fees, that would increase if the sets 
were placed around public businesses. The same law limited television repairs to licensed 
individuals, and stated that clear accounts must be kept of the specific serial numbers of the 
sets that they would repair.396 
Another reason may be the decidedly limited reach of television and the economic limitations 
of purchasing sets. Television’s reach was confined to Cairo for the majority of its early 
history and was one of the more widely used tools for mobilizing the dominant middle class 
in the city.397  
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The “Naksa’s” lasting effects: an entrenchment of the securitized state 
After the 1967 Naksa398- an embarrassing military defeat for Nasser- the level of distrust and 
paranoia increased and maintaining the authority of his presidency became a priority. The 
role of internal monitoring and intelligence greatly expanded.399 Since Nasser, the role of 
military, security and intelligence services in monitoring different factions within society had 
been becoming more expansive and complex. Hazem Kandil argues that this was the 
beginning of decades in which the military was not only a guarantor of power, but at times an 
active participant in it, in-time alongside other security apparatuses400. Further chapters will 
reveal how in the era of private media, they at-times engaged in unilateral regulation of media 
systems and day-to-day output as well. 
Abu-Elmagd drew parallels between the military’s control of political and economic affairs 
as being consistent with the Foucauldian observation of some modern states: 
The Egyptian military is a modern institution in a modern state. According to Michel 
Foucault’s deconstruction of the modern state’s mechanisms of power, this state 
developed the practice of closely observing the population in order to make it a 
docile population…In the Egyptian case, the military institution that exercises state 
power by itself has turned the whole society into an infinite, long-lasting camp where 
everyday life is subjected to the officer’s visible or invisible watch, yet with 
allegations of achieving security or guarding the nation.401  
 
4) Sadat: From sweeping consolidation to tepid modernization 
Any potential successor to Nasser would have been well advised to proceed with caution after 
witnessing his funeral. It was one of the largest funeral processions in history as millions took 
to the streets of Cairo in disbelief at the death of Nasser. He had been a defining 
representation of post-monarchy Egypt, and would symbolize the country’s new institutions 
as a republic. The relatively newly appointed vice president Anwar El-Sadat was tactful in his 
method of taking charge and took his time before attempting to introduce the kind of radical 
change that would define his own presidency.  
Sadat went from being Nasser’s unassuming Vice President, to another long-term president, 
who managed to make his own distinct mark on public life. Many of the institutions of 
government remained, but Sadat would still seek his own means of consolidating power. He 
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first sought to limit the power of some of Nasser’s legacy projects, such as the ASU, which 
was defunct by 1978. Significantly, political parties were allowed to exist again. In 1976 
independent “platforms” (manabir) were allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections. 
These political platforms were touted as a potential precursor to expanded democracy. But the 
state restricted the effect of this new feature of political organization, by limiting them to the 
three groups that were 402 initially approved.403  
“Opposition” became once more an acceptable word in Egyptian public life. Although to 
Sadat, this was only permissible when this opposition was not accompanied by damaging 
criticism.404 He persecuted some of his staunchest, and most vocal opponents, especially 
ardent Nasserists. By the end of the decade, his list of political detainees swelled to more than 
1,500 from across the political spectrum. The only political party able to fully function at the 
time was Sadat’s newly formed, National Democratic Party as well.  
The end of the Nasser’s presidency also saw a split between those who wished to take a more 
liberal economic route and encourage more foreign direct investment, and those wishing to 
retain strong state capitalism.405 Sadat leaned towards the former, causing him to purge the 
“leftist” factions remaining in government. He then began instituting his infitah (economic 
open-door) policies, ostensibly calling for a more liberal economy. However, these policies 
did not lead to any measure of profound liberalization. As Waterbury points out, “The 
marketplace reign[ed] supreme neither in Egyptian economy nor in the political arena. Sadat 
and his entourage carefully moved towards mixed systems in both.”406 Despite the clear gulf 
between his approach and Nasser’s, Sadat insisted that the Open Door Policy was a 
continuation of the changes brought about by the 1952 Revolution, and would help boost 
public funding.407  
Saddled with the public expectations of state aid and the myriad social support schemes, Sadat 
decided to further entrench the state to maintain its control-based functions, while seeming to 
encourage foreign and domestic investments. Importantly, the “state” maintained its 
dominance.408 Massive inflation, the deterioration of the manufacturing sector, and 
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inefficiencies in the public sector, despite a windfall of oil revenues and remittances, 
ultimately meant that by the time of Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the state of the economy 
was in tatters. 
By the end of his presidency/life, Sadat’s relationship with mass media will have seen its 
share of ups and downs in correspondence with other policy fluctuations. As is the case with 
the presidencies of his successors and predecessor, the media system during Sadat’s time bore 
a resemblance to the policies and general characteristics of his rule. Amid a stated desire to 
liberalize the media, along with his attempts at economic infitah policies, he also grappled 
with political opposition and public criticism, both of which he did not tolerate. This criticism 
would be the cause of tension between media (especially the press) and the President, and one 
of the main reasons there was never a genuine hope for the development of private, 
independent media in the country during his time in power, as he had seemed to suggest.  
Once again, mass media manipulation was among the tools he used to cement his grip on 
power. Like almost every major political transition in modern Egypt, the media would be an 
important factor to be addressed by the incoming leader. It would be a recurring theme for 
Sadat. First, one of the key moments that led to the Corrective Revolution409 was a reported 
coup attempt by his first vice-president Ali Sabry who had tried to takeover radio and 
broadcasting facilities. “After the failure of this coup [Sadat] paid much more attention to the 
radio and television broadcast.”410 The second factor was the role played by Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal, both in his capacity as the head of AlAhram newspaper (which had become 
the dominant publication) and as a political operator in his own right. Sabry, known for his 
ties to the Soviet Union, accused Heikal- who was advising Sadat on cabinet choices of 
attempting to veer the country more towards the US. Heikal was in fact writing frequent 
columns in his paper about the attempt to “neutralize” the relationship with the US and 
improve ties, while Sadat was moving in the same direction. Sabry’s group levelled their 
accusations towards Heikal in AlGomhoriyah, which remained staunchly Nasserist.411  
Print media became a main point of contention between these “centers of power,” a phrase 
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Heikal was particularly fond of.412 One group advocated a continued Soviet allegiance and a 
more aggressive response to Israel for its continued occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. The 
other wanted to delay war and improve US ties. The goal for Sabry’s group was to overtake 
Sadat, and liquidate Heikal’s influence, or at least take over AlAhram.413 Ultimately Sadat put 
Sabry’s group on trial, and aimed for decreased military presence in government, the first step 
in an ideological and institutional coup.   
Liberalization and Modernization 
While the Corrective Revolution was an early affirmation of his power, it wasn’t until after 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the reclamation of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel, that many 
of Sadat’s changes were to be implemented in earnest. His steps towards democratization 
looked to ultimately serve the purpose of diluting these “centers of power.” Economic 
necessity, and a shift away from Soviet authority, would also see the implementation of 
Infitah. Liberalizing the press temporarily accompanied these shifts. There was a need to 
come up with a media system compatible with proposed liberalization of the political system. 
Sadat saw himself as an ally of journalism and as a journalist of sorts in his own right, having 
been appointed to chief editor of AlGomhoriya and AlTahrir newspapers between 1953 and 
1956. He would also be in charge of the National Union between 1957 and 1962, during 
which the Press Organization Law of 1960 had passed, placing the nation’s entire press corps 
under the NU’s complete control. Thus, he would have had profound knowledge of how the 
sector was structured and its transformations over the preceding years.  
As a way to move beyond the influence and grip of Nasser’s legacy and his institutions, Sadat 
initially ordered the release of many political dissidents from prison (mostly members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) and the reorganization of the ASU, both precursors for more profound 
political change in the country, and a recalibration of concepts such as freedom of speech, 
thought and political participation.414 The ASU, which under Nasser was in complete control 
of the press, would have its powers of oversight slowly removed, until it became obsolete by 
1978. Early on in 1973, through the ASU Sadat would revoke the licenses of over one 
hundred journalists, charging them with making contact with foreign journalists “with the aim 
of tarnishing Egypt’s reputation by providing false mass media information.”415 The purge 
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included top scholars and intellectuals, including renowned novelist Yousef Idris and literary 
scholar Louis Awad, both of whom were top editorial staff in AlAhram.  
Their licenses were restored in six months’ time, after Heikal reportedly convinced Sadat of 
his need to maintain the press on his side at this time of war.416 Interestingly, the purge was 
initially justified by Sadat as being a necessary war-time precaution. This period would serve 
as a reminder for the press of their “dependence on the regime for their livelihood,” and as an 
indication that “the threat of being prevented from exercising their profession on a long-term 
basis hung over their heads as an incentive.”417  
The President’s own words in the wake of this incident would come to sum up the attitude 
that would frequently underline shifts in mass media, “I meant and still mean to give a 
warning. It has not been my aim nor is it my nature to harm any person in his work, or 
livelihood… I want freedom of the press. At the same time I want it to be a dedicated [loyal] 
press.”418  
Sadat would take a more open attitude towards the press, but his policies in effect were more 
ambivalent. 419 After a request by the Journalists Syndicate, direct censorship was lifted in 
1974 by removing government monitors that were sitting in newspaper offices, dictating 
content and removing unwanted material for years.  Columnists would write more critically, 
and were not faced with the same level of threats and imprisonment that they had faced under 
Nasser. Access to news was once again restored to editors in the form of an “open information 
policy”. The state stripped its communications via the mass media of the flamboyant 
propaganda of the Nasser era, as papers regained credibility as sources of information. The 
most radical such example was Heikal printing information of the Israeli infiltration of 
Egyptian ranks during the 1973 war, which was a wartime catastrophe420, a stark difference 
from the reporting during the 1967 defeat. Print media, looked to be regaining its status. 
Although as a rule, all papers still refrained from publishing editorials that would attack basic 
principles, such as socialism, “national unity and social peace”. The President (as a topic) was 
still a very clear red line not to be crossed, while critiquing the performance of many other 
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government officials was tolerated.421  
Heikal himself provided a major litmus test for this tolerance. After years of publishing 
columns that did not always conform to Sadat’s foreign policy, and casting doubt on Sadat’s 
tactics in the October (1973) War and its aftermath, especially questioning whether Kissinger 
and Nixon were acting in good faith towards Egypt, he was relieved from his post at AlAhram 
in February 1974, after 17 years in charge. Sadat had equated Heikal’s brazenness to creating 
yet another “center of power”.422 After removing Heikal (in his capacity as one of the last 
remaining powerful Nasser-era stalwarts), the reinstituted Ali Amin was put in his place. For 
the eight years that followed, AlAhram had eight different chiefs.  
The non-daily papers on hand at the time offered the more diverse perspectives and opposition 
views, especially the Marxist monthly AlTaliah and the left-leaning weekly magazine Rose 
Al-Yousef; along with the religiously conservative AlDa’awah and AlI’tissam, which were 
banned under Nasser.423 Security services still had the ability to quickly shut these paper’s 
down, as they were also part of government publishing houses, they were effectively under 
the thumb of government control.  
The Supreme Press Council (SPC) would be established by a Presidential Decree on 11 
March 1975. Much of the oversight powers of public publishing houses and newspapers were 
already transferred away from the ASU the previous year, the SPC became the new 
overseeing committee. It was to be charged with granting licenses to journalists, preparing a 
revised code of ethics for the field, ensuring the freedom of the press, and arbitrating disputes. 
The first article of the decree claimed that the press was independent, and in charge of 
watching over the government.424 It was a short lived council (only until 1978), with some at 
the time saying that the only reason it was created, was out of a desire from Sadat to create 
another entity that would help gain control of the press, after the manabir system (and the 
subsequent multiparty system) created a cacophony of political voices that he could not bear 
(or control).425 This would especially ring true when factoring in that the figures in charge of 
the SPC would be appointed by the government. Sadat himself announced in the Council’s 
first meeting in May 1975, warning members of the press to avoid focusing only on negative 
aspects.  
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Waterbury curiously remembers this period as the “heyday of Sadat’s liberal experiment”: 
The press was remarkably free in its coverage; the television, now in the hands 
of the new minister of information, Gamal al-Utaifi, televised lively and 
significant debates among top-class policy makers, and the new 
parliamentarians took their role seriously.426 
The political process opened up again with the permission granted for the operation of the 
manabir (political platforms) as quasi-political parties, while allowing for applications for 
other parties, meaning newspapers that would be attached to these parties could also be 
formed. Sadat’s Center party, established on 28 June 1977 launched the weekly Garidit Masr, 
whereas the leftist Taggamo’ party established AlAhali. Later on in 1978 Sadat’s new 
National Democratic Party established Mayo (May) and in 1979 the Socialist Labour Party 
established AlSha’b, both were weekly publications.427 
Turning on “Press Freedom” 
 “There are some people in this country who think they can copy the American press. They 
think they can have their Watergates and get rid of the President that way, but they forget 
where they are.”428 
Heikal quotes Sadat’s words above, as a harbinger of things to come for current affairs-driven 
mass media outlets operating amidst partial liberalization. But it must be said that aside from 
the political climate that could potentially shackle media at any moment, the industry itself 
was already structured in a way that made it very difficult for any paper to be able to operate 
sustainably without support of the central government.  The majority of the party papers were 
not distributing in amounts that could compete with AlAhram. AlShaab and AlAhali for 
example were unable to publish and distribute anywhere near 100,000 copies and never 
seemed to garner enough fanfare or support by the public. They also had limited publishing 
and distribution capacities. Meanwhile government papers were easily printing and 
distributing in figures that comfortably eclipsed the party papers’ aspirations.429 As the sector 
was structured, non-government party papers were unlikely to  ever compete with state-run 
papers.  
Sadat still seemed threatened by these papers, and always reeled back on any slack in 
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freedoms for mass media, even if he had stated an intention to introduce these freedoms 
himself. Liberalization of the media was also an element that looked good to the West and 
Sadat knew that it could work in his favor at a time when he was negotiating with the IMF 
and other organizations for loans and foreign aid. According to Heikal, Sadat was able to 
secure $120 million in USAID loans to national newspapers mostly to buy machinery. These 
loans required guarantees that a vibrant press would be allowed to flourish, and that they 
would be run under in a fiscal responsible manner. But, the main beneficiaries of this were the 
public papers under the more direct control of the regime and its allies.430 
Ironically, it was Sadat’s decision to push forward with further liberalization of the economy 
that edged him towards moving from ambivalence regarding press freedom, to going back on 
his concept of this “open era” of media. Biting criticisms of infitah policies in most daily 
newspapers could have played a role in this policy U-turn. Following consumer price 
increases in 1977 due to record levels of inflation, and attempts to remove subsidies, massive 
“bread riots” in the streets were described in Ros AlYousef and AlTali’ah as being indicative 
of public disapproval of the new economic direction. The editor of Ros Al-Yousef was 
replaced by someone “more supportive” of government policies while the Ahram Publishing 
House stopped printing AlTali’ah altogether, replacing it with a science magazine.431 One year 
later issues of AlAhali were seized for producing “undemocratic content” after campaigning 
against growing inequality, and issues were withheld again one year later for criticizing the 
peace treaty with Israel.432  
By 1978, once the ASU was officially dissolved, ownership of printed media was transferred 
to the newly created Shura (Consultative) Council, which owned 51% of the public papers. 
The other 49% went to employees of the papers, despite editors asking for public ownership 
via share issuance, in the spirit of Infitah. The year before, Sadat had given a very Nasser-
esque speech as parliament were discussing new press laws: “The fourth authority we have 
created is the press…the press has a great influence on public opinion… We cannot allow our 
press… to be controlled by an individual or by an opinionated and temperamental newspaper 
publisher…No, the press is the property of the people and will remain so.”433  
This sentiment was a precursor to Sadat drafting a law in 1978, which included articles 
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allowing for governmental interference in the editorial process.434  Besides the Bread Riots, 
another major turning point for Sadat and the press was the signing of the Camp David 
Accords with Israel in 1978, which directly affected the proposed law. Many journalists, 
especially with Nasserist or Islamist backgrounds were vehemently opposed to the deal and 
the thought of normalizing relations with the Israeli government, given the state of affairs at 
the time. Many journalists fled the country after Sadat banned any criticism of the Accords in 
local media and forbade any such perspectives from being published.  
Despite tightening his grip on publishing internally, journalists abroad still posed a problem. 
On the Syndicate’s 40th anniversary, Sadat gave them an ultimatum to return before 15 May 
1981, while also pressuring the Press Syndicate to revoke their licenses to practice in Egypt. 
The syndicate refused, clearly drawing a line in the sand in order to assert its independence.435 
As a result, in an attempt to strip the Syndicate of its regulatory powers, Sadat proposed a plan 
to transform it into a “club for conversation and entertainment.”436 
The plan never reached the light of day since Sadat was assassinated a few months later. His 
death would lead to a lull in the escalating tensions between the Presidency and the Press. 
Although it is worth noting that by that time, the majority of the vocal opposition press were 
imprisoned.437 
Legal maneuvering vis-à-vis mass media 
Sadat was ever conscious of the fact that the status of mass media touched on two matters that 
were important to his image abroad, economic and political liberalization. The most effective 
way for him to express his discontent with the political media in a more systematic, policy-
originated level, was by creating legal obstacles. It started early on in 1971 with Laws No. 33 
and 34, respectively the Law Guarding and Ensuring the Safety of the People and the Law 
Protecting National Unity. Then in 1977, more laws were issued to curb criticism, namely 
Law No. 2 for the Safety of the Homeland and the Citizen and Law No. 40 amending clauses 
on political parties. Both of these laws provided legal grounds for censorship, under the 
pretense of security concerns and safeguarding the political process.438 Journalists that year 
were also threatened with being fined or even imprisoned for criticizing the Camp David 
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accords and the peace deal with Israel, an act that landed Heikal in jail. 
Also in 1978, exacerbated by the diverse array of oppositions’ rhetoric and especially by their 
international ties, Sadat submitted a referendum effectively banning from public life anyone 
guilty of “religious defamation” and anyone who served in Parliament prior to the 1952 
Revolution. This law, known as Law No. 33/1978 for Protecting the National Front and Social 
Peace was aimed clearly at Communists and the liberal New Wafd Party. It would heighten 
monitoring of political and media communications.439 The referendum, which passed by a 
reported 98.3% margin, effectively silenced opposition voices that had been escalating for 
over one year.  
During that period the party papers provided the only opposition voices in the press, as they 
were the only ones not publicly funded and run. The Tagammo’ Party (National Progressive 
Union) said the law "cancels out legitimate political life, threatens the safety of every citizen 
and suppresses every free opinion.”440 A couple of years later, the “Law of Shame” was 
introduced, making “antisocial behavior” an indictable offense; a law that would target 
journalists for than anything.441 Meanwhile the 1980 Law 442, known as the “Press Authority 
Law” was also the first law to formally acknowledge the independence of the press, even 
going so far as to call it the Fourth Branch of governance. The law had regulated private, 
independent ownership of papers under the stipulation that an individual could not own more 
than 10% of any paper. It would be years before this stipulation would become relevant to 
daily newspaper publications.  
The experiment of partial liberalization –both of the press and politics- seemed to be reversing. 
By 1981 Sadat was fed-up with press criticism, and in the context of cracking down on 
opposition, he shut down several newspapers and jailed many journalists, along with many 
critics, university professors and students. He had also reverted to direct state control over the 
press. Licenses for many of the opposition papers were not officially revoked, however the 
conditions for operating in the prevailing political climate at the time made it impossible for 
the majority of the opposition papers to continue their operations. Besides the laws and arrests, 
these papers were reliant on public institutions for both publishing and distribution, the state 
frequently ordered the suspension of papers such as AlAhali, AlSha’b, and the Muslim 
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Brotherhood’s monthly, AlDa’wah.443 Much of the party press available at the time, were left 
to die slow deaths. 
From “National Guidance” to “Information” 
Cultural and news production, especially audio-visual, during the eras of Nasser and Sadat 
were highly centralized areas under the Ministry of National Guidance, which Nasser 
fashioned as the main tool in shaping the kind of citizens he thought necessary for his plans 
for Egypt.444 The Ministry of National Guidance was renamed and rebranded as The Ministry 
of State for Information in 1971 (a decision taken in 1969).445 The name was less patronizing 
and was a conscious departure from the use of terms such as “guidance” that directly upheld 
and displayed the authoritative and directive position of the government.  
The new name also reflected a shift in the direction of the Ministry from being purely 
concerned with issues of one-way political communication, to an entity that could be 
characterized in more corporatist, organizational terms. The four departments under this 
cabinet at its creation were: The Publications Division, The Press Division, the Advertising 
Division and The Information Committee. The first two dealt mainly with managing press 
content and publication activities between the government and the public press, while also 
controlling the output of any content to be issued through the non-state printing presses, or in 
foreign press organs. The Advertising Division was in charge of coordinating advertising and 
distributing revenue among the press organs.446 The result was the creation of a clear 
bottleneck regarding finances of the entire sector. The Ministry was in charge of a 
considerable operation that grew in size and infrastructure steadily. In 1976, the three main 
public press organizations, AlAhram, AlAkhbar, AlGomhoriyah were collectively printing 1.4 
million copies on a daily basis, and nearly double that number for their weekly special 
issues.447 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union: Structure, politics and finances 
Under Sadat, the Ministry maintained oversight of the press, albeit to varying degrees. Radio 
and Television broadcasts would still be run entirely by the Ministry of Information, until a 
government-sanctioned study on the best way to manage broadcasting recommended the 
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formation of a separate entity to organize the sector. Television and radio broadcasts were to 
be run under the nominally independent Egyptian Radio and Television Union448 (ERTU). 
The wholly different factors necessary for the operation of these facilities in such a sector 
with rapidly evolving technology were central to this organizational decision.  
The ERTU’s formation brought together three previously separate entities, Radio Broadcast, 
Television Broadcast and Broadcast Engineering449. Almost all news and cultural production 
in Egypt would also be centralized under the entity. It was also the only broadcast center with 
regional aspirations that had the capability to of emit to the Arab World. The Minister of 
Information would appoint the head of the ERTU, but would remain its figurehead. The 
Union’s Board of Directors would come from both Ministerial and political directives. The 
Minister himself would be able to issue ordinances to the ERTU as he saw fit, leaving little 
doubt as to who controlled broadcast and radio, and clearly showing that the organization was 
not independent from the state.450  
Despite Sadat’s stated attempts to liberalize and decentralize many areas of government, the 
mandate of the ERTU issued in Law No. 1 of 1971 ended up entrenching the role of the 
central government’s authorities in controlling broadcast production.451 Little had changed in 
Radio and Television administration under Sadat initially, due to the fact that the original 
reorganization of the sector had instituted a rigid government bureaucracy, rather than a 
dynamic institution capable of change.452 
Politically, the development of the sector was greatly affected by the status of Egypt’s foreign 
policy. As Boyd put it, “more than any other mass medium, television has tended to reflect the 
changing international political orientation of the country.”453 Relatively limited broadcasting 
capabilities and the low quality of production increasingly plagued the sector due to the 
demoralized and financially precarious situation of the state after the 1967 defeat. The RCA 
had been put on a regional boycott list for its business dealings with Israel, which complicated 
attempts to modernize and maintain operations since the company had also installed much of 
the equipment in use from the 60’s. Strained relationships with some Arab countries at the 
time (partly due to Egypt’s involvement in the Yemeni civil war) had also stymied sales of 
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Egyptian programs to countries like Saudi Arabia.  
After 1973, with Sadat’s shifting position away from the Soviet Union and towards the USA 
and Western Europe, television programming improved greatly. The RCA’s dated 
“monochrome” system was replaced with SECAM’s color equipment from France, and studio 
equipment from Great Britain. ERTU revenue had also been increasing due to higher program 
sales to Arab countries. Advertising revenue was up due to spikes in upper-middle class 
income from higher remittances in the mid-70’s. Sadat had also famously encouraged 
increased imports of American and European luxury goods, companies that sometimes paid 
four times above local advertising rates.454  
A decade after it was formed, a law was passed to reorganize the ERTU in order to do two 
things: facilitate its ability to fulfil the political goals of the government and put an end to 
inefficient management practices that were causing major economic strains. Politically, rather 
than focus on entertainment production, Sadat understood the need for more political 
expression to contain the anger fomenting on the streets in Egypt due to diminished spending 
and decreasing public services. Financially, like other government agencies and bureaucracies, 
the ERTU was in need of a more regimented financial structuring.  
A 1979 Law (No. 13) that would continue to be in use until the 2016455 was meant to offer 
more independence to the ERTU. Articles (2.5, 2.6, 2.7) mandated that the television services 
broadcast the proceedings of the House of Representatives, while allocating timeslots for 
different political parties to present their issues along with general social issues that may not 
have been discussed previously.456 
Article 2.2, however leaves no doubt as to the role of the ERTU in supporting the regime 
stating that the goal of the ERTU is “working towards bolstering the Socialist Democratic 
system, national unity, social well-being…”457 Furthermore, the law places control of 
broadcasting services more directly back into the hands of the Presidency, allowing the 
President to decide on the Ministry that would be responsible for the ERTU (normally the 
Minister of Information). It also left the main appointments of the head of the General 
Assembly in the President’s hands. The General Assembly would be in charge of the budgets, 
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annual planning, and evaluation. 
As television’s importance continued to grow, ERTU leadership came to assume a much more 
central position of power. “An Egyptian video producer once said of government control over 
the Egyptian Radio and Television Union that, clearly, someone in government thinks 
whoever runs the ERTU runs Egypt.”458  
Commercially, the reorganization of the ERTU created a framework that would be more in 
line with Sadat’s aims to liberalize and decentralize. However, it still affirmed the complete 
monopoly of the state on broadcasting emissions and production. Otherwise, the ERTU 
would’ve played a more expansive role in the sector flourishing, had it used its ability to 
engage with private companies, create mergers/joint ventures or employ contractors to 
provide services at different levels of production.459 The Union still looked for ways to 
diversify its sources of income and would make a concerted effort to have its finances 
managed independently. One way it attempted to boost revenue was to improve collection of 
television set-licenses fees by including them directly in electricity bills, ensuring the 
payments came in rather than spending resources on the inefficient process of collecting these 
taxes separately. This practice was unfair to those millions of Egyptians without television 
sets, but it guaranteed revenue generation at a time when the financial burden of television 
spending was being criticized by some local press.460  
Aside from the licensing issue, the 1979 law would in theory create a public broadcasting 
system that was more akin to the organizations functioning in Western Europe and the US.  
According to Mohamed Gohar, a news services provider who first came to prominence as 
Sadat’s photographer, “Sadat spoke often about wanting to have a vibrant media system. He 
liked the way media was run in the US especially, and would always seek to be interviewed 
on American stations, but he did not believe Egypt was ready for such an endeavor.”461 Gohar, 
who was by Sadat’s side for a majority of his trips abroad during the second half of his 
presidency, had created a network of friends in American and European media organizations 
as he would always be present and play a role in Sadat’s appearances. By 1977 Gohar 
understood that there would be a huge demand for private broadcasting services in Egypt by 
these groups, who felt that the monopoly of the state on all broadcasting matters, would hurt 
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their credibility. Accordingly, he took the idea of him launching a private business providing 
these services to Sadat: 
Sadat was with the idea, he encouraged me to continue thinking about the issue 
but he never took real steps or worked on building infrastructure that would work 
towards this issue… After returning from Camp David, I noticed that [Sadat] 
seemed to actually believe more in the concept of private broadcast media as 
being essential to a modern society…  [Minister of Information] Mansour 
Hassan462 was also supportive of the idea. State Security463 were against it... 
Obviously this meant it would not go through.464 
Gohar would go on to build a successful media services business, but not during 
Sadat’s time.  
The symbolism of Maspero 
The building that would house the ERTU came to be known as Maspero, after the area in 
Central Cairo on the Nile, where it is built.465 The building is the most imposing structure in 
downtown Cairo, boasting a robust base and a protruding high rise tower through the middle 
and with a tall antenna jutting upwards.  
It would symbolize the seemingly unhealthy growth of state bureaucracies beyond reason or 
practicality. Douglas Boyd estimated 15,000 – 20,000 people worked in that building with 
“too many permanent staff members; the various sectors could function effectively- some say 
a great deal more efficiently- with one-third to one-half of the people.”466 The number of 
employees inflated to about 43,000 by 2016.467 
5) Mubarak (1981-2001): before private media: Strong Regime, Weak State468 
Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) would inherit a nearly bankrupt government, and a security 
regime that would greatly expand and diversify under him. Crucially, for the majority of his 
term as president, Mubarak did not have to worry about wrestling power away from other 
powerful factions from within the government. He inherited his position in a way that Sadat 
and certainly Nasser had not and was under less political pressure to implement immediate 
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changes. As McDermott noted, “Mubarak [was] trying to acquire his legitimacy through the 
unexciting policy of buying time.”469 The nature of his predecessor’s demise provided him 
with a different set of immediate concerns. 
Sadat’s assassination while attending a military parade on 6 October 1981 was a natural jolt to 
Egypt as a whole, especially for government and the state’s security apparatus. The 
assassination was carried out by military officers- who were also members of an extremist 
group. Mubarak was sat beside Sadat as his Vice President, and managed to emerge unharmed 
and poised to pick up as President- a position he held on to for the following three decades. 
He initially showed a similar ambivalence as Sadat had to the role and structure of mass 
media in Egypt.470 But the length of his time in power along with the shape-shifting political 
scene, economic policies and security considerations were well reflected in the changes to the 
country’s media system. His longevity as an autocrat after a major assassination was in part 
due to his attempts to find outlets for a population under duress amid deteriorating economic 
circumstances, a single-party parliamentary presence, and an increasingly overbearing internal 
security structure that grew to unprecedented levels of size and power under his reign.471  
This era began with an indication that Mubarak would not inherit all of his predecessor’s 
political quarrels. He released the majority of Sadat’s political detainees almost immediately 
after assuming power. “On the whole he did not share Sadat’s hidebound view that only 
‘constructive’- which meant in effect uncritical and uncontroversial– opposition could be 
permitted.”472 Mubarak initially was relatively open to the existence of an opposition that was 
allowed to raise concerns, within limits. The policy of tanfis473(airing out) would consistently 
be used as a safety valve against public outbursts such as the 1977 Bread Riots. Mass media 
were a major tool for this, especially later on in his presidency, when some outlets were 
permitted to air segments critical of some government policies. Some public protests were 
also allowed-in the same spirit of tanfis- as long as the overall message contained a clear 
directive conveying a desire for a strong regime.474 
Economically, the plan was always to stay on course with Sadat’s Open Door Policy. 
Mubarak stated as much in his opening statements at an economic conference held by the 
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government on 13 February 1982.475 In this speech, he announced his aim to remedy some of 
the ill-effects of Sadat’s method in implementing these policies by acknowledging the need to 
increase value-added production, enhance individual participation in the economy, boost 
corporate involvement and push to increase foreign and local investments. To usher in his 
presidency, Mubarak also directed the legislative and executive branches to work towards the 
prosperity of individuals, an obvious continuation of liberalization-oriented policies. He 
mentioned in the speech the need to strengthen the foundations of “democratic rule.” 
A perpetual emergency and unlimited power 
From the outset of his presidency (and for its duration), Egypt was under an official state of 
emergency. This in effect gave both the President and the security forces excessive leeway in 
monitoring and regulating a variety of activities, and then deciding supra-judicially if they 
constitute a sufficient enough reason for censorship or persecution, especially if deemed 
menacing to national security. This severely hampered freedom of assembly and expression. 
With regards to media, it granted the Ministry of Interior unlimited discretion in combatting 
perceived threats. Ultimately, it freed the president and the security forces from having to 
operate within the confines the constitution and within the normal confines of the law. 
Mubarak’s first presidential decree was a declaration of emergency law.476 In addition to other 
laws issued to govern mass media, the 1958 Emergency Law that he used contained clauses 
that could override any commercial or editorial freedoms offered to mass media outlets. This 
provided for a caveat to any legal provisions, proclamation, or trends in mass media 
development during this period. Below are some of the more relevant clauses that allow for a 
major suspension of laws upon declaration of a state of emergency: 
(1) Restrict people's freedom of assembly, movement, residence, or passage in 
specific times and places; arrest suspects or [persons who are] dangerous to 
public security and order [and] detain them; allow searches of persons and 
places without being restricted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code; and assign anyone to perform any of these tasks. 
(2) Order the surveillance of letters of any type; supervise censorship; seize 
journals, newsletters, publications, editorials, cartoons, and any form of 
expression and advertisement before they are published, and close their 
publishing places. 
(3) Determine the times of opening and closing public shops, and order the 
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closure of some or all of these shops. 
(4) Confiscate any property or building, order the sequestration of companies 
and corporations, and postpone the due dates of loans for what has been 
confiscated or sequestrated.477 
 
As per the 1958 law, the President may declare this state “whenever public security or order is 
threatened.” The vague wording allowed for a broad application of this law. The 1981 decree 
also allowed for a variety of ordinary crimes to be referred to State Security Courts, including: 
crimes concerning state security, crimes of public incitement (including by newspapers), and 
crimes involving public demonstrations and gatherings. These courts operated under normal 
judicial proceedings, although their verdicts are not subject to appeal.478  
Due to this law, developments involving journalism, civil society and politics during the 
majority of this period occurred with the overhanging cloud of an emergency law that, by 
design either suspended or restricted due process and carried within it, the ability to suspend 
or completely outlaw an publication/broadcast at any time. 
As was the case during his predecessors’ reigns, the development of media systems under 
Mubarak closely reflected the political, economic and security climates prevalent at the time. 
They also typified the paradox of a regime claiming to be moving towards liberalization, 
without ever seriously altering the underlying autocratic political structure.479 
Mubarak was also able to maintain a tight grip on society through the semantic ambiguities in 
the law. While the constitution allowed for pluripartism, it stipulated that it must not stray 
beyond ‘the framework of the basic elements and principles of Egyptian society.’ Parties 
were also greatly hampered by a host of operational impediments forbidding them from 
operating and assembling openly outside of party doors, with the exception of the period of 
parliamentary campaigning and elections. They did enjoy one major benefit of being the only 
entities able to print newspapers without the prior approval of the Higher Press Council.  
Similarly, laws allowing for freedom of opinion and expression were constantly tagged with 
the vague stipulation of, ‘according to the provisions of the law’ (wafqan li-ahkam al-qanun), 
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essentially allowing the public prosecutor to decide when certain actions are lawful and 
others are not.480 
The constitution also gave Mubarak immense ‘real’ powers over all branches of 
government.481 His powers were not to be checked by the People’s Assembly, yet he had the 
power to veto the Assembly. He could also dissolve parliament with minimal resistance.482 
The President appointed the majority of the heads of quasi-governmental bodies, some of 
which were watchdogs for branches of the government. This included, for example, key 
members of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, the Central Auditing Organization, as 
well as the Political Party Affairs Committee (PPAC), instituted in 1977. The latter was the 
most important arbiter for political party life in Egypt, along with the court system. The 
PPAC refused applications for the formation of nearly 70 parties during Mubarak’s reign, 
allowing only eight.483 Other political parties were able to gain recognition through protracted 
judicial proceedings after the initial denial by PPAC. 
Up until 1991, Mubarak was largely able to maintain the status quo he had inherited from his 
predecessor. The state was bearing the same welfare burdens it had overseen until this point, 
while no real development in output growth was made. Instead, like Sadat, Mubarak’s 
centrally planned economy still relied on rent-seeking. After the crash of oil prices in 1986, 
not only did Egypt lose oil revenue, but spillover effects from oil-rich donor countries were 
affecting remittances and foreign donations.484 Public finances and the country’s entire 
economic structure were at an impasse. This was the catalyst for a major shift in the country’s 
political economy, a shift that Mubarak would see to it, continued to maintain his grip on 
power.485 Through its participation in the Gulf War that year, half of Egypt’s debt was erased, 
in exchange for an agreement to implement a full structural adjustment and economic 
liberalization program prescribed by the IMF. These agreements would constitute the first 
real push towards a neo-liberal economy. The prescriptions of International Financial 
Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and USAID would also be seen as the cover, under 
which the Mubarak regime would ultimately create a new clientelism.  
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Plans to privatize a majority of state-owned businesses began in 1994 with state assets being 
progressively transferred to the private sector, usually to entities from within the circles close 
to the power center.486 While the process was initially slow, it set up the creation of a new 
form of dependency of the growing industrial and rural elites on the state for access to public 
economic resources. The impetus for democratization among these groups would be minimal. 
Rather they had a vested interest in supporting the status quo. Many of them bolstered the 
regime’s coalition by joining the ruling NDP and participating in parliamentary elections 
under their banner.487  
While this cohort was growing, it was not until 2005 that they would become the centerpiece 
of major shift in the country’s power dynamics. Until then, the regime was very gradually 
retreating from its developmental role, while maintaining control with an ever-growing 
security force, which ballooned under Mubarak, who oversaw the reinforcement of the 
Interior Ministry to the point where it began to rival the military in size. As of 2012, nearly 
2.3 percent of Egyptians worked in one security agency or another. At its height, the KGB in 
Russia did not employ more than 150,000 servicemen. Egypt in 2012 had just over 2 million 
individuals working in the different departments of the massive security apparatuses.488 
The second half of Mubarak’s presidency was thus defined by the duality of a growing 
security apparatus and clientelist class.  
One of the more enduring “socialist” legacies in Egyptian media have been the cooperative 
structures of the national newspapers. From Nasser to Mubarak, it helped develop the 
institutions surrounding the publicly-owned press in ways that would shield it from some of 
the institutional drawbacks of Egyptian public organizations, be it in tiresome bureaucracy, 
crippling hierarchies or stagnant professional development. Ironically, this “socialist” legacy 
would make these organizations robust enough to cope with increasing liberalization and 
commercialization, while avoiding the difficulties of a public sector saddled with 
continuously compounded fiscal strain. The culture of the press and of the profession of 
journalists were also able to endure the test of time through the Mubarak years, partially due 
to the aforementioned structure, but also due to the legacy of the profession from its earliest 
years nearly a century earlier.   
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The remainder of this chapter will assess the performance of media under Mubarak for the 
first two decades of his rule (1981-2001).  This period represents a diverse array of shifts in 
the mechanisms through which the regime decided to maintain power, as well as a gradual 
recalibration of power structures and alliances under the expanding neopatrimonial system. 
These years witnessed more rapidly advancing communication technologies. And despite the 
emergency law, it was also an era defined by ideas such as Fukayama’s flawed, “End of 
History” where Western liberal democracies would become the inevitable end to the evolution 
of mankind’s political ideology. Whether or not Mubarak believed this, the financial burdens 
on the state during recession in the late 1980’s convinced him to instigate changes that 
seemed to aspire towards a transition into a Western liberal model.  
Despite the singularity of rule during this period, both print and broadcast media were 
constantly in flux, due to changing infrastructural capabilities, variable loosening and 
tightening of the regulatory leash and the growing involvement of security forces in mass 
media on an organizational and administrative level.  
Mubarak and the Press 
Unlike both Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak did not have ‘his own’ journalists, but rather looked 
to create a state of general subservience to his regime. 489 Heikal explained how this came 
about in his book, “Mubarak w Zamanoh” (Mubarak and his Era) by revealing Mubarak’s 
attitude towards the press upon assumption of office. During their first private meeting, the 
incoming president spoke flippantly about the role of journalists as well as their 
professionalism and integrity. He complained to Heikal that his Prime Minister at the time 
(Fouad Mohi El-Din) was constantly providing journalists with information that they would 
not always publish, which Mubarak thought reflected on a general state of disintegration 
within the profession: 
The issue is not that they do not publish news, [because] they either have a 
personal interest in the matter, or they are unintelligent… Mohamed 
‘Bey490’, you are measuring the journalists of today, with that of a forgone 
era. Journalists now do not enjoy special relationships with the president 
491…If we tell the journalists more, they will just manipulate it. 492   
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This is at a time when the press (and all media) were nearly entirely under government control. 
Heikal reminded him of this during their interaction. “But, Mr. President, you are talking 
about your press, I mean the country’s”.493 This interaction occurred in the context of Heikal 
attempting to convince Mubarak to grant journalists more access to news regarding a 
forthcoming Cabinet reshuffle. Mubarak responded to the request with indignation. 
Nonetheless, Heikal thought at the time that there was still the possibility of a palpable barrier 
shift between journalism as an entire profession and the state insofar as Mubarak may see the 
press through a more political lens, rather than as a tool/conduit for communication with the 
public. The possibility of this separation could have occurred if it was the case that an 
independent press would benefit the Mubarak presidency. This, as opposed to Nasser who did 
not see mass media as having a future that would be at all removed from the plans of his 
government.   
A few months into his presidency, Mubarak released political prisoners, including journalists 
jailed during the latter years of Sadat’s presidency, while allowing the opposition papers to 
begin publishing once more.494 The following period saw press restrictions ease, with 
opposition writers finding that, unlike under Sadat, they were able to express their positions 
more freely, “within limits495”.496 Again, the state’s leverage was immense as it still had 
ownership of the most important outlets, publishing houses and means of distribution.  
One journalist, Raga’i Elmerghany497 described the relationship between Mubarak and the 
Press as being very nuanced:  
The relationship with [Mubarak] was uncomfortable and complicated and 
had many collision points…[It] was not generally a result of [Mubarak’s] 
personal philosophy [towards the press] but rather the philosophy of any 
dictatorial regime.498 
Relatively speaking, the first few years saw a significant increase in journalistic freedoms, so 
much so that the International Press Institute stated in 1983 that the Egyptian press had 
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experienced its highest level of freedoms since the fall of the monarchy in 1953.499  
Opposition papers like AlSha’ab and AlAhali had resumed publication in 1982. While the 
New Wafd party, which was established (and suspended) in the late 1970’s, won a court case 
and began publishing its own paper AlWafd.500 They were selling nearly half a million copies 
weekly, nearly 6 to 10 times that of other party weeklies.501 Mubarak had even lifted the ban 
on publications by Christian and Muslim groups.  
However, at times when the state was unable through its own channels to completely control 
the narrative on certain sensitive topics, it was not uncommon for it to resort to more extreme 
measures. One of these sensitive topics was said to be Saudi Arabia, whose relationship with 
the Egyptian government had improved since Nasser’s death. The Nasserist periodical, Sawt 
Al’Arab was closed in 1988 precisely due to its criticism of KSA.502 A 1992 antiterrorism law 
also allowed the state to take direct actions against publications deemed to be “disturbing 
social peace” or “spreading panic,” two phrases often open to vast arrays of interpretation.503 
From 1981 to 2000, over 300 publications were launched. Political parties were more likely 
to publish newspapers (AlWafd became the most important, daily "opposition" political party 
paper). Private newspapers began popping up such as AlDostor, Al'alam Alyoum (financial), 
and El'isboo'. Magazines were also resurgent, after having had to accommodate much more 
limited opportunities to publish under previous governments. Magazines had begun to evolve 
as they were beginning to emulate other well-known markets in that space. Specialized 
magazines were being produced to meet consumer demand. This happened, while Egyptian 
television was also searching for ways to raise revenues, potentially seeking a similar 
commercially-driven direction.504 
By 1993 five party papers were circulating nearly 100,000 copies each. That year, there were 
in total 263 licensed newspapers of all kinds: 76 by national publishing houses and 
government organs, 11 by political parties, 79 by individuals and professional societies and  
the rest were specific to provinces, universities, social clubs and youth centers.505 Mass 
publication continued to be more or less exclusive to the main national publications and some 
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 At the end of the 1980s Mubarak had yet to implement the economic, social and political 
policies that would come to define his presidency. One writer described the 80’s as a decade 
when Mubarak was “content to balance the legacies of Nasser and Sadat and reform 
initiatives remained caught between the contrary interests generated by them.”506 Editors and 
journalists thus had more room to maneuver, unlike the previous two decades. There was not 
as much of an ideological line to tow with the state, and so as a general rule, self-censorship 
became more prevalent when it came to matters more directly concerning the regime and its 
performance, rather than on broader issues, as it had been in the past with some specific 
topics: Infitah, Nasserism, USA vs USSR etc.  
The 1990’s were a different story. Political strains and a more precarious internal security 
situation, compounded with escalating economic difficulties and a massively indebted 
government all came together to factor into decision-making at the time. Egypt’s 
participation in the Gulf War and its signing onto loan agreements with International 
Financial Institutions, directly led to the country aligning itself with the liberal west and the 
Washington Consensus principles507. Along with economic changes involving liberalization 
and privatization, politics were expected to also shift.508  
This contentious and ambitious shift was initially felt in economic policy, while internal 
politics and liberties seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. After conducting a 
decidedly more democratic parliamentary election cycle in 1987-resulting in nearly one fifth 
of the representatives being from outside the ruling party- steps were taken to reverse that 
tide. Snap parliamentary elections were called under differing criteria. The result was that the 
opposition representation in Parliament decreased from 94 to 29. The 1995 elections, saw the 
introduction of businessmen (allied to Mubarak’s NDP) to parliament just as the privatization 
process was picking up speed, and the most arduous tenets of the economic reform program 
were being implemented. Between 1991 and 1995, state budget expenditures decreased by 
around 11% with wages and subsidies bearing the brunt of this reduction.509 
The same year saw an escalation in Egypt’s costly and casualty-heavy attempts to neutralize 
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Islamist Militant groups, a campaign that ultimately would lead to mass detentions, especially 
from the Muslim Brotherhood, which had made significant gains in the 1987 elections. The 
1995 elections itself was said to have been rife with fraud. It left the ruling party in control of 
94% of the seats. The regime’s Political Parties Committee—which regulates the creation of 
new parties—rejected every application made to it during the 1990s.510 
A short-lived attempt to “assassinate the press” in 1995 
The regime felt the need to control the narrative surrounding these changes. Unlike Sadat, 
Mubarak decided to act in a more proactive manner in order to consolidate his control and 
avoid public backlash caused by the media. With his full support, the government proposed 
Law 93 of 1995511 in order to do just that. The law, which was passed in May that same year, 
was popularly called the law to “assassinate the press”.512 It was hastily passed in the People’s 
Assembly with no parliamentary debate on the matter. Most deputies were not given sufficient 
access to review the law, nor was was consultation on the law requested from the Higher 
Press Council, The Shura Council, nor the Journalists Syndicate, as was customary for laws 
concerning the press. Statements from the government claimed the law was passed to protect 
private life and rectify weaknesses in penal law, but most journalists viewed it and the manner 
and timing of its passing as being “too close to the November parliamentary elections [that 
year] to be coincidental.” 513  
The law contained amendments to the 1980 law, significantly increasing both the state’s 
means of controlling the media, as well as the punishments doled out to journalists for a more 
expanded spectrum of perceived transgressions.  Anyone guilty of spreading “false or 
defamatory” information would now face up to three years in jail along with a fine of up to 
LE10,000 (at a time when most journalists made around LE1,000/month). Significantly, if 
misinformation was deemed to have been published with the aim of harming the national 
economy or national interest, prison sentences were increased to five years and fines were 
doubled. Previously, prison sentences for journalists with similar convictions had barely 
exceeded one year. After the law was passed by nearly one year, over 100 journalists were 
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interrogated and 33 officially charged.514 
Editors of opposition papers such as AlWafd and AlSha’b were targeted, as Mubarak began to 
turn on opposition party papers.515 The law was also used to bring journalists from official 
publications in line as well. Interrogations spread to editors from publicly owned papers such 
as AlGomhouriya, Rosa Al-Yousef, Sabah El-Kheir and even the chief editor of AlAhram and 
the head of the Journalists Syndicate at the time, Ibrahim Nafei. Under the new amendments, 
courts could decide to prosecute insults, even if they were not libelous. The vague language 
used, allowed for broad interpretations of the law and led to a unified and definitive moment 
of defiance from members of the Journalists Syndicate.516 
The Journalists Syndicate would for long cite its 13-month long effort to abolish law 93 of 
1995 as one of its crowning achievements. Even loyalist journalists joined the fight, such as 
Nafei. That year represented a watershed moment for journalists, who organized general 
strikes, protests, and general assemblies in opposition to this law. Despite attempts from the 
government to appease some journalists, by insinuating that the legislation would not apply to 
them, the syndicate maintained unity. The group’s leadership drew a line in the sand, largely 
due to broad pressure from its general membership. This was seen as a rare moment when 
journalists did not divide in pro-government and opposition camps.517 On June 21 of the same 
year, local and international opposition led to a six-hour meeting between Mubarak and 
leaders of the Journalists Syndicate. Mubarak decided to defuse the situation by agreeing to 
convene a committee to produce a revised draft law within three months.518 In June 1996, the 
law was repealed and replaced by a press law (No. 96 of 1996) that was touted as being the 
most liberal in Egypt’s history. In reality, it was only marginally more liberal that the 1980 
law, in rhetoric rather than application. The effect on the press corps was to instil a more 
defined and rigorous notion that the legacy of journalism in Egypt was one that was not solely 
confined to the halls of power and that it still had the ability to influence major political 
change. “It is undisputed that Law No. 93 would not have been repealed if it had not provoked 
such wide-scale protests.” 519 Nonetheless, the penal code still contained many clauses 
allowing it to restrain to the press. It still included ‘crimes of publication’, the press law, and 
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public sector ownership of the media. 
Restrictions to media ownership (especially in obtaining security permits) still precluded 
anyone with the gumption for such an endeavor from realistically setting up an independent 
newspaper. Licenses for private foreign-published papers were technically allowed. The 1996 
Law stipulated that it would require a paid-in capital of one million Egyptian pounds in the 
case of daily publications and 250,000 in the case of weekly papers. Sole propriety of the 
papers would not be permitted, rather these companies could only be set-up as joint stock 
companies or cooperatives where a shareholder could not hold more than 10% of the shares 
and must be Egyptian.520   
It had become known that obtaining a new one was near impossible. Aside from the price 
barrier, most aspiring publishers were not able to obtain the security permits, forcing them to 
search for alternative solutions. One option would have been to obtain one of the existent (yet 
largely dormant) private newspaper publishing licenses directly from a previous owner.521 The 
other legally viable option was to register the publication in a foreign country and apply to 
open an operation in Egypt as a foreign publication without going through the same security 
barrier. This loophole contributed to the formation of a modestly-sized parallel press with 
some publications taking full advantage.522 For example, Egyptian publisher Essam Fahmy 
established a weekly paper, AlDostor in Cyprus where it was licensed and distributed in Cairo 
as a foreign publication. The Higher Press Council did not have the power to grant or repeal 
licenses to these ‘international’ papers.523 Even though they were checked by the censors, 
most of these publications did not conform to the political status quo and were a thorn in the 
regime’s side.524 In 1998, a law (No 3) was passed restricting the formation of any 
newspapers or satellite television companies, unless approved by the Council of Ministers, 
greatly reducing the power of the Higher Press Council, and centralizing power on these 
matters.525 
As one of the more popular political news publications, AlDostor was a major target for these 
restrictions.  Fahmy took a chance on a young chief editor, Ibrahim Eissa. For three years the 
paper was sold in Egypt where it made a name for going against the official state narrative 
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and offering a platform for opposition. In 1998 AlDostor was banned for seven years after 
publishing a letter by the extremist group Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, in which it had threatened to 
assassinate three Coptic Christian businessmen.526 A year before that in 1997 the government 
had already begun finding ways to legally shut-down these foreign-registered publications, 
even resorting to using archaic and rarely used laws from the time of the monarchy.527  
AlDostor would resurface again in 2004 after gaining to operate in Egypt. It would be one of 
the first private papers to be locally published, while also being consistently critical of the 
government. The same year marked the actual beginning of private papers in Egypt with the 
emergence of one of the more influential private daily newspapers AlMasry AlYoum. The case 
of which will be more thoroughly dissected in later chapters.  
The impending liberalization of the sector would be on the heels of both a state of upheaval 
within the profession, as well as the overall direction of state policies. Journalism was in a 
simmering state prior to the emergence of private independent newspapers, especially after 
the galvanizing campaign against the1995 Law. Journalists were also encouraged by the 
state’s promise and preoccupation with appearing to be implementing political and economic 
liberalization, as per the state’s shifting political and economic posturing earlier in the decade. 
Through the turn of the century, the Journalists Syndicate continued its campaigning for a less 
restrictive penal code on journalists, and a liberalization of the sector more generally. One of 
AlAhram’s broadly respected editors said at that time: 
 “There should be all sorts of revisions like establishing papers cancelling the 
provisions in the law that allows for imprisonment over publication offenses 
etc. If this does not happen we will not be able to have a leading position or 
compete with the international press.”528 
Despite these calls and campaigns529 the situation did not change significantly until the 
introduction of AlMasry AlYoum. With the emergence of a class of politically-connected 
businessmen, the balance of political and economic power was shifting, while at the same 
time editors and journalists were continuing to understand how the changing situation would 
translate into the relocation of the invisible red lines of journalism. Papers were printing more 
frequently about corruption in government, although this resulted at times in persecution and 
																																								 																				
526 Amro (2010) 
527 Kienle (2001) p. 105 
528 Salama Ahmed Salama; Interview by Shaden Shehab in AlAhram International, January 6-12, 2000 p3. In 
Kienle (2001) p. 162 
529 Including a 1999 campaign by the Journalists Syndicate for Mubarak to remove restrictions on newspapers 





fines.530   
Amid these developments, the appetite and market for media was growing as evidenced by 
the high distribution of the three major public daily papers, which reached over one million, 
by 2003.531 Printing and distribution under the umbrella of these large public papers also 
increased greatly. In 1998 AlAhram and AlAkhbar inaugurated new print houses that would be 
used by a majority of private papers seeking mass distribution.  
Television: Maspero and beyond  
Like the press, Mubarak began his relationship with television with no real plan. The 
development and growth of Arab Satellite television created an inflection point in the sector 
when it penetrated Egyptian markets in the mid-1990’s. By then, neighboring regimes were 
investing in regional projects and outlets that were forcibly transforming the sector by 
introducing new programming formats, content and business models.  Pan-Arab mass media 
growth played a critical role in the development of Egyptian broadcasting in the 1990s, 
especially since it came at a time when Mubarak’s regime was already attempting to reinvent 
itself as being more liberal and open, while hoping to reassert its role as a regional 
powerhouse.  
The trends above, coupled with rapidly developing broadcast transmission technology offered 
both opportunities and challenges to the Mubarak regime. It was very quickly making access 
to global media more affordable. At the same time, it created a pace of change that may have 
been too quick for the ruling cohort, which seemed to have no plans to shift away from 
keeping a self preservation-minded drive towards control of the public sphere.  
Illiteracy rates were still high at around 45.4% by 1996532 and so the state maintained its focus 
on broadcasting for communication with the general public. The ERTU continued to grow 
while regional channels continued to open. Radio development effectively stagnated, as 
television development became the sole broadcasting priority, especially with the introduction 
and growth of satellite television, which would replace radio as the main conduit for regional 
audio-visual communication.533 Between 1989 and 1995 the ERTU was broadcasting 8 
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terrestrial channels with Channels 4-8 targeting specifically the majority of the larger 
governorates.534 
Up until this point, television broadcasting had only been owned and run by the government, 
under the auspices of the ERTU, although the Union had begun to rely on private sector 
advertisements and some private production in order to fund its operations. At the same time, 
many saw the addition of the five new stations (along with a teletext service) as a first step 
towards decentralization by Mubarak.535 It was a possible departure from the shackles of Law 
No. 223 of 1989, which gave the ERTU monopoly over broadcasting, allowing the state to 
unilaterally employ and react to these changes, as long as it could keep up with it.  
The ERTU however, was a bloated and inefficient agency that was consistently running a 
deficit. By 2013 this deficit reached a reported LE13 billion ($2 billion536) of debt to the 
government, while employing an unjustifiably large workforce of around 43,000, of which 
7,000 where security personnel.537 Content-wise, the institution was constantly criticized for 
its low-quality productions and that it rarely catered to audience preferences as much as it did 
to the regime’s.538 Maspero’s size and the employees within it acted more as a testament to 
the regime’s aspirations for survival, rather than to its  practical media ambitions. Terrestrial 
broadcasting would continue to be monopolized by the state.  
 
Mr. Media  
For over 22 years, former intelligence officer Safwat ElSherif sat at the helm of the Ministry 
of Information (and by default, the ERTU). He was appointed to the position in 1982, after 
two years as the head of the ERTU.539 Aside from his history in the General Intelligence 
Services, ElSherif was also a founding member of the NDP. He had initially been in control of 
building the President’s media image. He was also behind the massive expansions in the 
ERTU, as well as the foundational changes in the country’s broadcasting sector. He was 
Mubarak’s longest serving cabinet minister. As ex-officio chair of the ERTU “board of 
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trustees” ElSherif was the main source of directives sent down to all local broadcasting. 
Under him were 36 other members of the board, who all owed their appointment to the 
Presidential chain of  command as well, representing ministries, universities and departments 
within the ERTU.540 “The process of co-opting so many people lends an aura of consensus-
building to a structure in which policy initiatives may have their roots somewhere below the 
ministerial level but can only see daylight if approved by players at or above it.”541 
The dominion of an intelligence officer over the country’s media theoretically precluded the 
need for any direct supervision from the country’s security apparatuses in order to ensure to 
conformity.  
Mohamed Gohar -one of a handful of private television producers allowed to operate in the 
1980’s through his company, Video Cairo- believed that Safwat ElSherif represented the 
direct control of a security-minded ethos within the state at the time. “Back in the 1980’s, 
there was no real direct form of censorship or control from the Interior Ministry, Intelligence 
Services or the Armed Forces, but editorial orders from the Ministry of Information were 
treated as they would have been from one of these agencies.”542 
ElSherif was behind the initial acceptance of opening broadcast media to the private sector, 
with the idea that it would be easy to control. He also thought this would be a viable source of 
revenue for the indebted ERTU.543 
Satellite television, a game-changer 
Technological developments in media often outpaced the ability of the state to control it. 
When it came to satellite television, the Egyptian government spotted an early opportunity to 
attempt to reassert its regional media supremacy. Egypt’s status in the Arab League was 
restored in 1989 after a two –year campaign that was bolstered by its support of Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq war, and increasing international pressure. The Arab League headquarters were 
moved back to Cairo in 1990. Plans to launch the region’s first satellite television station 
began around the same time as Egypt re-joined the Arab League’s fold. In addition, Egypt 
would also be allowed to participate in ARABSAT, a pan-Arab Satellite launched in 1985, in 
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which Saudi Arabia was the largest shareholder.544 The Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC) was 
officially launched on 12 December 1990. The launch date was earlier than originally 
scheduled, ostensibly in an attempt to air to Egyptian troops stationed in Saudi Arabia at the 
time as they were preparing to participate in the Gulf War, “in order to broadcast Egyptian 
television materials to counter the psychological war launched by Iraqi media”.545  
The main goals of the channel included: 
a. Introducing Arab citizens to the Egyptian culture… adding to the Arab 
intellect in such a manner that would help unify their thoughts and their 
position toward common and crucial issues 
b. Linking embassies and cultural and media centers in the Arab region 
c. Creating a link between expatriates in target areas and their motherland 
d. Promoting tourism and economic and commercial activities 
e. Using space in promoting the Egyptian media message on a wide scale546 
 
These indicated that the regime thought it had found its permanent alternative to radio in order 
to gain mass media access to the region. Cross-border media would still be expected to 
conform to nationalistic goals, meaning satellite television would be treated as local and 
would be subject to both local laws and the normative expectations placed upon them by the 
state. According to the goals, satellite television would play a role in promoting commercial 
interests and economic liberalization, while potentially generating revenue in its own right.  
The final goal was one of the main stated motivators behind plans by ElSherif to increase 
Egypt’s Satellite output by launching more stations on a new government satellite, while 
leasing space on the satellite for other stations. The Egyptian Satellite Company (NILESAT) 
was launched in 1996 while the satellite itself, Nilesat 101547 was in operation by 1998, 
launched with seven new thematic channels (Nile News, Nile Sport, Nile Comedy, Nile 
Drama, Nile Culture, Nile Children & Family and Nile Variety) at a cost of $158 million. 
Despite ElSherif’s claims that the project would provide an annual $50 million in revenue, it 
made only $27 million and $36 million in 1998 and 1999 respectively, falling behind some 
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individual regional stations.548 The potential for future revenue remained since the region (as a 
market) had not changed, and so private advertising companies were still looking to seize the 
economic opportunity of new ad-space provided by the satellite.  
Many from within the sector took the perspective that the Nilesat’s success or failure would 
be based more on “intangibles,” such as its ability to present Egypt as a cohesive community, 
or increase Egypt’s prestige in the region. 549 By that time, only around 10% of Egyptian 
households had access to satellite television, which was much lower than its neighbors, 
especially in the Gulf Countries, where the rates were closer to 50% of households.550 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Information did not embark on a campaign to increase satellite 
penetration in Egyptian households, although it did not impede it forcefully either.  
The launch of an Egyptian satellite, would ultimately come to perform the role of a tool to 
improve the country’s soft power, rather than one that would lead to a structural 
transformation in the media sector as far as how it operates vis-à-vis the state. Nonetheless, it 
represented a major shift in the Egyptian broadcasting, creating new opportunities and 
markets for the sector. The satellite that was launched could, after all, still carry private 
broadcasting. However, this prospect seemed far from reach, even in the late 1990’s. The 
government did not give any indication it would be gearing towards such a move. ElSherif 
himself said in an interview on the show Good Morning Egypt on 1 January 1997 that “the 
Egyptian media are not ready to compete in the era of open airwaves.”551 
Yet just three years later, the country would see the single most important development 
leading to the private broadcasting. A prime ministerial decree in 2000 launched Egypt’s 
Media Production City (EMPC) on an area that was previously a complex of television and 
film studios as well as uplink facilities. The decree designated it as a free zone putting its 
activities under the supervision of the Public Authority for Investments and Free Zones, 
according to Law 8 of 1997.552 This effectively would allow private companies wishing to 
circumvent the ERTU, to gain their licenses directly from the EMPC, via the supervising 
government body. The ERTU still maintained control via its 43% ownership of EMPC, while 
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the rest was spread between financial organizations and around 20% public shares.553 
Both the proliferation of satellite television and the 2000 designation of the EMPC would 
become the major precursors to the proliferation of privately owned, locally produced satellite 
channels. 
Along with technological and infrastructural developments in broadcast media under ElSherif, 
the rise of the internet and the noticeable shift in the country’s overall power structure caused 
on the heels of the neoliberal policy shift would all play their parts in setting the scene for a 
mass media sector that would come out from under the direct ownership of the state. 
6) Summary and Conclusion 
The history of Egyptian mass media as a sector and its relation with the periods of both 
continuity and transition shed light on ways in which the country’s media system was 
integrally linked to the broader changes in the country’s political economy. Shifts in the sector 
reflect a state of constant flux and developments in parallel with concurrent technological 
changes as well as transformations in journalistic labor markets. From the very first attempts 
at creating print publications that would reach the public in ways that could affect public 
opinion, the state was shifting its posture towards these media and the proliferation of 
information and ideas, of which the history of the press especially is central.  
Gamal Abdel-Nasser had set a plan on how to outright weaponize media as a tool towards his 
broader goals. It involved total control, building up capital and spearheading a technological 
drive in the sector, especially in the telecom sector. Media development during this period 
was meant to serve the larger purpose of helping achieve the regime’s developmentalist goals 
for post-monarchy Egypt. This era would leave an institutional imprint on the sector for 
decades insofar as the state would approach it as being a necessary tool at its disposal, and one 
with major national security implications. 
The eras of Mubarak and Sadat showed that in the absence of a consistent political and 
economic ideology for the regime, the overall attitude to the media will also be ambivalent.  
The main constant was an intolerance to dissent, and an extreme paranoia regarding any 
potential relinquishing of control over the regulation and infrastructure of broadcast and print 
news outlets and programming. Both regimes also carried-over a view that-on some level- 
																																								 																				





media buy-in to the state was expected. A major caveat behind these regimes’ outlook was 
that that the media and their access to the public would also be viewed as matters of national 
security. Development of private media in Mubarak’s latter years would be under the same 
context, but this was complicated by the rapid technological developments in the sector, and 
the regime’s desire to appear to be edging towards both economic and political liberalization. 
There seemed to be a constant negotiation occurring, especially in print, where there was an 
ebb and flow of freedoms in the sector, stemming from Mubarak’s understanding that he 
needed a mechanism for the public to vent frustrations at the deteriorating economic situation, 
to avoid any larger internal conflict.  
Former Intelligence Officer Safwat ElSherif held the position of of Minister of Information 
for two decades and was a defining player in the development of Egyptian media under 
Mubarak. While he wielded direct power over all mass media in the country during this period, 
he also developed the infrastructure that would pave the way for a new era of private media 
albeit within the context of a regime that was increasingly clientelistic and neopatrimonial. 
Tides were shifting towards a growing private sector as the economic ethos of the state 
seemed to move away from the complete, centralized State Capitalist model of the Nasser-era. 
The same could not be said of the political and security-oriented ethos of the state, which led 















Chapter 4- Privatization: The genesis of private print and broadcast 
Around ten years into Mubarak’s presidency, the deterioration in the country’s economic 
situation (and the lack of actionable problem-solving by the government) led to more drastic 
and invasive policy changes for the remainder of his time in power. The following period 
would be characterized by an implementation of neoliberal policies that would be rooted in 
the preceding economic crisis and would have far-reaching effects. One of the hallmarks of 
this change would be a massive expansion of the private sector as the state began to 
marginally relinquish its direct operational control over many sectors. Private sector 
operatives would also grow in political stature.  
Egypt’s media system was to be eventually included in these changes, about a decade after 
the reforms were announced. Around 1990, state-run mass media-like other publicly funded 
enterprises were under duress due to the state’s dire fiscal situation. Policies regarding 
broadcast and print mass media were altered in ways that would open the door for the sector 
to be a natural candidate to participate in the economic liberalization process. Ownership of 
print and broadcast outlets would be open to the private sector eventually, and they would be 
run as commercial entities. Many of these outlets would continue carrying out the task of 
championing the regime’s goals, especially since economic liberalization was a major priority, 
and the owners of these outlets were among the main beneficiaries of these policies.  
This chapter outlines the genesis of private mass media and the political-economic contexts 
under which they were formed. It attempts to answer the question of how privately-owned 
media outlets developed at the point when the country’s political economy was creating one 
of its more pronounced transformations in recent history. Naomi Sakr notes that in the case of 
broadcast media, private outlets were allowed to develop as a “reactive” measure mostly in 
response to the state’s shifting policies, similarly to what had happened in Jordan.554 Edward 
Webb555 views developments in Egyptian mass media as being symptomatic of an “adaptive 
authoritarianism” looking to maintain its grip on society in ways that prolong regime survival 
and ultimate control over public spaces.  
Webb along with Fatima El-Issawi556 analyze developments in Egyptian media during this 
period through the prism of Hallin and Mancini’s approach of describing the parallelism 
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between political contexts and media structures as a way to understand media development. 
This chapter takes a similar approach, with a view to building on some of the arguments 
made by these authors. One point of departure is that this chapter (and the remainder of the 
study) argues that some of the crucial developments that shaped media systems over these 
periods were in fact unintended consequences of the political and economic context, rather 
than being the spawn of a specific plan. As a result, the parallelism (between shifts in the 
media systems and transition in the country’s political-economy) were at times circumstantial.  
Media development during this period of change undoubtedly reflected the political and 
economic context of the transition and the relevant power players from the state, security 
forces and business elite; but the nature of some elements of private mass media that would 
emerge after 2001 were not initially intended by the state, such as the expansive coverage of 
political news and the highly influential nature of social/political talk shows on public 
opinion.  
This chapter will also take into consideration the disparate histories of print and broadcast 
media. Media scholar, Abdullah Schleiffer says the developmental discrepancies between 
print and broadcast in Egypt affected how they would form in the private sector: 
Unlike much of the Arab press, which enjoyed at least a formative 
development as privately owned newspapers that functioned within the 
context of some sort of journalistic tradition, all Arab television, be the 
prevailing state systems left wing or right wing, market economies or 
socialist economies, republics or monarchies, were state owned and more 
than any other media the national television channels were extensions of 
the ministries of information. It is no coincidence that in many Arab 
countries the minister of information ran his ministry from the national 
television station building.557 
Given the rapid changes and the myriad of political and economic elements that hung in the 
balance, the development of mass media during this period became more pronounced and 
prominent given its positioning at the intersection of all of these changes. Mass media is at 
once a sector with considerable commercial potential (if liberalized), a public space for the 
dissemination and competition of ideas, a venue for the promotion of tourism, and an 
important soft-power tool for the regime both internally and region-wide.  
																																								 																				





A Former Dean of Cairo University’s School of Mass Communications558 attributed the rise 
of Egyptian private media (with a focus on satellite television), to three main factors: 
1. Information and communication technologies that allowed the 
audiences to expose themselves to more liberal and open communication 
with little or no government control on media sites, media channels or 
content that people use. 
2. Economic pressures that force the government to invite businessmen to 
invest in media industry and finance some new media projects that are 
beyond the capacity of the government and,  
3. The new liberal economic wave that opened the door for a new 
generation of capitalists who seek to maintain political support for their 
economic projects by owning media outlets especially television channels 
like Dream and ElMehwar.559 
These factors are all factually correct, but lack political factors as well as infrastructural 
changes to the sector internally that have helped open the door to private media owners. 
 
1) “Liberalization” 
The economic crisis that led to the shift in policies occurred due to Egypt’s excessive reliance 
on rents and remittances during the early years of the Mubarak presidency, backfired when 
global oil prices decreased in the mid-1980s.560 By 1990 the debt-to-GDP ratio was reaching 
150% and annual inflation stood at more than 20%. Real wages ($US per work week) 
declined from $70 in 1980 to $11 in 1990, while GDP per-capita growth averaged 0.2% per-
annum during the period 1980-1993.561 Public spending during this period as a percent of 
GDP was at an excessively high rate of 50% in 1982 (second only to Israel regionally).562 The 
state would no longer be able to maintain the high levels of control it had by the end of the 
decade. Political scientist Samer Soliman would summarize his approach to finding the 
reasons behind the resulting change in socioeconomic policy during this period in one phrase: 
follow the revenue trail.563 The regime would not be able to sustain itself as the state’s main 
sources of revenue were faltering.  
The following decade would lay down the foundations of institutional change that would 
greatly affect the media sector. A class of businessmen with close ties to the regime would 
emerge as some of the main benefactors of the state’s gradual retreat from running the 
economy.  
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Once again, the first Gulf War figures as a pivotal moment after which much of these 
changes occurred. The war affected the region and Egypt specifically in many ways. As 
previously mentioned, it was a watershed moment for regional satellite media as it allowed 
many regimes and would-be media entrepreneurs to see the effectiveness of providing robust, 
regional news coverage, partially prompting the birth of the Arab satellite media market. 
Between December 1990 and March 1991, the ERTU had broadcast nearly 800 hours of 
CNN’s programs, which had a massive effect on Egyptian viewing habits as viewers began 
contrasting the quality of its programs with that of local public terrestrial television. 564  
Regional power balances would also shift, especially in cementing America’s enhanced 
political and economic involvement in the region for the near future. To secure its oil 
interests in the region, the US would also be securing not only the oil-rich Gulf Countries, but 
neighboring countries such as Egypt, whose stability was seen to affect the Gulf.565 
Egypt’s involvement in the Gulf War allowed the government to regain a position of 
influence in the region566, while also offering brief respite from the crippling economic crisis. 
The government negotiated debt forgiveness or rescheduling for half of the country’s foreign 
debt in exchange for joining the US-led coalition in the war. Shortly afterwards, Egypt 
concluded agreements with the IMF and World Bank in May and November of 1991 
respectively that resulted in a comprehensive Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Plan (ERSAP) meant to improve the balance of payments, reduce public debt, curb inflation 
and help pay-off foreign debt. This allowed the government to massively reduce its 
expenditures, lift price controls, impose new taxes and reduce public services.  
Through all of this, the state would take a step back from industry and commerce, while the 
private sector’s role would increase either through gradual privatization or increased private 
investments. A near complete withdrawal of government from the markets is something that 
was not initially contemplated and the overarching coordinating role of the state remained.567 
Initial attempts to liquidate state owned enterprises (SOE’s) were met with resistance from 
labor movements, but after implementing ERSAP between 1991 and 1998 inflation figures 
marginally decreased and the budget deficit shrunk from 15% of GDP to 3%568, while nearly 
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$3.3 billion worth of SOE’s were either partially or entirely sold.569 The most aggressive 
portion of the privatization drive occurred after 1996 when newly appointed Prime Minister 
Kamal ElGanzoury signed a new two-year deal with the IMF promising just that.  
This deal occurred during the crisis of the crippling new press law of 1995 that preceded the 
November 1995 parliamentary elections that resulted in an overwhelming majority for the 
ruling party, as well as a new cabinet reshuffle which brought the new PM. Even though 
liberalization policies could be traced back to Sadat’s Infitah, this period under Mubarak saw 
for the first time, the promotion of the private sector to taking the reins of the state’s 
development goals.570  
The prevalence of the free market ideology in Egypt during this period was firmly rooted in 
“a worldwide political and ideological transformation that rests on a powerful arsenal of ideas 
and theories produced by international financial institutions (IFI).571” The regime was able to 
gain the approval of these IFI’s after intensifying its application of the reform agreement. 
Egypt was deemed by the IMF to be among the most “successful reformers” due to these 
policies coupled with a decrease in poverty levels in the second half of the 1990s.572 This 
would not continue as the privatization drive came to a halt in 1999 due to recession and a 
liquidity crisis that was exacerbated by the global post 9/11 downturn.573 Declining social 
circumstances along with the fear of looming layoffs and forced retirements were the main 
instigators for the 287 worker protests that year, a period with the highest concentration of 
labor agitation since the 1952 revolution.574 Until 2005, the overall process of privatization 
would remain stagnant as it was deemed to be politically too costly.575 
Mass media development amid the changes 
Development of Egypt’s mass media and broadcasting capabilities had been planned 
immediately before the acceleration of neoliberal policy initiatives. In 1990, the state made a 
decision to upgrade the ERTU. This was essentially an industrial decision, to keep track with 
some major technological developments in the sector. Internally, the move was seen as being 
“underpinned by a commitment to be the ‘pioneering’ regional leader, and first mover [of the 
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sector].”576 The launch of Saudi-owned MBC, ART and Orbit on ARABSAT repositioned 
ERTU to a point where it was no longer a  regional leader in broadcast production.577 To 
combat this trend, the ERTU attempted to limit local viewership of pan-Arab satellite 
channels by banning the sale of imported decoders in 1995 on the grounds that Law 13 of 
1979 entrusted the ERTU with matters related to radio and television transmission, so as to 
“preserve and safeguard society’s values, ethics and traditions.”578 
Even though the plan was to enhance state-run broadcasting, it would ultimately lay down the 
infrastructure upon which private broadcasting would be built, given that the changes would 
involve broad infrastructural enhancements.579 The main tenets of this  policy would be the 
creation of four different enterprises between 1990 and 2000. The plan was to launch the 
following companies: Cable News Egypt (CNE) a satellite television service provider; Egypt 
Media Production City (EMPC), the largest audio-visual production company in the world; 
Nile Thematic Channels (NTC), a portfolio of satellite television channels that would be 
distributed by CNE; and Nilesat, which would be the first Arab or African state-owned fixed 
satellite platform. The initial plan for this integrative facility, according to then Minister of 
Information Safwat ElSherif was to launch state-broadcasting into a more globalized 21st 
century, by creating synergy between production and transmission capacities as well as by 
producing quality content.580  
Egypt’s broadcasting ambitions had been arguably disproportionate to the country’s financial 
capabilities and resources. The scale of public investments had drawn much criticism, 
although it has also been the reason Egypt was able to play a leading role in the field.581  
During this era of fiscal tightening, the ERTU upgrade would constantly search for remedies 
to this issue. CNE was established in 1990 as the region’s first subscription provider, opening 
up to non-Egyptian channels, and for the first time offering subscribers access to premium 
audio-visual content. It also gave the ERTU and the Ministry of Information unprecedented 
information about subscribers and satellite television viewers in general.  
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The rollout of the service in January 1991 during the Gulf War fell well below expectations 
of a minimum of 60,000 subscribers, garnering barely over 4,000 subscribers by 1994.582 The 
proliferation of unencrypted services on satellite dishes gave many Egyptians a much cheaper 
option, especially since the likes of MBC and CNN all offered unencrypted access to their 
programming. The speed of technological change and the forces of globalization would prove 
too expansive to be contained by the government bureaucracy and would force it to relinquish 
control. In this case, CNE would re-launch in 1994 after partnering South African satellite 
giant M-Net, and bringing in a much larger list of Western television stations.583 
 
2) EMPC launch and the new investment laws 
The same year CNE launched, construction would begin on EMPC as one of the largest state-
of-the-art studio complexes in the world. It was built at a cost of $1.5 billion on 3.5 million 
hectares of land in 6th of October City, 30 kilometers from downtown Cairo. The first phase 
of studios was completed in 1996, the second in 2000. The final studio complex including a 
shopping mall and a five-star hotel was inaugurated in 2002.584 Initially, it was envisioned as 
a large-scale project to serve public broadcasting and help Egypt keep up with technological 
developments to assert its regional dominance in the sector. As a major production hub, the 
EMPC was also supposed to attract foreign investment through global television and media 
outlets that would make use of its studios and facilities. The original concept would then be 
altered to adapt to the neoliberal policies. After starting out as a mega-project that would 
boost Mubarak’s regional profile and maintain Egypt’s clout, it became a showpiece for the 
liberalization era, as it was turned into a Free Zone to attract investment in 2000. 
Mismanagement and faulty execution would contribute to EMPC eventually becoming the 
incubator for private Egyptian satellite television, which was not part of the original plans.  
 
The Ministry of Information had decided on the creation of a media city as early as 1988. 
Construction plans were postponed due to the Gulf War. During the period of postponement, 
and amid the major changes in regional media, the scope of the Media City Project would 
drastically change to its more ambitious aspirations as a global production hub and major 
source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the “Hollywood of the Middle East”.585 EMPC 
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was meant to be a place a haven for foreign production in the region. The hope was to turn 
compete with (and eventually overtake) other popular Middle Eastern film production 
locations such as Jordan and Tunisia. Initial plans for the project involved building three 
complexes with 29 fully-fitted studios along with ten outdoor cinematic shooting areas and a 
plethora of hospitality, leisure and commercial facilities. After spending nearly $400 million 
dollars by the year 2000, the City was not yet close to covering its costs as much of its 
construction plans remained unfulfilled.586  
By contrast, before the completion of the first two phases of construction at Dubai Media 
City (EMPC’s regional counterpart), the UAE-based hub had secured 100% (Phase 1) and 80% 
(Phase 2) occupancy of its studio spaces, by building on-time and securing major “anchor 
clients” through a more clearly thought-out and executed plan.587 Clients such as Reuters and 
MBC would have buildings named after them in Dubai. By 2002 CNN, Viacom, Newscorp 
and Disney all set-up regional offices in the Emirate alongside an assortment of major 
regional and international news wires and stations, advertising agencies and production 
companies.588 EMPC’s bid to become a regional leader, was already proving beyond reach, in 
the short-term at least. A more pressing goal, would be the need to achieve financial stability 
and avoid default.  
Located only 3.4km away, the Nilesat Earth station provided a potential solution for the 
EMPC’s financial predicament. Chairman Abdelrahman Hafez looked to lure private 
television stations to air from the location. There, they would benefit from the ready 
availability of both skilled labor and infrastructure. Although they were unable to lure the 
large global companies, the EMPC was still able to deploy valuable resources such as: editing 
and post-production facilities, and skilled workers including technicians, actors, anchors, and 
TV personalities.589  
During the development of EMPC, Investment Law No. 8 of 1997 was enacted to boost the 
country’s regulatory framework in order to enhance FDI. Some of the major changes it made 
was to give national treatment to foreign investments, as well as guaranteeing unregulated 
expropriation of profits. Crucially, audio-visual production was included as an activity that 
could benefit from this law.  
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Over the same period of time Jordan and Dubai announced that their media cities would 
become “Media Free Zones”, prompting the EMPC to follow suit (in order to remain 
competitive) and declare the city a Media Free Zone in 2000 as well, using Law 8 as its legal 
basis. This placed the operation of audio-visual companies within this area under the auspices 
of the General Authority for Investment (GAFI). Both foreign and private firms would 
benefit from tax exemptions if they operate in the area.590 
The legal framework upon which the Media City would allow private television stations was 
inherently problematic as it was not initially conceived to include the audio-visual sector, and 
was instead meant for other sectors, especially in trade, manufacturing and tourism. The Law 
allowed for the inclusion of broadcast media, without addressing the law’s compatibility with 
it.591 The intangible nature of media’s end-product, and the ability to transport it via satellite 
uplink provided one such legislative issue. A bemused researcher of the matter questioned the 
adaptability of the law to this structure: 
…upon leaving the zone with a tape of a recorded program, how is the 
customs tax applied? Is the $15 tape itself taxed, or is the $50,000 
episode on it taxed? How can the percentage be determined and by which 
official? For instance, a worker could leave the zone taking with him an 
empty tape, get taxed only on that, then record the episode's signal at the 
zone's gateway via a receiving satellite dish worth $1,000 and operated 
from a car battery.592 
 The other issue with the law was the fact that under the legislative and organizational 
structure of the Free Zone, there would be confusion as to how the sector would be organized 
and regulated. The EMPC was a public-private partnership with the ERTU meant to hold 
around 40% of the shares while the rest would be distributed among public banks and 
financial institutions as well as a small group of private individuals.593 Its stock went public594 
in 2001595 and the overall structure would remain the same, with public institutions firmly in 
propriety control over the city.    
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Ultimately, the state (via the ERTU) would have the final say as to who operates within its 
walls and under what guidelines. On the other hand, according to Law No. 8, GAFI also 
holds a considerable measure of control: 
The Authority is the ultimate policymaker with respect to regulatory 
matters concerning the zone. It is the competent administrative body that 
decides upon the general goals of setting up a free zone and the means of 
realizing such goals.596  
It is also the Authority that appoints the board of directors; sets the 
regulatory framework for the management of the zone…597 
The board is responsible for issuing permits for the establishment and for 
issuing licenses allowing specific projects to operate in the free zone.598 
Still, according to Mohamed Gohar, co-founder of Video Cairo Sat and one of the first clients 
and collaborators with the EMPC, the role of GAFI was merely ceremonial, “it was in the 
hands of the Ministry of Information. Back then, everything was up to [the Minister] Safwat 
ElSherif who is a military man, but in its early days, he tried to appear to be balancing 
between the state’s security interests and media development. In the end, the security 
apparatuses had the last say about everything concerning media. Any attempt to ever appear 
otherwise was a façade.”599  
The operation of stations within the EMPC would directly contradict with the ERTU charter 
(in Law 13 of 1979, modified by Law 223 of 1989), which gave ERTU absolute control over 
the media, and also declared it the sole broadcaster. Not wanting to change the law that would 
diminish the dominance of the ERTU, the state found a loophole to its own laws by only 
allowing private outlets to broadcast via satellite.600 By allowing the ERTU to retain sole 
control of terrestrial broadcasting, the integrity of the ERTU Charter would ostensibly remain 
intact. Law No. 8 was also adapted to the sector and both local and international private 
stations would be allowed to set-up in the Media City after 2001. 
The legal barriers that were being addressed to allow the formation of private television 
companies allowed for the development of a framework that would force media companies to 
register and operate as commercial entities, rather than in their more specific roles as media 
companies, with all of the additional regulatory and operational details that would entail. 
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Licenses granted to television operations registered them as business projects without 
providing guidelines on the operation of these outlets. The private broadcasting sector as a 
result started without a clear framework for many essential elements, including: regulating 
diversity, fairness of representation, systems for allocating frequencies, and the rules for 
election coverage.601  
The existence of private television would be confined to the physical barriers of the EMPC. 
Broadcasters would also have to apply for frequencies for their emissions from Nilesat, a 
company owned by the government. The majority of the uplink (ground-to-satellite) 
technology was under the state’s control. These elements could point to a crucial factor 
behind the outwardly liberal attitude the EMPC and GAFI had taken towards the private 
media market. The government knew that it would be able shut off any satellite broadcast 
with a virtual on-off switch in its possession.  
Privately-owned Egyptian media stations represented a drastic shift, given the decades-long 
stronghold of the state on all broadcast media. One area that did not change, was terrestrial 
broadcasting, which remained entirely state-owned, run-out of the Maspero building. 602 
Terrestrial broadcasting was seen as being more accessible. This led to a belief in government 
that private satellite television would not represent a real and direct competitor to ERTU 
broadcasting.  
 
3) Private sector, clientelism and authoritarianism at the turn of the century 
Even though private Egyptian-owned broadcasters would emerge following the decision by 
the EMPC, it seemed to run counter to the state of political and social “de-liberalization” that 
occurred between 1990 and 2000.603 In assessing the Mubarak years during this time period 
Eberhard Kienle remarks that the overarching trend during the period of economic 
liberalization was a retreat in almost every other aspect of political and social liberties.  
Kienle noted that political representation experienced an “erosion of positive liberties… 
elections [had become] non-competitive and without choice.”604  After the 1995 elections the 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) controlled 94.05% of the seats in the People’s 
Assembly, a sharp increase from 1990 when around 20% of the seats were held by other 
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parties.605  This was after a series of measures taken by the government to stifle political party 
activities and representation in the media in the first half of the decade, including the 
aforementioned Law 93 in 1995. The state had also increased its control over local 
assemblies, professional unions, public universities and even student elections.606 At the same 
time, the role of State Security apparatuses and military courts were expanding and the 
number people arrested for political reasons increased from 8 thousand in 1992 to between 15 
to 20 thousand in 1998, although this was rationalized by the state as being due to the 
growing problem of militant Islamist groups.607  
By the end of the 1990’s, the state’s finances were also once again in a dire situation. 
Reforms that focused on real estate and finance had been put into effect, mostly to shore up 
the budget, sidelining some of the original intentions of the economic reform, which included 
helping Egypt become more competitive in global trade and more integrated in the world 
economy. A brief period of currency stabilization and a miniboom caused by the privatization 
push of the mid-1990s did not avail the state of relying on rents for a significant portion of its 
revenue, rather than by taxing productive activities. Around one third of government revenue 
came from two state-owned enterprises that typified the continuation of Egypt’s rentier state, 
The Egyptian General Petroleum Company and The Suez Canal Authority.608  The global 
financial crisis between 1997 and 1999 had come at an inopportune time as internal factors 
had also contributed to decreasing confidence in the economy.  Two very different local 
events especially contributed to a decline in global confidence in Egypt: The 1997 terrorist 
attack in Luxor and a scandal of connected MPs using their positions to obtain around LE1.5 
billion loans from state banks.609 Debt increased to 90% of GDP in 2002 from 67% in 1992610, 
although this time it was mostly to local creditors.611 One of the available options for the 
regime and the NDP was to begin accessing capital from businessmen who would attain a 
privileged status, they would also help define the political economy of the country for the 
coming decade.  
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Hazem Kandil describes the initial phases of the blossoming relationship between this class 
and the state: 
The easiest and most readily available way to keep the political 
machine solvent was to count on the generosity of regime-friendly 
capitalists. [A]s monopoly capitalists began taking charge of the ruling 
party and [were elected in parliament], they assumed financial 
responsibilities as well. They funded NDP conventions; they launched 
government media campaigns; they paid bribes to stifle the opposition; 
they bought votes and organized pro-regime demonstrations; and so 
on. 612 
Mubarak began to clearly pivot towards relying on the support of businessmen by making the 
private sector a key constituency in the NDP as he added major CEO’s to head the party’s 
Political Bureau. The three most prominent additions were Ahmed Ezz of Ezz Steel, Ibrahim 
Kamel of Kato Investments, and the president’s son Gamal. By the 2000 parliamentary 
elections, businessmen would represent 14% of all of the party’s deputies and would begin to 
gain cabinet seats.613 The period between 1998 and 2004 also marked an era of more 
profound institutional changes to liberalize trade, promote exports, protect intellectual 
property rights and amend laws governing commerce. A 2015 World Bank study also noted 
that in 2000 the government introduced a variety a measures to protect politically connected 
firms from some of the newly implemented liberalization policies offering them protection 
from foreign competition and access to energy subsidies and land (among other potential 
advantages not included in the scope of the study).614 While these individuals benefitted from 
the “carrot” of benefits to their businessmen, many were also co-opted by threats to their 
businesses if they refuse to fall in line with the NDP.615  
Beyond the political realm, Safinaz El Tarouty notes in her study “Businessmen, Clientelism, 
and Authoritarianism in Egypt,” that the patron-client relationship Mubarak developed with 
wealthy Egyptians involved offering access to benefits that could only be accorded by the 
state, in exchange for other forms of loyalty, including providing mass media support to the 
regime.616   
The rise of the private sector also gave the state the ability to deflect some of the public ire 
regarding the economic reforms onto the businessmen whose increasing control over the 
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economy was becoming more apparent, while many cross-sections of society were 
complaining of declining living standards. Criticism of these businessmen was more palatable 
to the regime than criticism of the ruling class itself: 
That the official and independent media still sometimes lash out at 
Egyptian capitalism does not reduce the hold of the ideology. The attacks 
take aim at the “parasitic” nature of the entrepreneurial class, its 
conspicuous spending, corruption, and other such moral aspects, but 
when it comes to serious public discussion of economic policy, liberal 
economics wins hands down.617 
The onus would be shifted on the incoming class of entrepreneurial media owners to attempt 
to drum up public support on their own importance and viability to economic development.  
 
4) Egypt’s private broadcasters 
The EMPC’s shift in focus and regulatory parameters had opened the door for private stations 
to launch their central production sites from within Egypt for the first time. GAFI, which was 
run under the new business-friendly cabinet of Prime Minister Atif Ebeid (appointed in 2000) 
had the legal authority to provide licenses for these outlets, pending security clearances.  
The infrastructure was in place, and the EMPC had already opened its door to the Saudi-
owned channel Orbit. Ali Beleil, who was a producer with Orbit in 1999 described how it felt 
for the channel to have been momentarily the sole occupant in the massively under-occupied 
and over-equipped city: 
 When I arrived for my first day of work at the Media City. We were among the 
only people there. It was still very impressive. I thought it was the beginning of 
some major transformation in Egyptian media, and we were there before 
anyone.618  
Coming from the BBC, Beleil was in charge of a department tasked with creating video 
reports for Orbit’s mostly social, cultural and entertainment programming. Before the EMPC 
opened its doors to local private television, Orbit had staked its claim as one of the original 
tenants among television outlets in the city in 1998.619 It was established by Saudi-owned 
retail giant, Mawarid Group in 1993 mostly out of Rome. Besides being an early tenant of 
EMPC, it was a trailblazer in other areas as it launched the world’s first fully-digital, multi-
channel satellite television and radio service, while also marking the creation of a new 
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industry in the Middle East.620  Orbit would go on to have a major effect on Egyptian media 
by creating the template for the nightly talk shows that have become the flagship program of 
every Egyptian private broadcaster, usually anchored by verbose hosts who go on rants about 
the topic of the day.  
Initially, Belail and his team were told to steer clear from politics, however Amr Adeeb, the 
politically inclined host of the show he worked on, AlQahira AlYoum (Cairo Today), tended 
to push in that direction. The program was an anomaly in Egypt as they were allowed to 
cover topics that would normally not be covered by Egyptian television stations, “because we 
were Saudi-owned, we had a lot of leeway,” Belail said. Crucially, they were also allowed 
flexibility because Orbit decoders were not sold in Egypt, so “Cairo Today” was ironically 
only seen by an audience outside of Egypt, and by elites who paid thousands of dollars to 
purchase and import Orbit’s coveted decoders with its bouquet of exclusive Western 
channels.621 The development of Orbit as a channel in Egypt occurred almost by accident as 
the network was mostly concerned with viewership, according to Belail, the only real red line 
was criticism of Saudi Arabia or its rulers. In 1994, BBC Arabic and Orbit engaged in a 
short-lived joint-venture that was scrapped due to disagreements over the BBC’s airing of an 
interview with a London-based Saudi dissident.622    
The existence of Orbit, and then MBC in the Media City and their relative success was 
encouraging for Egyptian would-be entrepreneurs in the field. They operated with relative 
freedom, as long as they followed a 32-clause code of ethics provided by the ERTU that 
included some standard guidelines such as forbidding airing of discriminatory material. It 
also contained vaguely worded clauses that forbade airing material that may “harm the 
state.”623  
As for the kind of television stations that were not allowed, Mohamed Gohar said that the 
EMPC had three main caveats, “no licenses for news channels (the state is the only provider 
of news), no license for religious groups, and none for political parties.”624 Gohar had 
attempted to set-up a news channel using the experience Video CairoSat already had in 
producing news reports and providing live coverage for international outlets. “The culture of 
producing truthful reports in short news segments and having news bulletins by professional 
																																								 																				
620 www.orbit.net 
621 Interview with Ali Belail (2019) 
622 Ayish in Mellor (2013) 
623 Abdulla (2016) p 4227 





newscasters was a completely alien concept.”625 Gohar’s initiative was meant to be called 
CSN (Cairo Sat News), and despite piloting the project and his conviction that it would be the 
region’s first 24-hour news service, GAFI did not approve it.  
 
Patient Zero: Ahmed Bahgat and Dream TV 
Private broadcasting was initially envisioned to be a landmark for the Egyptian regime’s 
“progress” in economic and social liberalization. Earlier statements from the Minister of 
Information as well as the policies forbidding private terrestrial broadcasting or news 
broadcasts were clear indications that the state deemed to risky to open up the sector with few 
restrictions. 
Orbit had taken this approach when it opened its Cairo Production Hub, which was according 
to Belail, to entertain, and offer a positive image for Egypt. “[Orbit employees in Cairo-based 
programs] were told to paint a postcard for Cairo.”626 Dream TV the first television station to 
be owned by an Egyptian in the EMPC would become a postcard of sorts for Egypt’s 
liberalization efforts. When it was launched on 14 September 2001, it would mark the 
beginning of privately-owned Egyptian television broadcasting. 
The station’s owner, Ahmed Bahgat was a self-made businessman who had initially made his 
first million in the US after selling the rights to an invention of his, which was a device 
guiding Muslims to Mekkah for prayers. He had received his PhD from Georgia State 
Institute of Technology in 1982.627 The station would never had occurred were it not for an 
encounter between Bahgat and Hosni Mubarak in 1984, when the President urged him to 
return to Egypt. During a meeting with prominent Egyptians in America, Mubarak is said to 
have told Bahgat, “if people like you don’t come back to Egypt, then who will develop the 
country?”628  
Upon his return to Egypt in the late 1980’s, he began investing in a business empire that 
would span real estate, electronic manufacturing, entertainment and leisure. Initially the 
Bahgat Group began developing Goldstar television sets and became the region’s largest 
manufacturers of the device. Prior to 1985, the only companies allowed to produce television 
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sets were Telemisr, a public company, and Al-Nasr which falls under the military industrial 
complex. Bahgat used his ties to high-ranking officers to obtain a license for this line of 
production.629  
Dreamland was his major real estate venture that would become a prototypical development 
in Cairo’s suburbs. Over the next two decades this model would be emulated expansively. 
The majority of these projects were given to allies of the regime. Timothy Mitchell counted 
two-dozen family conglomerates in 1999 (of which Bahgat Group was one) that often began 
as real estate or construction companies, and due to their close ties to the regime, were 
allowed to grow rapidly. while expanding into other sectors.630 This kind of preferential 
treatment allowed projects like Dreamland the financial and administrative ability to grow 
abnormally quickly. “Ahmed Bahgat, the family head, is reputed to be a front man for well-
placed interests within the regime, which may explain why the express roads out to 
Dreamland were built in record time.”631  
An investigation into his finances after Mubarak’s ouster in 2011 led to Bahgat being 
formally accused of corruption by having procured much of his real estate irregularly via his 
relation with Minister of Housing and New Communities, Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman who 
sold him the 1,950 feddan plot632 at the low price of LE50633 per meter. After only paying off 
the equivalent of LE5 per meter, Bahgat re-priced the land, to nearly LE1,500/meter before 
listing in the stock exchange, reaping massive rewards.634  
When the opportunity arose to open his own television station, as the EMPC and Nilesat were 
struggling, Bahgat’s business was booming and Dreamland was on the cusp of a massive 
expansion. His relationship with the regime by this point (2001) was beyond doubt, and he 
seemed to lack personal political ambition, making him a minimal political threat to the status 
quo. Furthermore, his position as a “self-made” millionaire toggled at the heart strings of an 
Egyptian public that was still skeptical at the viability of the liberalization policies and the 
improvement of the overall financial well-being of the country. From the perspective of the 
government, he was the perfect candidate to own a station. For the EMPC and Nilesat, he was 
a most welcome investor, at a time when this government mega-project was on the brink of 
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failure. Bahgat himself said he “saved Nilesat from bankruptcy when it was just launching 
since there weren’t any channels willing to broadcast from it, besides Orbit and now [on 20 
November 2012] 550 channels use Nilesat. After Dream TV was a success everyone copied 
[them].”635 
5) Private media emerging: emanating from the center of power 
Mitchell’s study shows that as the private sector expanded and neoliberal policies became 
more entrenched, developments of the most rapidly growing and expanding business empires 
cannot be looked at independently from their connections to the regime. Media development 
was no different and television licenses were often distributed mostly in accordance with the 
shifting power patterns of this neopatrimonial regime. Egyptian broadcaster and academic 
Gamal ElShaer had noted that as a sector, media was the subject of major changes during the 
implementation of the new economic policies, but its development was still shackled by the 
lack of institutional change in other areas of governance:  
Contrary to the predicted path to democratization cited in most comparative 
media literature, the Egyptian case demonstrated not only a divergence, but 
even a reversal, when it came to widely held assumptions regarding state-
media relationships in general, and the concept of political parallelism in 
particular. This is mainly because, in Egypt, the main economic, political, 
and social structures have not witnessed fundamental changes.636 
While he is correct in noting that there had not been a fundamental change in the underlying 
structures he had mentioned, developments in state-media relations were not in fact evolving 
in ways that negate the concept of political parallelism. State-media relations were taking 
time in order to form, given the novelty of private media and the state’s lack of preparedness 
(by its own standards) for how it would retain control over them. 
Given the above, it is unsurprising that upon further scrutiny, the origins of Dream TV may 
have not been as independent of the state as once thought. Evidence suggests that, despite the 
context under which Dream was established (from within the Drealand project), the state 
played a more distinctly direct role in both envisioning and facilitating the project’s birth.  
In the relatively short life-span of private Egyptian media, there are very few periods in time 
when an observable distance between the state and private television networks existed. As 
one media scholar put it, “There is no such thing as public and private in Arab Media.”637 
Major and minor moments of transitions in power created periods where private media was 
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operated with more relative autonomy. The early period of Media Production City, was not a 
moment of political transition, although it did fall within a period of economic transformation. 
The general structure of political control remained the same, meaning the new media policies 
were all squarely under the auspices of the powerful Minister of Information, Safwat El-
Sherif. It would not be until the 2005 elections when the first major period of transition 
would occur.  
According to Mitchell, the Bahgat Group “was linked to senior military officers and used 
military-owned factories to build its products…Dr. Ahmed Bahgat, the family head, was 
reputed to be a front man for unpublicized moneymaking by the presidential family…”638 
Despite running into difficulties with the government because of Dream TV in subsequent 
years, his connection to both the Mubarak family and a security establishment639 marked the 
beginning of a trend of television station owners who, until the Arab Spring in 2011, would 
have clearance from both institutions. Bahgat denied his financial connections to the 
Mubarak family640 while owning up to his close relationship with the president, who visited 
Dreamland in an official capacity 25 times.641 
In his retelling of Dream’s start, Bahgat said that he went to the Minister of Information at the 
time, Safwat ElSherif, with a master plan for his entire business. These connections point to 
the possibility that, despite his proclamations, Dream TV began as a regime initiative. Amr 
Khafaga, who held the positions of executive producer and head of programming for Dream 
TV (2002-2007) said that there was “a top-down decision by the government to establish 
private television stations.”642  
This notion is further bolstered by the fact that the ERTU was widely believed to be a 10% 
stakeholder in Dream at its inception. The terms of their partnership was lopsided in that the 
ERTU did not actually have to pay-up its capital contribution. Instead, it had promised to 
provide that in programming, according to the Vice-President of the channel in its early years, 
Hala Sarhan.643 Financially, Bahgat would have been able to afford starting up a television 
station, or even getting privately financed, given that Sarhan estimated the costs of starting up 
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a station such as Dream TV network was 20-30 million Egyptian pounds.644 Bahgat had once 
estimated his wealth to be around 1.5 billion Egyptian pounds. The Ministry of Information 
opted instead to keep a close eye on the first private television station, using this partnership. 
Similarly, the other private television station to launch in 2002 was ElMehwar, which was 
launched by cement magnate, Hassan Rateb, the anchor investor who owned 65% of the 
company, while the ERTU also owned roughly 12%. Rateb was known for having the 
unofficial license to invest heavily in Sinai, which is one of the most politically sensitive 
areas to operate in Egypt due to its status as a tourist destination, and a demilitarized zone 
under the 1977 Camp David Accords.  In the earliest days of private satellite television, 
government partnership was an unwritten rule of licensing. Rateb stated that he intended for 
his station to “represent civil society”.645 However, not only was Rateb himself a close ally of 
the government, but the composition of ElMehwar’s board shows in no uncertain terms the 
existence of the channel in full accordance with the state. This board included Hassan Hamed 
(head of ERTU), Amin Bassiouny (Head of Nilesat), and AbdelRahman Hafez (director of 
Media Production City). Prominent business persons owned a collective 18% of ElMehwar, 
each of them had significant stakes in different sectors that were benefiting from the 
liberalization policies they included among others: Hossam Badrawi (health services), 
Moustafa El-Sallab (ceramics), Nawal El-Degwi (education).646 
One obvious method of control of private broadcasting by the state was to always ensure that 
ownership and internal control of the mass media organizations were in the hands of trusted 
individuals. In the case of station ownership in the era of liberalization, this meant the class of 
connected businessmen who owe their wealth to their connections to the state.  
Dream TV, relied mostly on Bahgat’s personal relationship with President Mubarak. As far 
as ownership and its relationship with the state, the link was quite direct. ElMehwar on the 
other hand was started in a way that not only represented the expanding economic control of 
the private sector (and the benefits of being close to the regime), but it also became a 
representation of the coalition of connected businessmen who would in-time ascent to a much 
more profound position of power. Rateb, Badrawi and El-Sallab were all central figures of 
the transforming NDP, which would soon be overtaken by Gamal Mubarak and a cohort of 
connected businessmen (including them), who would all help push the younger Mubarak to 
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the de-facto leadership of the party.647 Bahgat was reportedly included as a founding member 
of ElMehwar before pulling out to start Dream. Private sector companies such as ElMehwar 
and Dream also attracted the services of the only established private media company 
VideoCairo Sat for help in producing content. Locally, Mohamed Gohar worked with the 
EMPC and Nile News in providing them with technical assistance for production of reporting 
content, and gravitated towards working with the likes of ElMehwar and Dream when they 
were formed. Ironically Gohar and his company, despite their experience and years of being 
the only private media operation in Egypt, were not allowed a television license, while the 
other business owners were, despite having no prior interest or experience in the field. “We 
played a crucial role in not only establishing the Production City, but also the first two 
stations. Although, it very quickly became clear that you had to be ‘in the club’ to get 
approval, we were not members in the political project.”648 Ironically, Gohar himself claims 
to have worked closely with Mubarak until 2009. His credentials providing him access to the 
presidency had been operational since 1974. Yet according to him, the two elements working 
against him at the time were: firstly, a desire to present news in accordance to the 
international professional standards (as he was the main news provider for Reuters news 
agency in the region); and secondly, his association with the Presidents (Sadat and Mubarak)  
rather than the budding power center in Gamal’s clique.649 
When it came to oversight roles, for a period of time the new entities and organizations that 
would be created would be run by a revolving door of bureaucrats. Turnover at the head of 
these organizations often entailed an exchange of places between colleagues. Hafez himself 
was chairman of ERTU, CNE and Nilesat at various points in his career.650 Hassan Hamed 
went from being head of the ERTU to head of EMPC as well. 
Importantly, Minister of Information Safwat El-Sherif retained a near absolute grip on overall 
developments and output of Egyptian media, private or public, for as long as he was in office. 
Ultimately, the management of the EMPC, the ERTU, and the television stations in operation 
would all answer to him. His ties to the central authority, security apparatuses, and 
																																								 																				
647 Fandy (2007) 
648 Interview with Mohamed Gohar (2016) 
649 Ibid 





intelligence community allowed him to exercise control in a personal capacity quite broadly. 
Subsequent Ministers of Information would not have his sway. 651  
The overtures made to privatizing media occurred under ElSherif’s watch and in accordance 
with his own vision. Although he was implementing a media policy, ElSherif’s significance 
to the regime during this period stretched far beyond this sector, as evidenced by his 
subsequent appointments in 2004 to the Shura Council (where he quickly became speaker)652, 
and to the role of Secretary General of the NDP during a period of radical change for the 
party. One thing ElSherif made very clear while putting together plans for the media city and 
Nilesat is that the concept of a “private media” was never on the table. In an interview 
centered on the new developments in the sector he had clearly stated, "we don't intend to 
privatize the media; rather, we mean that there should be more freedom.”653  
Years later in 2016 Hassan Hamed would confirm El-Sherif’s approach of ultimate control. 
When asked about his thoughts on private media he said, “there has never been private media 
in Egypt, it is all a branch of the official media.”654 Hamed, although a staunch supporter of 
the regime in 2016 (and of the Mubarak regime previously) was not critical of that state of 
media. Rather he believed that ElSherif and the underlying organizations he created were all 
part of a system that was designed to be interdependent. The role of media according to 
Hamed was always to serve the greater interest and that its position had to be subservient to 
the greater goals of the state. Private media never presented itself as a viable alternative to 
achieve these goals, according to him.655 Hamed represented a generation of media 
professionals that viewed mass media as a matter of national security (especially in war time) 
and believed that the main impetus behind expanding private media in Egypt was to boost the 
liberalization plans and little else.  
Hamed saw ElSherif as “an enlightened thinker.”656 This perspective was not shared by all. 
The Minister’s presence in the media sector was in fact enough to dissuade many 
businessmen (and especially from specific political profile) from entering the field despite 
harboring clear interests in doing so. Businessman, Naguib Sawiris, who would later launch 
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OnTV from the EMPC, was an early sceptic, claiming that at that time they were “almost 
forced into being in partnership with the state to open any station,” adding that he was “one 
of the first people interested in this sector, but that it didn’t make sense and was not worth the 
cost of starting up a business.”657 
The departure of ElSherif from the Ministry of Information in 2004, coincided with the 
expansion of the private mass media market, including in newspapers. The absence of a 
central figure with such broad powers in the state also left an oversight void, as the private 
mass media sector lacked comprehensive institutional regulation. The result was that the 
private stations operated with slightly less direct control from the Ministry of Information. 
Many believe that despite his absence, ElSherif through his work in other NDP and 
government positions continued to set strategies and policies of Egyptian media until 2010.658  
Nonetheless, having vacated his office on the fifth floor of the Maspero building, there was 
no longer the commanding presence of a military man with unlimited power supervising the 
day-to-day affairs of the sector. 
The new Minister, Anas El-Fiqqi659, was not nearly as authoritative as his predecessor, yet he 
was a pivotal figure for the transformation of the media system during his tenure as Minister. 
Unlike, ElSherif, the former media executive did not hold the same influence over security 
apparatuses and the command center of the government and neither did he hold as much 
direct sway over the private sector. One Dream TV producer noted, “[El-Fiqqi] was clearly 
jealous of the private channels. That’s how it felt, especially when [Dream TV] would have a 
successful show or land a very important international interview guest, we would sometimes 
get summons to the Ministry to remind us that we were still under their auspices and needed 
to clear potentially sensitive topics by them.”660 
Abdelrahman Hafez, alluded to a rivalry between EMPC and the Ministry of Information in 
numerous interviews after he left his position. Hafez, was accused of embezzlement of public 
funds in 2005 after El-Fiqqi called for an investigation regarding missing funds from an 
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advertising contract with Ihab Talaat, who owned one of the few advertising agencies with 
controlling stakes in the market, Promedia.661  
A Wikileaks Cable would later reveal that the Ministry of Information position was in fact 
used in a proxy war between Gamal Mubarak and Safwat ElSherif, who ostensibly opposed 
Gamal’s plans for succession.662 Ihab Talaat’s company’s partnership with Safwat El-Sherif’s 
son, Ashraf was thought to be one of the main reasons it was granted extensive government 
contracts. Ashraf ElSherif himself had presided for a few years over the only two privately-
owned FM radio stations, obtained through his father’s intercession.663 “In this context, the 
Talaat-Hafez corruption case could be viewed as the latest stage of a proxy war between 
Gamal Mubarak and Safwat Sherif.”664 Despite El-Fiqqi’s position as a stalwart of the 
neoliberal project led by the President’s son, his desire to ensure the acquiescence of all 
media, led to an apparent ambivalence, bordering on skepticism towards the private media 
sector in its early days.  
6) Gamal Mubarak and “new” politics 
El-Fiqqi was brought in at a time when the neoliberal policies in Egypt were expanding, and 
the connected businessmen in the private sector were not only gaining business opportunities, 
but dominion over the political arena. They were a part of the same general political direction 
that El-Fiqqi was promoting. Attempting to rein them in seemed antithetical to the ruling 
cohort’s general direction. It may have also been an attempt by him to more clearly define the 
institutional relationship between his Ministry and the private sector, in an otherwise vague 
regulatory environment.  
The creation of these new mass media entities occurred amid a political impetus to make the 
public sphere seem more open and accessible. U.S. President George W. Bush met with 
Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif in May 2005 and pressed for Egypt to pursue more 
political reforms, even linking these changes with a potential free trade pact between the two 
countries. The Egyptian government heeded the call in order to both secure its relationship 
with the U.S. (which involved more than $2 billion dollars of annual aid) and enhance the 
country’s reputation globally. The speech was followed by the addition of some amendments 
to the electoral process, such as the introduction of multicandidate presidential elections, 
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rather than the “presidential confirmation referenda” that Hosni Mubarak had resorted to for 
his first four, six-year terms. These amendments bolstered the “new thinking” platform of the 
NDP, the foundations of which were established in 2002 when Gamal Mubarak assumed his 
first official party position as a member of the Policies Secretariat along with some of his 
businessmen confidantes. The “new thinking” platform would see technocrats and 
businessmen being put forth for cabinet positions and positions of power, as MP’s and NDP 
leaders. Figureheads of this platform were meant to present the Egyptian elite as a 
progressive and liberalizing force, departing from the militaristic and archaic statesmen of 
previous eras. Nonetheless, these changes would also be widely seen as a form of “faux-
liberalization,” to bleach the face of the regime and the elite who would “embrace the mantle 
of reform only to enshrine its dominance beyond Hosni Mubarak’s passing.”665  
Gamal Mubarak’s presumed succession and the political/business cohort’s leadership of the 
“new thinking” campaign, was thought to be a way to ensure a continuous flow of the US aid 
package, of which $1.2 billion went directly to the military. As a result it was a direction that 
was tolerated by the Armed Forces along with other major power centers.666  The new 
direction in the ruling party’s represented a major departure in the shape of the political 
power structure and in the embedded neoliberal rhetoric for the state. When the first round of 
privatization started in 1994, the party still claimed to adhere to the principles of The Free 
Officers’ 23 of July Revolution. Gamal’s introduction to the policy committee in 2002 led to 
more open and concrete calls for the party to more openly adhere to liberalization, with the 
stipulation that the state continues to play an important role .667 As the stature of this group 
grew leading into the 2005 parliamentary elections, they contributed an exacerbation of the 
already existent patron-client relationship between the state and the business elite.668  
A new limited access order (LAO) emerged and it appeared to embrace reforms that would 
accommodate the interests of big businesses more readily. The way the political and business 
elite formed around Mubarak’s sons at the time conformed with the description of LAO 
frameworks by Douglas North et al as one that is created by “using the political system to 
create and allocate rents, arising from arrangements such as government contracts, land 
rights, monopolies on business activities, and entry to restricted job markets.”669 Connected 
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businessmen were not only offered preferential treatment in these markets, but also decision-
making power in the state. The “technocratic” government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif 
(2004-2011) included six of those connected businessmen, some of whom were also elected 
representatives in parliament.670 Besides attempting to implement policies beneficial to their 
businesses, the group of businessmen allied with Mubarak’s sons were accused of amassing 
exorbitant wealth during this period by making use of corruption mechanisms that included:  
- The use of privileged information to acquire advantage in the 
privatization program and insider trading.  
- [Excessively borrowing from state banks] to buy stock market 
shares 
- Allocating credit on the basis of personal contacts and relationships;  
- The sale of public land at negligible prices, and many times through 
"direct allocation" to select people in what became known as "the 
largest land grab" in the history of Egypt.  
- Illegitimate commissions made of arms deals and from sole-
sourcing in the purchase of equipment and materials for public use; 
- Reallocating foreign aid to private firms and consultants.671 
 
As a result of a political and business climate that was highly preferential to the class of 
connected businessmen, wealth within this class grew rapidly. This climate “increased the 
structural and financial power of businessmen and allowed them to enter into a semi-
clientelistic relationship with the regime based on bargaining and less subordination.”672 
Along with their growing wealth, was their growing influence on society as well as politics. 
In exchange for their access and ballooning wealth, they used their public positions to drum 
up public support for the reforms. Private media became one major means by which some of 
them sought to capitalize and extend this influence. Mass media ownership, which had 
previously been seen as riddled with both security and commercial risks, opened up to this 
class just as their relative power across the board in politics, society and the economy were 
growing at a quick rate.  
Major expansions in both print and broadcast mass media platforms occurred around this 
period. These platforms allowed businessmen to enhance their political profile and provide 
propaganda for the policies that they support, as a cohort. Many station owners did not 
necessarily run the outlets or decide on content by direct fiat on a daily basis. Rather as this 
study will show in later sections, some of the owners of the larger stations found other ways 
to reap personal or political benefits from the outlets. One television executive who requested 
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anonymity to protect his job said, “Before the [January 2011, uprising] I can honestly say that 
throughout the four television stations I worked in, I only saw one television station owner 
directly interfere in editorial content, it was during my time in OnTV. That had to do with the 
owner’s objection to the positive reporting on a factory worker’s strike in 2009.”673 The 
owner of OnTV, Naguib Sawiris himself acknowledged that one of the reasons he sought to 
enter the mass media market (which he did through both television and print) was to help lead 
the drive towards more “liberalism and democracy.”674  
GAFI-which controlled satellite broadcasting licenses and much of its regulation- had a 
mandate to improve the investment climate in Egypt, suggesting that it was partial to 
licensing owners of private stations who share its agenda and would aim to enhance it.  This 
agenda was also an integral part of the NDP’s new platform.  
The 2011 uprising and its aftermath would show that the power of Gamal Mubarak’s business 
cohort may not have been as deep-seated as they would have thought. State decisions in the 
form of policies, laws and regulations remained primarily guided by the state incumbents' 
priorities of retaining power. Given the rampant corruption within which state-business 
relations developed in post-liberal Egypt, there is a wide consensus that Egyptian businesses 
had never gained significant-enough capacity to permanently shape public policies.675 They 
were often thwarted by members of Mubarak’s old guard, who felt threatened that changes 
could affect their overall position in the power paradigm.  
Nonetheless, for a relatively short period it appeared the economic course set by the new 
guard could have benefited the business elite and restrict the role of the state within the 
economy, undermining the interests of the old guard in the process. Some of their most 
important sources of power had been from within the state’s official entities, including the 
inflated public sector and bureaucracy. Leading members of the old guard resisted the rising 
influence of the “political businessmen” who intensively supported Gamal Mubarak’s 
political career.676 Skepticism from this cohort, was not confined to the politicians, but to the 
military establishment as well. A Wikileaks document from 2007 confirmed rumors that the 
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Minister of Defense at the time, Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi had “had it 'up to here' 
with Gamal and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they [were] facilitating."677 
Tension between these two groups would manifest in their attitudes towards media ownership 
and methods of control of media content. These tensions became apparent in one area of 
broadcasting specifically, the flagship daily talk-shows that came to define private mass 
media in Egypt. They were one of the few areas of content generated, where elements of 
politics and commerce coalesced. Media owners retained financial control of these shows 
while advertisers wielded a fair deal of influence as well. Looming in the background of these 
programs were both the ERTU ostensibly as the content and industry regulator, as well as the 
security establishments monitoring the “red-lines” of content. During this time period the red-
lines were reduced to the President, the Military and matters of “National Security,”678 after 
previously being much more expansive and protective of most public political officials and 
state positions. Within these parameters and with the opening of media spaces online along 
with the landmark presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, talk-shows became more 
politicized, spearheading a similar direction in other areas of the private mass media. The 
collective trajectory of this media trend would ultimately play a role in the lead-up to the 
2011 uprising.  
7) Dream/Orbit & the political economy of “the talk-show” 
Arab satellite television was often viewed as having potentially transformative effects on 
democracy. It is more likely that the inverse is true, political changes played a part in media 
developments.679 In the absence of vibrant political parties in countries like Egypt, the 
pressures of globalization and the penetrative effects of technological innovative in media 
helped prompt a heightened appetite for information in ways that transcended the norm. 
Blogs, which pre-dated pro-democracy/pro-labor/anti-corruption street demonstrations, had 
become prominent sources of information, especially on opposition activity, free speech 
suppression, and different cases of injustice. The launch of Youtube in 2005 made it a lot 
easier to share media.680 The politicization of mass media spaces had greatly expanded with 
the open-access nature of online platforms and new media in general. It was only a matter of 
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time before traditional media such as television and newspapers would follow suit.  
 
The culture of media consumption and production had already been changing, partially due to 
the expanding access to Arab satellite television and Egyptian private broadcasting. Content 
in these media reflected the new ownership structures and professional cultures surrounding 
them, while also conforming to a traditional view that private media “reinforces the trend of 
perpetuating audiences’ cultural preferences (and biases) in order to receive large 
transmission ratings and advertising.”681 Talk-shows discussing sensitive social and political 
topics emerged, in-part due to the growing public appetite for it at the time.682  
The rise of these shows and their massive impact and transformations reflected the political 
and economic climate of Egypt and the changes the country was going through. They 
provided a relatively new format of content that engaged more with the viewer, while also 
being a direct reaction to both public demand and social circumstances, at least initially. 
As mentioned above, talk-shows played an important part in the genesis of private media. It 
became clear that, the new outlets saw these shows to be their main chance at winning an 
audience that could help these stations (and the sector itself) succeed. Islam Maher, who has 
been an executive producer of multiple prime-time talk shows since 2007 until the time of 
this study, said that in time she came to understand that these programs “represented the 
station.683” 
From the earliest days of broadcasting, Egyptians had been exposed to the phenomenon of 
the “talking head” media figure with nearly special access to the public’s living rooms in 
Ahmed Said’s radio broadcasts on Sawt AlArab. When news talk shows were gaining 
popularity in the early pan-Arab stations, others such as Orbit followed suit. The only 
difference would be that unlike Ahmed Said, the new talk show hosts would not initially be 
porte-paroles for the president. Instead they would need to navigate the tricky path of finding 
their own voice, while avoiding cancellation or censorship. 
 For Orbit, the originator of the Egyptian talk-show through AlQahira AlYoum, the general 
idea was to create a social magazine with compelling reporting and commentary. These 
programs tended to start with a highly opinionated, extended and prepared opening statement 
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by the presenter on the important topic of the day, followed by segments on other topics, 
which would often include a journalistic report. An inordinate amount of editorial leeway was 
given to the presenters of the programs who were considered to be the main draws of the 
show, along with their choice of guests. The format is not a novel one, especially when 
compared to international news networks’ programming. For Egypt, it suddenly created a 
potent, opinion-forming space that broadcast to the public content that did not originate from 
the state. Almost unknowingly, stations found their loophole around the de-facto embargo on 
news programming.  
Orbit’s initial intention was to employ a charismatic host who could attract audiences by 
discussing potent social and cultural issues. 684 Journalists and reporters prepared content, 
while the executive producer would decide on the overall format of the show. Orbit 
purposefully did not structure a proper “newsroom,” as they hadn’t envisioned covering 
current-affairs. After years on-air, AlQahira AlYoum transformed into a political show, 
“almost by accident”. When its reporters on the field decided to cover the 2004 Kefaya 
Movement685 and the 2005 presidential elections, the topics happened to pass through 
editorial approval, without much scrutiny and was even seen as a possible oversight by 
management.686 Nonetheless, this coverage proved so popular that AlQahira AlYoum 
continued to push forward with political topics, despite it not being a part of the program’s 
initial mission statement. The program’s popularity prompted nearly all of the later outlets to 
copy it. These kinds of shows subsequently became the major feature of private Egyptian 
television stations. AlQahira AlYoum evaded local censures due to it being unavailable in 
Egypt on the sanctioned cable provider CNE, since all other decoders were not allowed on 
the market at the time.687 It was however available to those willing to pay relatively exorbitant 
amounts, reaching $10,000 for the decoder and the nearly 70 channels included (mostly 
English language entertainment).688 Ali Beleil said that even though he was keenly aware that 
the vast majority of Egyptians did not have access to Orbit, it became a household name 
among the rich and powerful in Egypt. “We used to find out that some very influential people 
in Egypt were following keenly, and would even be influenced by the program.”689  
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Professionally, the program according to Beleil, was not run on any real journalistic principle. 
The almost haphazard growth of Orbit and these channels in general were met with derision 
by many stalwarts of the sector prior to privatization. Hassan Hamed, for example saw that 
“private media in general relied on experience of those trained in the public sector…their 
innovations were merely meant to serve commercial bubbles in the sector…they never 
contributed to any new institutions in media.”690 The lesson many in the private sector learned 
was that the demand for new content and a departure from the government’s prescribed 
version of current affairs was no longer desirable. Orbit attempted to accommodate this clear 
thirst for content by creating new professional modes of operation (independent from the 
Maspero legacy) to help deliver it. Islam Maher, who started out as a reporter with AlQahera 
AlYoum, believed her time with Orbit helped institutionalize new professional standards, 
especially pertaining to the production of current affairs talk shows.  She would see this 
model carried on and duplicated by herself and others in all of the private outlets that would 
develop.691  
One of the major elements of this model was the actual presenter. Orbit’s model of attracting 
subscriptions played into its priority of maintaining viewership vis-à-vis compelling 
presentation. Presenters were the main draw and they were given the reigns on air.  “The 
presenters ran the shows, there was never a set structure for how they would present. They 
didn’t have scripts, so they just became these sounding boards based on their ability to riff on 
topics.”692 A presenter like Amr Adib who was a gifted talker, would then riff on the topic 
and it would suddenly become an influential segment, with a very loose time limit.  
AlQahira AlYoum’s model was not only replicated, but deemed essential for any emerging 
private broadcaster. The difference would be that Egyptian programming would not operate 
with the same freedom from restrictions. When Dream and ElMehwar stations first launched 
in 2001 and 2002 respectively, one of the main considerations for them was that they were 
not allowed to air newscasts that might compete with those of the Egyptian Radio and 
Television Union (ERTU). 693 This would be especially true for Dream 2, which opened a few 
months after Dream 1, and was planned to have the majority of the compelling political 
programming.  
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The position of the presenters became one that was particularly politically sensitive. Dream 
TV executives would learn this very early on. Bahgat had initially hired a core team of 
individuals that represented his initial ambitions. The station was to be led by Hala Sarhan 
who started out with the ERTU, but was better known as a presenter with the Arab Radio and 
Television (ART) in the 1990s, mostly based out of Rome. There were a host of presenters 
fronting shows on culture and society, but it was the politically-oriented programs that drew 
the most attention. Ibrahim Eissa, the founder of the critical, AlDostor newspaper was to 
present a weekly political (and often sarcastic) show Aala Alqahwa (At the Coffee Shop). 
Hamdy Kandil, also an ART and ERTU alumnus, was given a prime-time weekly program 
Ra’is AlTahrir (Editor-in-chief), a nod to his prolific career as a journalist. The show had 
been initially planned to be an ERTU program, but had been quickly cancelled due to his 
criticism of US war in Afghanistan.694 Along with recurring appearances by Mohammed 
Hassanein Heikal, this roster was meant to attract enough viewers to make the station 
commercially viable.695 By 2004 all three lost their jobs.  
Eissa believed that Bahgat was genuine in attempting to start a liberal television station, but 
that he was a “victim of his dream”.696  While his program was on-air, Eissa delivered 
criticisms of the government often through indirect (although not subtle) sarcasm. According 
to him, when Bahgat’s financial issues with the state began, they used Dream TV as leverage. 
"When the prime minister himself insists on canceling my program in order to support 
Ahmed Bahgat in his financial troubles, this is really a question mark," Eissa had said.697  
Sarhan, was dismissed in 2003. She claimed it was down to two things. First of all, she 
thought the regime was upset that she pushed to air numerous appearances of Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal, even after knowing that he would be critical of the government. In 
September 2003, Ahmed Bahgat reportedly received a call from “the authorities” to cancel a 
scheduled appearance with Heikal marking his retirement from his work with AlAhram 
newspaper. 698 This came after the station was reprimanded for airing a speech by Heikal in 
October 2002 at a symposium held in the American University in Cairo, where he was 
especially critical of the state on a variety of issues revolving around foreign policy. Along 
with the Heikal incidents, Sarhan had said in an interview that the state pressured Bahgat into 
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firing her because of the religiously taboo subjects she would deal with on her own 
program.699 Kandil, for his part was always problematic from the point of view of the 
government. In his memoirs he recalls how Safwat El-Sherif rebuked him for how he referred 
to Hosni Mubarak on his program: 
Once, Safwat El-Sherif brought to my attention that I am the only one on 
television who refers to Mubarak as “The President” (Al-Rais), rather than, 
“His Excellency the President” (Siyadat Al-Rais).700 
Bahgat’s project seemed to be dead-in-the-water in 2004. His dream of a liberal, independent 
station was clearly not to be. It had been argued that this should have been evident from the 
initial insistence that the ERTU becomes a partner in his station, and that, according to its 
station manager, Dream was “dependent” on the state for all of its daily operations and 
“always seeking its approval”.701 Furthermore, since 2002 Bahgat was warned by “authorities” 
that "strict measures will be taken" if the channel "again tackles serious subjects in a 
sensational manner".702 Bahgat denied that the liberties he had taken within Dream TV had 
any bearing on his own personal business dealings with the state, especially the loans he had 
reportedly taken from public banks, which he was accused of taking without offering 
adequate collateral.703 The timing of a government investigation into his loans were too 
conspicuous, and many came to the conclusion that the investigation was a direct result of the 
political content on Dream:   
Eissa [suggested] that Bahgat had violated the patron-client relationship with 
the regime by allowing criticism of the government to be expressed on his TV 
channel, leading the regime to enforce this patron-client relationship by using 
the banks to threaten Bahgat‘s business. For instance, Bahgat denied that he 
had defaulted on any loans, saying in 2002 that his total assets (LE1.7 billion) 
were more than the total sum he had borrowed from the banks over a number 
of years (LE1.6 billion). Yet, in May 2004, the government prevented Bahgat 
from travelling abroad until he settled the billions of pounds he owed to the 
National Bank of Egypt and the New Housing Communities Authority.704  
Bahgat’s decision to support Hosni Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections, also coincided 
with the revival of Dream TV. A report by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights found that in 
the months leading into the election, Dream TV dedicated 69% of its coverage to Mubarak 
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specifically, compared to 41% for ElMehwar and less than 30% for the public Channels 2 and 
3.705  
Dream’s resurgence would come, not only as a result of the regained status vis-à-vis the 
President, but also as a benefactor of the NDP’s attempts to appear more liberalized and 
modern. Again this would be marked by a new flagship program El’Ashera Masa’an (10pm). 
The presenter this time was Mona ElShazly, a choice that didn’t upset the authorities. El-
Shazly’s background was more as a talented and charismatic interviewer of artists and cultural 
figures. “At this time, the majority of chosen TV hosts who weren’t explicitly talking on 
behalf of the regime or ruling party, were seen as needing to be politically risk-free choices, 
due to their backgrounds in other areas,”706 said Mohamed Nasser one of the producers who 
worked on the show.  
When the opportunity to revive Dream’s fortunes presented itself to Bahgat, Dream again 
turned to the talk-show. Amr Khafaga was at the helm of 10pm and behind the decision to 
bring in Mona ElShazly. This time, the program would still attempt to connect to the viewers’ 
everyday concerns and criticisms of public life, but in a way that was to be more social than 
political.707 As a fan of AlQahera AlYoum, he decided to replicate their model, and even 
recruited from its staff to do so. “This way of working was supposed to be a way to appear to 
give the audience what they want, without the controversial hosts and without stinging, direct 
criticism of the government.”708 El-Shazly was never meant to be as politically influential as 
she would become, especially by the time of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, when she was 
the first to interview Wael Ghoneim, a computer programmer and one of the chief architects 
of the online campaign and protests leading to the Uprising.709 
Like both Khafaga and Sarhan, ElShazly was one of many private media figures with prior 
experience in Pan-Arab satellite broadcasting –in the case of these three with ART. A good 
portion of the journalists brought to work on the programs were also initially sourced from 
Pan-Arab television. Khafaga, recruited Islam Maher from Orbit, along with many others. 
Maher, who would become the show’s executive producer for three years had sought to 
recruit her group of journalists fresh from university. “The idea was to start with a journalistic 
perspective that was new and with a group of young people willing to learn, rather than being 
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saddled with old habits from public institutions. Also, many of the salaries offered were not 
quite low and would only suit college students.”710 
The absence of experienced journalists in the field of private television opened the door for 
print journalist (from both private and public institutions) who were also recruited. Many 
agreed in order to supplement their income in television, contributing to the overlap between 
the media. Khafaga himself represented this crossover, having worked in print with Roz 
AlYousef magazine as a journalist. He would later go on to help establish the private daily 
newspaper AlShorouk in 2009.   
Khafaga, along with his colleagues and counterparts were well aware of the precarious nature 
of reporting the news on their networks since the government was not licensing news 
channels at the time. In addition, the opaque legal framework regulating broadcasted content 
had been used as a tool for intimidation when influential private TV stations dared to venture 
beyond the agreed-upon topics they were allowed to cover. Licenses of private broadcasters 
like Dream and ElMehwar allowed them to provide a general service, with no specific 
authorization to broadcast news. In order to bypass these restrictions given the popular nature 
of news and news-related discussions, Dream had resorted to providing news in their popular 
talk show slots rather than risking launching news programs.  
On the other hand, this loophole put their license in danger of being revoked or their 
programs halted due to possible infringement of their registration as a non-news entity. The 
state’s direct control of the satellite signals upon which these private ventures were reliant, 
gave the government a sense of ultimate control and reassured them of the private stations’ 
acquiescence as they veered more towards journalism and news.  
Attempts to transform these talk shows into fully-fledged journalistic enterprises occurred 
once it became clear that this form of programming would be allowed and that these 
programs would be prominently present on private television stations. Dream TV would, as a 
result, come to rely on its talk shows as the main draw. “At some point after around 2007 and 
2008, whenever the managers would be discussing strategy to bring in income from 
advertisements or increasing viewership, they would essentially be talking about, 10pm … 
and it was the same with the flagship talk shows of other stations,” said Maher.711  
																																								 																				






During the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, outlets such as AlQahira AlYoum 
and Dream TV sent out reporters to cover the voting, and were surprised at the lack of 
resistance to their coverage. Audience reaction to this coverage was massive and these 
newsrooms continued to provide the popular content. In 10pm’s newsroom, journalists 
seemed as surprised as the audience at the content they were airing. The team at Dream were 
convinced they were showing Egyptians something they had never seen before, even though 
their intention was simply to “go out and cover some stories on the street.”712 
After the elections, which was announced to be heavily in favor of the NDP, Mona ElShazly 
was allowed to host Noha ElZeiny, an elections judge who was exposing ballot rigging. She, 
along with the show staff, knew they would be annoying the regime in so doing.713 Even 
though El-Zeiny’s episode aired, it did not sit well with the government. And as a result they 
were forced to suddenly cancel a full episode that was prepared to expose voting irregularities 
in the 2007 Shura Council elections, according to a journalist who was working with the 
show, but preferred anonymity.714 The Shura Council was also growing in importance, and by 
censuring the Shura Council voting episode in 2007, but allowing the 2005 episode, the 
regime showed-through their media censures- plans for shifts in the legislative branch to help 
maintain the regime’s grip, even if the People’s Assembly became more diverse and open for 
participation.  
The Shura Council had historically been the lesser of the two chambers according to the 1971 
constitution. Yet it became a particularly important haven for the old-guard of the NDP under 
Safwat El-Sherif, who was speaker of this assembly between 2004 and 2011. The House of 
Representatives in 2005 was open to members of staunch opposition groups who in the past 
wouldn’t have been allowed to contest these seats. The Muslim Brotherhood for example, 
fielded candidates (as independents) in 2005, winning 88 out of the 450 seats. This would not 
be the case for Shura Council, where 84 out of the 88 seats up for election were occupied by 
NDP candidates, and another 44 seats were directly appointed by the President. The NDP’s 
choice to field ElSherif for speaker of the council indicated the growing influence of the 
Shura, especially since ElSherif was also Secretary-General of the NDP, and head of the 
Supreme Press Council. He was the most influential speaker in the history of this chamber. 
During his time at its helm, the Shura Council came to symbolize the regime’s intent to 
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maintain absolute control of local politics. ElSherif’s presence there implied to journalists 
that this would be another “red line” that they couldn’t cross. Mohamed Helmy, who was a 
journalist with Dream and a producer with several other local stations during this period 
explained the “red lines” concept at the time: 
We were figuring out where the limits of this new ‘freedom’ in media were. 
Some things were always clearly off limits, such as the military and the 
president’s family. The looming presence of Safwat El-Sherif in positions of 
power always gave off the impression that the government never truly 
liberalized.715  
8) Between commercial opportunity and legitimizing the private sector 
The early days of private broadcasting were met with skepticism. Those who had sought to 
run the stations as independent, profit-motivated ventures, found the initial costs of running a 
media outlet in an underdeveloped advertising market to be challenging. Despite theoretically 
being able to access viewers across the Arab world, the nature of the content (especially the 
social talk shows) would limit viewership more or less to Egypt and Egyptians in general. 
Advertising revenue would be further restricted by the fragmented nature of consumer 
markets in the Middle East at the time. In a 2001 interview, Nader Gohar expressed doubts as 
to whether he and his brother (Mohamed) would pursue ownership or a major investment in 
private satellite stations due to the fact that it did not reach the much larger audiences of 
terrestrial TV: 
"We're counting upon advertisement-based revenue," says Nader Gohar. But 
even he is quick to concede that the costs of operating a TV station for one 
year boils down to $24 million. To try and cover that cost from 
advertisements alone isn't feasible. Gohar is hoping that the government will 
relent and allow private terrestrial transmission, after it "gets used to and 
comfortable with" private satellite transmission. "Will Egypt TV permit 
someone else to share the market with them?" Gohar asks. "That's what 
we're waiting to find out."716 
The motives for engaging in the private broadcasting space shifted, but tended to revolve 
around gaining political favor in one way or another. In the early days of the EMPC, 
businesses would curry favor with the state by investing into the project, as they would invest 
in any major government endeavor that needed private sector financing and general 
involvement to be successful. Those who invested would also begin to see ways they could 
use their ownership and influence over media outlets as a political tool they could deploy in 
its own right. Ahmed Bahgat, for example had seen his ownership of Dream TV as an 
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effective way to spend the advertising budget of his much larger holding company to promote 
his core business. It was to be a business opportunity for him, as he was able to create his 
own advertising vessel in a tax free environment. “Bahgat's rationale in creating Dream TV, 
according to the channel's leading presenter Hala Sarhan, was to divert the bulk of his annual 
spending on advertising to his own television channel.”717 
In time, these stations continued to grow until they became part and parcel of the “public 
sphere,” which had been monopolized by the public terrestrial broadcasting for over four 
decades.718 
While the state still maintained ultimate control, the growing audiences after the 2005 
elections helped television outlets begin to envision the makings of a more self-sustained 
market. Egyptian private television managers had begun to entertain the concept of 
“commercial success.”719  
This optimistic outlook contributed to ballooning budgets for the television stations, 
especially when it came to salaries of the talk-show hosts. Coming across financial details of 
television stations is extremely rare. Yet most professionals in the field agree that despite 
there being growing revenue from advertisers, private television channels had never reached 
the point of becoming profitable or even self-sustaining (in the long run) in their own right. 
“Media experts claim that all private satellite channels are spending incredible amounts of 
money to get the highest percentage of audiences’ shares yet the advertisements expenditure 
never covers the costs.”720 
One of the main prizes for the station owners was in its promotion of liberalization, especially 
by making the private sector seem more legitimate in the eyes of the public, a message that 
gelled well with the political leaderships plan at the time. Hassan Rateb, owner of ElMehwar, 
claimed that his vested interest in the success of the NDP’s direction and neoliberal policies 
were the actual drivers behind the establishment of his station. In a 2002 interview Rateb 
explicitly expressed this as being the mission of his venture: 
… the socialist way of thinking that was the reason for the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union is still very evident in this region. Many of our 
journalists, critics, and intellectuals are a product of the socialist 
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legacy. One of the important missions of this station is to legitimize the 
private sector in Egypt. This is not to say that the private sector doesn't 
have its problems…businessmen who are not paying their loans and 
running away from the country are not the full picture. The private 
sector needs a voice, their achievements and successes need to be 
represented, and ElMehwar is a vehicle for a genuine and important 
group in our society.721 
Similarly, Bahgat saw Dream TV as a symbol of both economic and political liberalization. 
This was the most direct political message and editorial compass to come from early private 
broadcasters. Hala Sarhan relayed Bahgat’s thoughts that “privatization equals freedom of 
opportunity. Privatization also means freedom of expression.” 722 Dream TV would gain 
audience credibility over the public stations largely due to its different approach.  
9) Conclusion 
The regime was attempting to appear to be implementing economic and political 
liberalization, while still retaining a firm grip on Egypt’s reins. Similarly, the media were 
being decentralized and shifting to the private sector, but the existent security-minded 
structure of power retained sufficient built-in restrictions around the sector. Meanwhile, the 
transforming NDP under Hosni Mubarak’s son and heir-apparent, Gamal had been attempting 
to expand and entrench neoliberal policies, built on a more expansive network of connected 
businessmen, who would be more concerned with the NDP project, than with protecting “old-
state” values and jurisdictions. The relationship between the Gamal’s “new” cohort and the 
established militarily oriented power structure was not always adversarial, but their goals, at 
times seemed to diverge. Dream TV and ElMehwar both launched as privately owned “liberal” 
outlets and while they were their own commercial entities, seemed to be ultimately in service 
of the neoliberalization drive. While they pioneered knew kinds of programming and brought 
some current affairs topics to Egyptian airwaves that would have been considered taboo 
under public TV, the state maintained a noticeable presence in both. State (or state-affiliated) 
entities were part of the ownership teams in both stations. More importantly, all private 
television stations aired in the state-built Media Production City and had to transmit using 
government-controlled satellite. In the coming years the private sector would continue to 
expand, leading to the 2011 Uprising and its aftermath. The state would henceforth be more 
reactive to changes in the sector, often leading to inconsistent policies and inconsistent 
growth trends in the sector.  
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Chapter 5- The “25 January Revolution” and its Aftermath 
1) Broadcast and print media in the run-up to 2011 
 
The changes brought about by the political transformation in 2005 picked up speed in the 
following years. The NDP persevered in pushing forth neoliberal economic policies while 
further entrenching its control over local politics. Shifting political and economic sands led 
the country directly to the uprising that started on the 25th of January 2011. Private media’s 
role was expanding and their influence on society was becoming more potent due to a variety 
of factors both directly and indirectly affecting the regulatory, structural, commercial and 
editorial climate in the sector.  
 
Further transformation and expansion of the private sector 
Changes on the economic front were being championed by those at the center of power who 
also benefitted from a security apparatus and legal system skewed in their favor.723 Gamal 
Mubarak had reached the height of his power during this period as the public face of the 
neoliberal drive and the new political/business elite. The privatization program that had 
originated in 1991 was not only reinvigorated, but rapidly expanding.   
 
Between 2004 and 2006, seventy-seven companies were sold for around LE20 billion, which 
is more than the entire early privatization phases combined. The total value of privatized 
assets up until that point was LE38 billion.724 This cumulative figure raised eyebrows as 
being too low for the sale of 289 public companies responsible for a sizeable wage-bill. One 
explanation for this was that a 2000 amendment to Law 203/1991 allowed for sales to be 
made at prices lower than the valuations made by consultants and the Central Accounting 
Agency.725 
Benefits of the economic climate at the time for the increasingly influential class of business 
owners contributed towards a palpable power shift. This cohort of businessmen was 
becoming “more demanding; their business expansion required the state to [further] 
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deregulate the economy, privatize public enterprises, reduce subsidies for the poor and taxes 
for the rich, and allow them cheap access to public resources.”726 
Access to the ownership of broadcasting and mass daily printing was one of the ways in 
which connected businessmen were able to gain access to public resources and benefit from 
deregulation in ways that were unheard of prior to 2001.727 This shift and the relative success 
of Dream TV and ElMehwar “initiated a trend in Egypt where businessmen have shown a 
vested interest in the power of media. This also includes AlHayat Channel, owned by 
[ElSayyed] Badawi728, and Sawiris’ OnTV.”729 These channels were established in 2008 and 
2007 respectively by businessmen who were not members of the NDP. They both harbored 
political ambitions, but were allowed to establish television stations due to their buy-in and 
massive support of liberalization process.730 By contrast, the owners of Dream TV and 
ElMehwar were either uninterested in politics, or were embedded with the ruling political 
class.  
Egyptian drama and cultural production had already been well-established, and was given 
space to grow in the private sphere, especially with the infrastructure afforded by the Media 
Production City. Political and news production, on the other hand remained an identifiable 
gap in the market. Many of the media professionals and journalists recruited to establish these 
stations attempted to exploit this gap.  
Hafez ElMirazi was one of those professionals. After spending seven years in Washington 
D.C. as a Bureau chief and presenter for AlJazeera, and having worked with the BBC before 
that, ElMirazi returned to Egypt in 2007 to join AlHayat hoping to help establish the outlet 
“as a serious news and politics station.”731 While well aware of the station owner’s political 
ambitions, he thought that the brief allowances given to connected businessmen may create a 
large enough overture in the Egyptian media scene to allow for such a model to be realized in 
a commercially sustainable and expansive manner. ElMirazi had returned to Egypt from 
America with high hopes that would quickly be quashed.  
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“We talked about creating a major news station, [network owner] Badawi was receptive to 
the idea at first. But it seems like at some point he was being pressured in some way by the 
government to avoid that route. They ended up turning the station into a variety entertainment 
channel.”732  
The desire to control what was deemed politically sensitive material continued despite the 
demonstrable push towards liberalization, especially under the continuously growing 
leadership of Gamal Mubarak. Webb noted that the concept of this control remained in force 
from Nasser until the end of the Mubarak years, albeit changing form:  
The main purpose of the media systems, from the perspective of the regime, 
evolved from mobilization of the population under Nasser to demobilization 
under Mubarak. The population could expect to be entertained, to an extent and 
to learn what the official line on events was…interviewees understood the 
Mubarak regime as seeing the media as a tool of pacification, to keep the 
population under control.733  
Once AlHayat’s plans to become a news channel failed to materialize and their programming 
focus shifted, they identified the need to mimic Dream’s success by engaging politically and 
socially. Most stations and advertisers at the time did not ignore the fact that the sector’s short 
relationship with the social/political talk-shows was one of the best ways to generate a 
dedicated fan base. It created “stars” for the channels that audiences found easy to sympathize 
with. By extension this helped establish a stronger relationship between the audience and 
outlets’ brands.734  
Growth amid an expanding public sphere and increasing global pressure 
The continued growth of political talk-shows against the backdrop of a media system that was 
structurally (and implicitly) linked to the regime with regard to licensing was an area where 
commercial goals seemed to relatively outgrow political considerations, leading to rapid 
developments. Advertising agencies that controlled the revenue of television stations were 
making direct demands on which presenters would be on air, based on popularity as a main 
criteria.735 Television stations at that time were not seeking explicit or tacit approval from the 
state on who could appear on screen.  
Talk shows with a critical edge and popular presenters became a new political currency in 
their own right. Suddenly, a media system that had very rarely been allowed to be openly 
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critical of the central government, could ask questions on live television with significantly 
reduced fear of major retribution. Anchors probed government officials and viewers called-
in, using their real names, to enquire, protest, and demand. Regulatory bodies within the 
regime often found themselves confronted with the reality that a certain type of regime 
criticism was occurring, as long as the aforementioned red lines were respected. The general 
atmosphere of the liberalization rhetoric pushed forth plans that would, almost unavoidably, 
allow for more leeway in media output and the structure of the sector.736 
For a generation of journalists who entered the fray of news media then, the overriding sense 
was that they were able to perform their duties at a reasonable distance from much of the 
political concerns at the top levels of power. At the height of its operations, the Dream TV 
newsroom operated in the way in which many of the young reporters were taught newsrooms 
should be operated. Yasmin Marwan was a broadcast journalist recruited directly out of 
university to work with TV presenter, Mona ElShazly on the nightly political talk show 
El’Ashera Masa’an. Having been recruited along with a group of her classmates at Cairo 
University’s Faculty of Mass Communication in 2007, her starting salary was around 600 
Egyptian Pounds/month (roughly $100 at the time). Despite the meager income, she relayed a 
sense of purpose not commonly associated with Egyptian journalism in previous periods: 
It was a very encouraging point in time to be in the field. For many of us, the 
first few years at our job made us feel almost free as journalists. Of course there 
were limits, but we mostly only had to report to our seniors. We were reporting 
on everything, including elections. We were aware that maybe at the end we 
could still be at the mercy of the government. But still, because we were in a 
team that had the ambition-and it seemed the mandate as well- to go do our 
work, there was a sense of media professionalism among the journalists.737 
Yasmin and others recruited at the same time acknowledged that this “liberalized” 
journalistic attitude was not common for previous graduates of their faculty. Their 
immediate supervisor, Islam Maher believed that through the political talk show, they were 
creating a new journalistic culture that would endure.738 This atmosphere would be reflected 
in the Freedom House annual Freedom of Press report. Until 2007, the organization had 
deemed the press in Egypt to be, “Not Free.” Starting in 2008, Egyptian press (broadcast and 
print) were labeled “Partially Free” (Figure 1). In its report that year, Freedom House 
attributed journalistic work to the change in designation:  
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Egypt’s status improved from Not Free to Partly Free in recognition of the 
courage of Egyptian journalists to cross “red lines” that previously restricted 
their work and in recognition of the greater range of viewpoints represented in 
the Egyptian media and blogosphere. This progress occurred in spite of the 
government’s ongoing—and in some cases increasing—harassment, repression, 
and imprisonment of journalists.739 
The popularity of talk shows such as El’Ashera Masa’an especially was a sign post of a 
shifting culture in broadcast. Mona ElShazly was called “the people’s conscience” in an 
article in Youm7, a private print and online news outlet in 2009. The glowing praise for the 
show was even more remarkable since Youm7 was known to have been created as a de-facto 
private-media apparatus in the state’s PR toolshed. Rumors had spread that the paper– which 
was established in 2008– was owned by Safwat ElSherif’s son, Ashraf. While it was not 
possible to confirm his ownership, the long-time chief editor of the paper, Khaled Salah, 
admitted in a television interview that there was a direct link with ElSherif, citing business 
relations between the largest shareholder740 and Ashraf ElSherif.741 Salah would claim in the 
same interview that they were cautious not to appear to be labeled an “opposition” paper out 
of a belief by the publication’s owners that being biased wouldn’t be commercially viable.  
At the height of ElShazly’s popularity, the Youm7 article said that she gained the trust of 
Egyptians, “by exposing their problems and the government officials responsible for them, 
she has been speaking for Egyptians for years.”742 While ElShazly avoided direct criticism of 
the President and the Military, her staff felt emboldened as journalists to stand toe-to-toe with 
other government entities.743 This was especially clear in 2008, when she interviewed 
President George Bush Jr. in the White House, causing upheaval at the Ministry of 
Information (MOI). Mohammed Nasser, who was a producer on the show at the time, 
recalled how incensed the MOI was that Dream TV did not seek its approval before going to 
meet the most powerful man in the world: 
The Minister [of Information] was really angry. Behind the scenes he tried to 
shut down the interview. He thought that any contact with a foreign 
government like this was a matter of national security, and that it was his job 
to regulate it. But maybe it was the Ministry feeling like we were becoming 
too powerful. I think our ability to get this interview without any state aid, 
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made us seem as a more important media outlet [to the West] then Egyptian 
state media.744 
The 10-minute sit-down interview was covered broadly in Egyptian media. It was widely 
celebrated at Dream internally. AlMasry AlYoum newspaper wrote that state media had indeed 
submitted a request with the White House for an interview at the same time, but that the U.S. 
purposefully opted for Dream, a private outlet. The paper also quoted a source from 
Washington saying that “the American administration wanted to give other TV stations [other 
than state-owned TV] the opportunity.”745 ElShazly, had added that Dream TV paid their way 
to Washington D.C. for the interview, dispelling the notion that they were being sponsored by 
an American entity for this trip. 
ElShazly’s interview in D.C. highlighted both rising popularity and the relative power of her 
talk show. The interview was aired on 13 May 2008, days before Bush was to meet Mubarak 
in Egypt at the World Economic Forum on the Middle East (18-20 May 2008).746 This would 
be the second meeting between the two presidents in Egypt that year alone, marking a period 
of heightened relations. The U.S. had been particularly vocal in stressing political 
liberalization in Egypt. On his first visit (18 January 2008) Bush made the point clearly 
saying: 
Progress toward greater political openness is being led by the Egyptians 
themselves, by pioneering journalists -- some of whom even may be here -- 
bloggers, or judges insisting on independence, or other strong civic and 
religious leaders who love their country and are determined to build a 
democratic future.747 
The role of international diplomacy in encouraging a certain degree of tolerance to private 
media is pertinent, but does not solely account for the rapid rise in the popularity of these 
outlets and their expanding importance.  
Ibrahim Eissa’s paper, AlDostor, for example was allowed to publish and distribute locally in 
2005, after having been shut down in 1998. In an interview with the Inter-Press agency in 
2008, Eissa said that international pressure was the main reason his paper was allowed to 
return, citing specifically former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Middle East 
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democratization initiative, which came against the backdrop of the Iraq war and the toppling 
of Saddam Hussein in 2003: 
These factors combined to force dictatorial Arab regimes to begin showing a 
degree of flexibility vis-à-vis the political opposition. As a result, we saw the 
opposition Al-Ghad party receive a license from the government and the 
(pro-democracy) Kefaya movement begin organizing street protests. And in 
2005, the four-year-old judicial decree allowing AlDostor to re-launch was 
finally implemented. All of this came as a result of pressure exerted on the 
regime by Washington and other Western capitals and international human 
rights groups. However, after the U.S. administration was dismayed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s surprise electoral performance in the 2005 
parliamentary elections, much of this pressure for political reform 
evaporated. 748 
During this time, Eissa claims he had also been the first to oppose the issue of Gamal 
Mubarak “inheriting” power from his father, “which had represented a major “red line” before 
[he] first began raising the issue.”749 Rather than penalizing the writer, the Egyptian 
government used the opportunity to attempt to promote a progressive image of the regime, 
with President Mubarak stating that unlike Syria, Egypt does not have presidential 
inheritance.750 Eissa had received a total of six jail sentences for his writings in private print 
media, they were mostly reduced to financial penalties.751 
Despite global pressure influencing the political climate, Freedom House notes that the 
improvements did not completely shield journalists and media outlets that were still 
theoretically subject to many of the same laws that limited the role of media. A few advances 
were made in amendments to the Press Law in 2006. These advances were tempered by the 
fact that laws still maintained the relatively harsh punitive measures. Fines and prison 
sentences could still be issued for insulting the President and his family, a foreign dignitary or 
a major religion. The fines were well beyond the ability of most journalists to endure, ranging 
from LE5,000 to LE20,000 (US$900 to US$3,600) for press infractions and up to five years’ 
imprisonment for criticizing a foreign head of state or the president.752 The ongoing 1981 
Emergency Laws persisted as well. Eissa could not avoid imprisonment on one occasion as a 
result. He was brought before a State-Security court in 2007 for claiming that President 
																																								 																				









Mubarak was ill, and was charged with publishing reports that could “harm public 
interest.”753  
It is worthy to note that in this case, the legal reasoning behind the “public harm” charge was 
not tagged directly to any endangerment of “national security” as was usually the case. 
Rather, court documents associated the harm inflicted by the misinformation with the 
potential economic damage, including subverting ongoing plans to transform the economic 
system. The legal reading of the charge outlined the effects of Eissa’s writings on foreign 
investment, the government’s major policy initiative at the time. According to a BBC report, 
“state prosecutors said the false rumors published by Mr. Eissa about the 79-year-old's health 
prompted investors to take $350m (£172m) out of the Egyptian economy in less than a 
week.”754  
Eissa’s cases clearly demonstrated the state’s continued intransigence regarding the President 
himself and the importance the state put on protecting the implementation of its 
neoliberalization program. As far as the media sector was concerned, the growing space to 
operate did allow the tide in the sector to shift towards a media system that was beginning to 
appear more tolerant to a degree of social and political divergence. Litigation of journalists 
and the number of fines issued were increasing, although actual prison sentences were 
declining in the run-up to the 2011 uprising.755 
The establishment of independent newspaper AlMasry AlYoum in 2004 provided the most 













753 BBC News (2007) 
754 BBC NEWS (2008). 






Figure 1: Freedom House: Freedom of the Press Reports, Egypt (2003-2017) 

















2003 Not Free 79 28 27 24 
2004 Not Free 76 26 28 22 
2005 Not Free 68 24 24 20 
2006 Not Free 61 22 21 18 
2007 Not Free 62 22 22 18 
2008 Partly Free 59 21 20 18 
2009 Partly Free 60 21 21 18 
2010 Partly Free 60 21 21 18 
2011 Not Free 65 23 24 18 
2012 Partly Free 57 20 22 15 
2013 Not Free 62 22 24 16 
2014 Not Free 68 22 30 16 
2015 Not Free 73 24 33 16 
2016 Not Free 77 25 35 17 
2017 Not Free 77 26 34 17 
 
Mass media evolution: progressive attempts and failures 
One of the most discussed elements leading up to the 2011 uprising was the rapidly 
expanding access to the internet and social media. While the specific developments within 
this theme -and the digital space in general- fall beyond the scope of this research, it is 
important to understand how the emergence of new media played a role in the development 
of the established forms of print and private media. The effects of social media in 
popularizing certain moments of protest and controversial issues, including corruption, police 
brutality and inequality helped create trends and topics of conversation that the burgeoning 
private media either could not ignore editorially or would come to see as a means to attract an 
audience. 
Publicly-owned media could not provide content compelling enough to engage a society that 
was already subject to the pluralizing effects of increased internet penetration. Between 2005 
and 2011, internet penetration increased from around 12.27% to 32.96% while also becoming 
the third most frequently used form of media after mobile phones and television.756 By 2010, 
																																								 																				





television penetration was thought to have potentially reached as high as 90% (in terms of 
general access), while over 4 million newspapers were in circulation.757 
Social media was helping drive the political and human rights discourse, especially. Popular 
blogs were raising awareness on specific issues dealing with corruption and police 
brutality.758 Large-scale labor protests outside of the major urban areas were becoming 
popularized by citizen journalists online.759  
Editorially, many of the independent press followed suit, often leading with local stories 
involving corruption or human rights cases while their counterparts in publicly-owned media 
continued to lead with news from the Presidential Palace. A study published in 2010 
highlighted the divergent coverage between these papers:  
The front page of Egyptian newspapers in mid-September 2009 ran different 
stories, depending on whether the paper was independently or state-owned. 
The government-run AlAhram’s online page had as its first story President 
Mubarak’s comments on Jerusalem capturing the hearts and minds of all 
Muslims, and, as a consequence, the importance of a regional solution… The 
front page contained none of the articles that were prominently covered in its 
independent counterparts, like AlMasry AlYoum, Daily News Egypt, and 
AlDostour. While the front pages of those papers contained versions of some 
of the same subjects covered by AlAhram, a number of others were less 
flattering to the government, such as: Cairo’s mounting garbage problem, 
which had deteriorated to the point where AlMasry AlYoum was running a 
campaign entitled “Serve Yourself—Forget the Government”; the rising 
prices of basic foodstuffs (just in time for the upcoming Eid); the sewage-
contaminated drinking water of Shabramant in the Delta; and the problems 
of underage marriage.760 
Print journalists specifically made multiple attempts to build on the growing “alternative” 
public voice amplified on social media. One of the more noteworthy endeavors was that of 
ElBadil, a left-leaning newspaper that was launched in July 2007 as a daily publication. 
ElBadil openly gave voice to labor movements and mass protests, which were becoming 
more frequent, and easier to organize due to social media. Notably, the paper highlighted the 
massive 6 April 2008 general strike protesting corruption and inequality, and on 7 April its 
main headline called it a “success” next to which was a story about the organization of a 
follow-up strike on the 4th of May.761 Government publications, on the other hand, were both 
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downplaying the strike and echoing the state’s warning against joining it.762 The strike was a 
response by activists around the country to an initial call by workers in AlMahalla AlKubra, 
an industrial town and hotbed of labor activity. Solidarity with the movement on activists’ 
blogs and on social media led to it being massively expanded in a highly diverse show of 
solidarity across sectors of society. Subsequently, the strike itself turned into a nationwide 
crackdown. Over 200 protesters were jailed and a surprising number of people participated in 
the movement by going on strike or joining the street protests.763 That day provided an 
indication of not only the societal and organizational shift provided by new media, but also 
the fact that the state’s outlook on freedom of speech had not changed.764 ElBadil’s former 
editor said the newspaper wanted to differ from other media outlets by covering both labor 
and political movements, believing there was a need for that, “hence the paper’s tagline Sawt 
ElMostad’afeen” (Voice of the Weakened)765 stood in stark contrast to publications owned 
by established businessmen. Many of the latter who owned papers actively intervened to ban 
reporting on labor movements, “most likely to support the economic direction of the country 
at the time.”766 ElBadil couldn’t generate enough revenue to stay afloat, however. It closed 
down in 2009 due to lack of funds, and reappeared two years later only as a website.  
Most of the private newspaper owners and practitioners acknowledged that, even though they 
were allowed to run the stories they saw fit on a day-to-day basis, they would often receive 
telephone calls directly from individuals in powerful positions (or their proxies) to “discuss” 
certain stories767. “Some of them perceive this as a form of pressure, while others describe it 
as a negotiation and bridge-building process.”768 
Structurally, many of the traditional print news outlets in Egypt became concerned with 
appealing to an online audience, by creating internet platforms, developing the advertising 
space there and allowing for divergent newsrooms. A media survey of the Arab World, found 
that by 2012, eight of the top ten most widely read online news sources were affiliated with 
print papers.769 
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Methodologically, media outlets clearly lacked any systematic approach to producing the 
kind of content that was deemed commercially and editorially worthwhile. Publisher Hesham 
Kassem believed that even if the intent existed to create commercially viable, independent 
media, decisions were made arbitrarily and in a top-down manner.770 Kassem for much of his 
career, ran private media outlets -including AlMasry AlYoum- and acted as a business 
consultant for others. He believed that a sense of professionalism in running media outlets 
never took hold. One of the main drawbacks he encountered was that, “most media outlet 
owners didn’t know why they wanted to go forward with the venture, other than to say they 
did it.771” Through his eyes the development of the private media was merely the result of the 
dwindling ability of the state media to cope with the industry’s technological and budgetary 
realities, leaving a clear gap in a market that was increasingly more accessible to non-state 
actors. In 2004 the ERTU exhibited a cumulative deficit of LE4 billion ($690m). This was 
increasing at LE800 million annually.772 “They were not spending enough time catering to 
viewers’ needs, especially as consumers’ desires tend to be a more powerful factor as 
economies liberalize.”773 
Portions of the private sector with connections to centers of power saw it as an opportunity to 
seize a portion of a market that has become readily available to them, while the state saw it as 
a way to gain favors with this cohort. “It was like the land-grabbing deals during the Mubarak 
years,” Kassem said in reference to the often cited774 allegations of corruption associated with 
land privatization during the Mubarak era.775  
Kassem’s perspective is bolstered by his 20+ years as a media executive in the sector. While 
his outlook is based on first-hand knowledge, some owners and managers interviewed in the 
course of this study have attempted to provide examples of just the opposite: attempts to 
launch and run sustainable media businesses. For the most part, despite their claims, Kassem 
is correct in pointing out that none of the prominent private media owners managed to launch 
a robust, stand-alone and sustainable business in the sector. 
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Amr Khafaga believes that while some of his employers did have the intention to run their 
organizations properly, the infrastructure supporting sound business decision-making did not 
exist. “There were no scientific ways to gauge viewership, effectiveness of advertising, or 
gain indications of future trends.776” Khafaga, who helped found and run Dream TV as well 
as one of the early independent newspapers, AlShorouk777 said that attempts by some private 
companies to plug some of the knowledge gaps in the sector existed, but were wholly 
inadequate. “All we knew for certain from some of these attempts at research was that at its 
height (in 2010), the size of the media advertising market in Egypt was around LE2 billion 
(roughly $355 million). Naturally it meant advertisers were interested.778”  
Kassem saw that the lack of professionalism coupled with the growing advertising market, 
helped allow advertisers to exercise control over private broadcasting and print media. When 
appearing on a private talk show (he did not specify which) as a pundit, Kassem asked a 
station manager during one of the customary 20-minute advertising breaks, why they agree to 
such an inefficient advertising allocation when they could charge more and have shorter 
breaks. The station manager said they were too afraid to refuse the advertiser’s request for 
more time, preferring to build the show’s schedule around their wishes.779  
Meanwhile, most prominent newspaper journalists found that they were not making enough 
money despite advances in the sector. They moved to supplement their income in the private 
media space by contributing to TV news talk shows either as presenters or producers. Many 
of the broadcast journalists and producers were also print journalists. The lines between 
platforms in the private media spaces were blurred. This, according to publisher Hesham 
Kassem, could have had a positive impact driving a move towards the technologically 
motivated trend of “consolidating newsrooms across platforms,”. Instead he believes it 
contributed to a blurring of editorial lines.780 
2)  Drastic changes: Disruptions to balance of power 
Before private media outlets or the overall system of privatized media could reach major 
headwinds due to structural inefficiencies or a lack of adequate infrastructure to support the 
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sector’s growth, the 2011 uprising occurred. Massive protests led to the ouster of Hosni 
Mubarak, and a seismic shift in Egyptian power dynamics ensued. For private media, it 
sparked another period of major turbulence and drastic changes.  
On the 25th of January 2011, the government was preparing to celebrate “Police Day,” while 
protests were being planned across the country, mainly against police brutality. The uprising 
that would begin that day would help propel private media into the epicenter of the Egyptian 
power paradigm as the desire to consume media from alternate sources (to the publicly-
funded outlets) reached an all-time high. One study noted that the 25th of January uprising 
and the subsequent sit-in leading to the downfall of Mubarak represented a period when the 
“curtains” of information set up by “individuals” in power would be taken down and replaced 
by what was essentially a new value system associated with popular modes of consumption 
and dissemination of information.781 That researcher attributed the shift in the dominant 
forces behind media and consumption trends within the sector to a change in public 
consciousness.782 While those conclusions have not aged particularly well, they still validly 
captured the essence of the Egyptian uprising as a watershed moment in private media, when 
looked at solely in the light of that moment.  
The wide participation of the often-dormant middle class in Egypt provided a significant 
momentary shift away from the previously dominant narrative that the central state was the 
main guarantor of a minimum threshold of social welfare and political cohesion, and that this 
role essentially maintained the country’s stability. Kandil correctly points out that the 
aggressive pursuit of neoliberal policies had stripped away the state’s ability to protect the 
middle class, providing instead more advantages to a small circle of connected 
businessmen.783 He added that these policies created a disequilibrium with the rural middle 
class, by upending the established system of political patronage and creating a new crop of 
middlemen represented by the winners of the neopatrimonial framework. Farmers had to also 
contend with the challenging removal of subsidies and guarantees that many had relied on.784 
These policies, along with the previously tolerated practices involving political corruption 
and the strong arm of the state’s security establishments, helped foster a thirst for change,785 
one that helped enhance the position of more critical private media. 
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Newspapers such as AlMasry AlYoum and AlDostor had built a track-record of reporting 
news items that would help fuel the uprisings and become part of the national discourse. 
AlDostor, for example had widely reported on the murder of Khaled Said, a young man who 
had been beaten to death at the hands of policemen on 6 June 2010. Said’s murder sparked a 
movement in Egypt that resonated internationally through a Facebook page expanding into a 
movement. State-owned papers largely ignored the incident or instead focused on a rumor 
that Said was not beaten-to-death, but rather choked on a plastic-bag full of drugs while 
evading capture.786 The case became a rallying call for the planned protests on the 25th of 
January.787 
The private papers that had not shied away from reporting cases such as Said’s were almost 
immediately catapulted above state-owned media in importance. This was immediately 
palpable at the epicenter of the protests. Protesters huddled to read the private newspapers 
and make a display of tearing state-owned papers, which had initially ignored the protests. 
AlMasry AlYoum’s chief editor at the time, Magdy ElGallad at one point was feted by 
demonstrators who recognized on the first day of protests on the outskirts of Tahrir Square 
(the epicenter of the demonstrators). In a moment that could just as well have been scripted: 
the editor told the swelling crowd around him, “I must run back to the paper to get 
tomorrow’s news out,”  and just then almost on cue, a random motorcycle appeared in front 
of him, with the driver offering to take him to his destination.788  
Journalists sensed the magnitude of the moment for their profession as well, especially as the 
Mubarak regime had quickly moved to control the information flow in the country by 
shutting down internet networks between January 28th and February 3rd, while a curfew was 
also in place from 28th January (the Friday of Rage) between 18:00 and 07:00 for the duration 
of the uprising. Many print journalists were finding places to spend the night near or in the 
epicenter of the manifestations in Tahrir square.789 While many Dream TV journalists were 
put up in a hotel near their studios on the outskirts of Cairo, in order to facilitate reporting.790 
Private media was beginning to emerge into its own at that time, as the discrepancy between 
them and state-allied media became more stark, offering them more credibility and more of a 
practical function in the moment.  
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Ahmed Ragab, who had been working with both AlMasry AlYoum and OnTV at the time 
thought this feeling was not exclusive to journalists, but permeated all levels of the 
organizations from the owners downwards.791 While they led the charge in covering the 
uprising, some of the prominent outlets and figures in the private media space were also 
exhibiting hesitation in embracing this role fully. Dream TV, whose owner had been a known 
Mubarak ally, showed signs of this throughout the initial period. El’Ashera Masa’an and its 
host Mona ElShazly was still the standard bearer for political talk shows in the country. The 
show was the first to interview a visibly traumatized Wael Ghonim, one of the leaders of the 
“We Are All Khaled Said” movement, after he had been detained and tortured. ElShazly was 
commended by the protesters for this interview. On the other hand, she had also raised many 
people’s eyebrows for immediately declaring that Mubarak “saved Egypt” after he gave a 
speech declaring he would not run for another term to appease the protesters. Mubarak’s 
speech that day was seen as unsatisfactory by the masses whose main demand was his 
immediate ouster. A Dream employee at the time described a level of hesitation among the 
prominent figures in the station as to how exactly to position themselves editorially:  
Mona was conflicted, and the station didn’t know exactly how to tilt editorially. 
But most journalists were excited to cover the protests and be a part of what 
was happening. In the end that helped drive the station to do the same. I think 
they knew we would lose relevance after the revolution if we hadn’t. Ultimately 
they figured Mubarak’s days were numbered, and they knew that at the very 
least they needed to stay in the good graces of the military after he was gone. 
Which they did. As journalists, we weren’t too aware of these things at the time, 
we were just really immersed in the moment and working really hard. The 
public treated us like stars. Whenever I went home during this period the family 
would gather around me to ask me about the latest.792 
The shift in state media over the 18-days also pointed to this moment of disruption in power 
relations governing the sector. Initially on the Friday of Rage, the military first secured the 
Maspero building, ensuring that protesters would not have access to terrestrial broadcasting. 
Ultimately, Mubarak’s resignation speech on 11 February was aired from the Maspero 
building, while the military officers allowed the release of footage showing them ordering the 
resignation tape to be aired. Public newspapers also went from denouncing the events and its 
participants, to making an effort to report on them.793 “In several prominent cases, this 
change was the result of a rebellion by the journalists themselves. At Rose al-Youssef 
magazine, journalists and administrative staff took over the building and locked out the editor 
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in-chief, an ardent Mubarak loyalist.”794 
The announcement of Mubarak’s ouster came by way of the former intelligence chief Omar 
Suleiman, in a statement aired from Maspero, under orders from the military, which had 
assumed complete control of the state media apparatus as well as most other government 
organizations.  
Sudden increase in licensing and production: An experiment in pluralism 
Mubarak’s ouster immediately led to a clearer delineation of who in both the private and 
public sector were considered closest to the regime. Many government officials were quickly 
placed in custody, including the Minister of Information, Anas El-Fiqqi. Many of the 
businessmen who were appointed to government and considered part of the central power 
structure were also imprisoned. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces were firmly in 
control of the country, on a transitional basis until a new government structure would be 
formed. They would remain officially in charge for 17 months.  Historian Zeinab Abu 
ElMagd believes that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) initial takeover was 
in line with the popular uprising’s motives, but that the end result was a more comprehensive 
domination of the country’s power centers. “The main pillars of a successful coup are all 
there: control over the media, the bureaucracy, security apparatus, and the legal system.795” 
Despite this control, for the 17 months that they were in power prior to Presidential elections 
in 2013, SCAF members attempted to appear democratic and veering towards civilian rule. 
Loyalist civilians were put in most government posts, and differing political groups were 
allowed to organize politically.796  
This approach spilled over into changes that were introduced to the media system. The 
Ministry of Information itself was initially abolished in February of that year, raising hopes 
that the uprising would be a watershed moment for media liberalization. However, it was 
reinstated in July under the auspices of the new minister Osama Heikal.797 The local and 
newly formed, National Coalition for Media Freedom (NCMF), rejected the move calling it a 
step backwards in the attempts to achieve liberalization of media policy and independence 
from the executive power, stressing that the Ministry of Information exists only in totalitarian 
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states and dictatorships.798 The NCMF was only founded one month earlier in the hope that 
the country’s media system would turn a new page. It included 13 human rights organizations 
and 20 media activists, who had joined in the hope that they would be able to lobby for media 
rights.   
Many media professionals in the private space did not know what to make of Osama Heikal. 
He was a seasoned journalist, who worked almost entirely out of the public media sphere, 
mostly at the Wafd Party newspaper where he spent over two decades. He was also known to 
have good relations with the Armed Forces having worked for five of those years as the 
paper’s beat editor for military news, an appointment he would not have gotten without being 
vetted and ultimately seen as a loyalist. 
The status of private media and their role became one of the central themes for the shifting 
public sphere.  New television outlets were granted licenses, although the mechanisms 
through which they were licensed or regulated did not change. SCAF promised not to 
interfere in private media, and 16 new channels were licensed in the immediate aftermath799. 
These included channels such as AlNahar, 25TV, Tahrir Channel, Modern Horeya, Rotana 
Massreya, Misr 25, an organ of the Muslim Brotherhood, and AlMasry, the mouthpiece of 
The Wafd Party.  
Among the new class of media owners, Mohamed El-Amin’s emergence was to be the most 
prescient. The little-known businessman launched CBC television network and invested in an 
estimated 14 other outlets.800 El-Amin, had seemingly come from obscurity to launching one 
of the largest and most well-resourced stations in Egypt. A department head who was an early 
hire at CBC (and refused to be named speaking on this, as he continued to work with them at 
the time of the interview), said that before joining, he and his colleagues were perplexed 
about the quick rise of CBC. “We suddenly found this station with limitless resources paying 
TV hosts enormous sums on the scene. It seemed to be in-line with the trend of stations 
opening. We were told the owner was a rich contractor who made his money in Kuwait. But, 
we didn’t know much else.”801 At his peak in 2015, only 4 years after launching CBC, El-
Amin was at the helm of a media empire that included 14 television stations and 3 major 
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newspapers802, including AlWatan newspaper, which was launched with Magdy ElGallad at 
its head, recruited following his success at the helm of AlMasry AlYoum.  
This rapid expansion was described by Mohamed Gohar as being due to the military’s 
backing of El-Amin in more ways than one. “His connections with the military are deep. 
Here’s a man who has no political ambitions, made a good amount of money working under 
the radar, but not enough to allow him to come and dominate the media scene, yet he does 
exactly that. He has been pushed both financially and politically by the military.”803 Gohar, 
who was consulted on the launch of CBC and also started his own television station, 25tv, in 
2011, said that while the private space in mass media opened during that period, the state was 
doing its best to make sure it didn’t lose total control over it, including injecting “their people” 
in it, such as Mohamed El-Amin.804 
Politics and Private Media: Another Lebanon? 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some aspects of the pluralism in Lebanon’s private media system 
were seen in Egypt’s private media space, primarily between 2011 and 2013. The country 
was going through a phase where numerous entities were grappling for supremacy in local 
elections, and there was a short-lived period of vibrant pluralist politics. With the relative 
easing of restrictions in private media licensing, the different groups looked to control their 
own mass media outlets.  Many of these groups were either newly formed or rejuvenated 
after being severely limited under a de facto single-party system for decades.   
Media scholar Adel Iskandar, classifies the private media outlets that were formed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring as belonging to one of two general camps: The first 
are networks content with Mubarak’s ouster while being highly supportive of SCAF and its 
decisions. “State television, AlHayat, CBC, Dream TV, AlMehwar, the Salafi Al-Naas 
channel, and others tend to be more celebratory and cautiously avoid what SCAF calls 
‘incitement against the military,’ inviting only occasional and mild criticism of the ruling 
junta.”805 The second group wanted to see the revolution continue to topple SCAF`s rule. 
Generally speaking, January 25 TV, AlTahrir and to a lesser extent OnTV represented this 
group (e.g., Ibrahim Eissa on AlTahrir calling for a trial of SCAF for the killing of protesters). 
Iskandar, believed the gulf between private and public television had grown to an 
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unprecedented level during that period.806   
Private television came to broadly mirror the political groups and rivalries that were forming. 
During the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party as well as the more conservative Islamist Al-Nour 
Party came up on top. They both had launched proxy media outlets. The Brotherhood had 
established Misr 25 television and a party newspaper called, AlHoreyya wal’Adala (Freedom 
and Justice), while Al-Naas television station was a clear supporter of Al-Nour Party. On the 
other hand, Naguib Sawiris who owned OnTV, OnTVLive and maintained a stake in 
AlMasry AlYoum, had established his own political party, Free Egyptians.  
While Sawiris repeatedly insisted that the media he owned were not instructed to speak for 
his party, they were meant to promote similar liberal values both economically and 
socially.807  More important for Sawiris was combating the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
He was among a group of media owners who either tacitly, or explicitly geared their stations 
towards opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). “It was really for me at this point about 
not wanting to give Egypt up to the Islamists.”808 A reporter for OnTV recalled a meeting in 
2012 during which station head, Albert Chafik explicitly told the staff that their “focus must 
be on bringing the Brotherhood down.”809 
Once the Muslim Brotherhood had secured both the Presidency and a parliamentary majority, 
they started to apply pressure on opposition television stations. This included attempting to 
force Naguib Sawiris to sell OnTV.810 Some businessmen complained of not being granted 
licenses to operate under President Mohamed Morsi’s administration due to their political 
position.811  
Many of the tools used during the Mubarak era to stifle the media were maintained by the 
new Minister of Information, Salah Abdel-Maqsood, who kept around 70 articles of 
Mubarak-era laws related to media.812 Under the Morsi administration, over 600 defamation 
cases were launched, which outpaced the rate of such cases under Mubarak according to the 
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Committee to Protect Journalists.813  
Perhaps the most famous of these cases involved Bassem Youssef, who hosted a political 
satire show called ElBernameg, which was wildly popular and produced scathing criticism of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Youssef was arrested and interrogated in March 2013.814 Tensions 
in the country were mounting ahead of planned anti-Morsi protests on 30 June 2013. Many of 
the anti-MB stations joined in the calls for these protests which were widely endorsed by 
ranking members of the military and police force.815 Throughout March of that year, tens of 
Morsi supporters launched a campaign of intimidation, laying siege to five television stations 
on the opposite side of the political fence: AlHayat, OnTV, AlNahar, AlQahira wal Nas, and 
CBC.816 Morsi himself took to dedicating time during a televised address to the nation, to 
criticize private media and call-out the owners of Dream TV and CBC for alleged tax evasion, 
just days before the 30 June protests.817  
Despite the mounting pressures on opposition mass media, the MB was unable to effectively 
eliminate these voices from the airwaves or news stands, partially due to their relative 
inability to wield the security and judicial apparatuses in their favor. Bassem Youssef 
remained on air, along with all other prime time news presenters and talk show hosts who 
were openly hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the meantime, red-lines involving the 
military were still firmly in place. In actuality, the military had been engaged in a process of 
reinforcing its power in society after Mubarak’s fall.  
In December 2011, the Editor-in-Chief of AlMasry AlYoum, Magdy ElGallad halted 
production of the paper’s weekly English-language publication Egypt Independent, after 
publishing an op-ed authored by an academic alluding to possible divisions within the 
military.818 The article’s author, Robert Springborg, was a prominent scholar on military and 
security in Egypt. ElGallad defended his decision by stating in an editorial that he was 
standing up to an attempt to “incite a coup” within the Armed Forces ranks, with a clear 
insinuation that Egypt Independent could have served a foreign agenda to destabilize the 
country.819 In the immediate aftermath, Springborg wrote, “I do not know whether [ElGallad 
censored the paper] on direct orders from the SCAF or because he anticipated General 
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Tantawi’s negative reaction. What has been reported to me is that the editor in question is 
known to have close ties to the military and intelligence services.”820 Springborg said years 
later that it was symptomatic of the fact that the military had been in actual control 
throughout this period, a fact confirmed by the eventual ouster of almost every prominent 
media personality that had openly criticized SCAF.821 
There is a general consensus among practitioners in the private media space that between 
2011 and 2012, the sector was relatively open and that any limits on political reporting were 
imposed mostly by the editorial line of the outlet rather than government fiat. Advertising 
revenue was expanding and salaries of some celebrity talk show hosts were ballooning. While 
political competition dominated the scene, many media owners still wanted to keep an eye on 
“giving the people what they want,” even if it was content that would have traditionally been 
considered taboo or politically undesirable by some of the business owners involved in 
private media.822 Hesham Kassem, had been consulting for various mass media enterprises 
while also working towards developing his own multimedia outlet. He claims to that by 2012 
the sector had become unshackled and that this trend would not continue in the following 
years. Aside from continued limitations on dealing with the military, he saw for a brief period 
an openness that could have gone in either direction: 
I did not hear, at that time, of media licenses being refused on security 
grounds…even though the security apparatus could have still stalled licensing, for 
sure… Newspapers could have published and not been bound to government 
publishing houses, but the market infrastructure was not there to encourage that… 
The lack of professionalism meant that in the end most outlets during that period 
ran towards trends for quick gains, and made very little plans for sustainable 
business in the future. Maybe, they believed the sector  would not be allowed to 
develop in the future.823 
At times, the lack of pragmatic long-term financial thinking led to the early demise-or shift in 
focus- of some of the early projects inspired by the uprisings. AlTahrir TV is a case in point. 
It had originally been founded by dissident Ibrahim Eissa and Ahmed Abu-Haiba (a media 
entrepreneur, with MB ties) on the eve of Mubarak’s ouster on February 2011 to reflect “the 
spirit of the revolution.824” Financial difficulties led to Ibrahim Eissa first selling his shares 
and then within less than a year 72% of the company was purchased by businessman 
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Suleiman Amer, who had made his fortune in real estate deals during the Mubarak regime.825 
The popular television presenters brought in soon left, officially over financial disputes as 
well.826 However, multiple accounts, including one from author Alaa Al’Aswany, say that 
Amer had reached an agreement with SCAF to mute all criticism of the military on his 
airwaves and that anyone who resisted was pushed out.827 This led to a very early transition 
of AlTahrir into a pro-SCAF station. 
The consensus among media scholars and practitioners interviewed was that media and 
politics in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising, were on a hotplate. The future of the 
Egyptian polity was tied not only to media independence, but also to the functioning and 
existence of watchdogs and NGO’s.828 The contentious politics of 2012, when the Muslim 
Brotherhood wielded power in both the legislative and executive branches of government, 
were underpinned by a cacophony of voices at ballot stations and on airwaves/newsstands. 
That was to be the last year in the immediate aftermath of the uprising when Freedom House 
would classify Egypt’s media as “Partly Free,” before downgraded it to “Not Free” in 
subsequent years.829 Adel Iskandar, who maintained a chronicled diary of the sector that year 
under the title, “A Year in the Life of Egypt’s Media: A 2011 Timeline,830” wrote a 
perceptive, forward-looking note that summarized the opportunity and apprehension for 
private media at the time: 
The greatest challenge ahead for private satellite stations will be in the coming years 
when their resolve, courage and occupational convictions will be tested perhaps more 
than at any other time in modern history…They must not submit to the new red lines of 
military inaccessibility.831 
 
3)  2013-2016: El-Sisi and the importance of consensus 
 
Newly promoted832 Field Marshal Abdelfattah El-Sisi announced his candidacy for the 
presidency in March 2014. The former SCAF member and Defense Minister under Morsi 
became president nearly one year after the ouster of Mohammed Morsi and a subsequent 
massacre of around 1,000 of Muslim Brotherhood supporters who had been involved in a 
month-long sit-in, protesting his overthrow. The incident, known as the “Rabaa’ Massacre” 
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was the beginning of the complete erasure of the Muslim Brotherhood from the public sphere 
The momentary plurality experienced in the private media space and the expectations that the 
sector would begin to develop with more independence would quickly wither away.  
 
Broadly speaking, the first 6 years of El-Sisi’s presidency and its relationship with the 
continued shift in privately owned mass media could be divided into two periods: the first 
was an attempt by the president to court the existing (non-MB allied) private media outlets 
and owners; while the second was a more clear-cut and direct phase of power consolidation 
in the sector, and a straightforward requirement of alignment behind the state.  
A clear foreshadowing of these shifts occurred late in 2013 after a leaked video appeared on 
an Islamist news network, Rassd, appearing to show a conversation between then Defense 
Minister El-Sisi and a group of army generals discussing private media.833 The video is not 
dated accurately, but the discussion seems to predate Morsi’s ouster based on the officers’ 
winter uniforms and references to [2012’s] December’s constitutional referendum.834” In it, 
the generals express genuine dismay at the freedom that the private press had been allowed in 
criticizing the media and crossing the long-established “red-lines” related to the armed forces. 
El-Sisi responded by calling for patience while he recruited allies in the news media. 
‘Building a state-wide alliance takes a long time and effort…It takes a very long time until 
you possess an appropriate share of influence over the media.”835 
This alliance-building was made clear during El-Sisi's first year in power. On May 3, 2014, 
the new president met with a who's-who of Egyptian media owners and personalities and 
lectured them on the importance of media in "unifying the nation." Within four months of his 
election as president, he held three more such meetings with representatives from the media 
and journalism institutions. None challenged him, though a few did propose progressive steps 
that could be taken for media freedom. 
The pathway for this process of “alliance building” was set even before Morsi’s ouster. As 
mentioned, previously, political lines had already been drawn in most private media outlets. 
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One of the first orders that El-Sisi gave after Morsi was deposed on July 3, 2013, was 
shutting down two newspapers and all nine privately owned pro-Morsi television stations 
airing out of Egypt, most notably, the MB’s Misr 25, AlJazeera and two Muslim 
Brotherhood-sympathizing Salafist stations.836 Many of the employees and owners were 
subsequently jailed on terrorism-related charges, as the Brotherhood and all of its affiliates 
were declared terrorist organizations by the Ministry of Justice.837 These stations were never 
allowed to re-open.  
Mohammed Helmy, head of the reports unit at CBC Extra TV in Cairo during this period, 
said that at the time "it [was] clear that the media agreed with the president that 'there is a war 
on terror and the media must play its part.' However, these are very loose terms and 
unfortunately many media organizations have been translating them to mean that anyone who 
has any opinion contrary to that of the state's must be restricted [from appearing or 
publishing].838"  
The consolidation of media behind El-Sisi began early on during the campaign for the 2014 
presidential election. CBC and OnTV aired a joint-broadcast of a highly edited, and 
reverential recorded interview with El-Sisi to introduce his campaign platform on 5 May 
2014. Five days later his main opponent on the ballot, a former MP and long-time Nasserist 
activist, Hamdeen Sabbahi, was offered only a live interview with CBC, in which he was 
heavily challenged throughout by combative hosts. The sense among many of the television 
producers and journalists interviewed was that there was some movement behind the scenes 
to bring the private media in line with the military, but that there was also a real consensus 
that among Morsi opponents of the continued threat of a resurgent Muslim Brotherhood. 
“There was a real belief for many in the field and the businessmen that owned the stations 
that El-Sisi saved Egypt from them.839” 
 
Many popular television hosts who came to prominence afterward or as a result of the 
January 25 Revolution, or were considered less-than-enthusiastic supporters of El-Sisi, were 
purged from the airwaves during the first portion of his presidency, mostly through 
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acquiescent internal media organizational actions.  
 
On October 25, 2014, the CEO of AlNahar TV walked into the dressing room of prominent 
Egyptian talk show host Mahmoud Saad moments before the airing of his live nightly 
television show to let him know that he would not be presenting that night. Saad, an amiable 
and relatively balanced media personality, dutifully obliged, leaving the station and taking his 
production team with him, according to some of the show's journalists who declined to be 
identified. The night before, Saad had hosted a guest who critically psychoanalyzed El-Sisi, 
and who, among other things, spoke about the psychological effects of popular support for 
the military. The guest, Manal Omar, also mentioned a 1967 Egyptian military defeat by 
Israel that led to a seven-year occupation of Sinai. On the day that show was aired, units of 
the Egyptian military came under attack in Sinai. 
AlNahar, a private station-acquired by El-Amin in 2011- never revealed why Saad was taken 
off the air, but its management issued a public statement saying "substantial changes" would 
be made to its political programs. "The channel will prohibit the appearance of a number of 
guests who promote ideas that weaken the morale of the Egyptian army," the statement noted. 
A few days later, AlNahar issued another statement saying that Saad would resume his 
position and that he was in agreement with the channel that they must work together on 
"unifying the ranks" and working toward "prioritizing ... the national interest." On October 29, 
2014, Saad took back the reins from his temporary replacement, Khaled Salah, a vociferous 
supporter of El-Sisi’s regime and editor-in-chief of Youm7 newspaper, which had also 
become an entirely pro-Sisi publication by then. Saad's only comment on his hiatus: "I 
honestly don't know why I was not on air these past few days." 
Even talk show hosts who nominally supported El-Sisi, but had a tendency to be critical at 
times had lost their places on the air or in the newspapers, despite being prominent and 
widely watched. "After June 30, the general trend and atmosphere in Egyptian media has 
been one of widespread support for the regime, paralleled with a hatred of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.840” 
																																								 																				





News broadcasters and talk show hosts such as Yosri Foda (OnTV) and Dina Abdelrahman 
(CBC TV) were frozen out of the private television stations where they dominated the 
airwaves in the nightly and daily primetime slots, respectively. In Foda's case, multiple high-
ranking insiders at OnTV (who requested anonymity for this report because of the potential 
for repercussions) said that one year before his contract was to end, he was told he would no 
longer have his nightly show but could stay on with a weekly show-an offer he was sure to 
refuse, in light of his popularity and the show's ratings. Foda himself had a different story:  
Since the 25 January revolution, I stopped my program three times, because I 
knew that each time we were on a collision course with the military. As a 
media personality I want to make a difference and do not want to go beyond a 
minimum standard of work under which I would not operate.841  
Abdelrahman, who had been presenting a nightly talk show highlighting social issues, was 
released from her job in March 2014, ostensibly because of what her employers described as 
her "decreasing stock in the media," according to a statement reported by the Youm7. 
CBC, pulled Bassem Youssef’s show off air in 2013, almost immediately after an episode 
where he took jabs at the public fanfare for the military leaders, while also dedicating a 
segment to mocking the way in which Egyptian media outlets (that claimed to be neutral) 
were pushing for El-Sisi’s presidency, by constantly praising him. Youssef was also fined, 
and the station released a statement distancing itself from his using of "phrases and innuendos 
that may lead to mocking national sentiment or symbols of the Egyptian state.”842 
Abdelrahman had used time on her show to criticize her employer's treatment of Youssef, a 
cardiac surgeon turned political satirist. 
Others, such as talk show hosts Reem Maged and Alaa El-Aswany, simply chose to retreat 
from the field, both after offering very public reasons. Maged wrote a public letter to her 
employer (also OnTV) that was made public, stating that she was invoking the "conscience 
clause" and stepping down from her nightly talk show because her principles regarding her 
job "do not coincide with those of my employer."  
The common factor for all of the departing media figures was that they were among the pre-
eminent media voices of the January 25th Revolution, which is when they became household 
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names. They were all liberals who opposed Morsi. They were not averse to hosting guests or 
entertaining topics spawned by the June 30 demonstrations that could be seen as running 
averse to the regime or SCAF. 
Mainstream writers and thinkers who were accustomed to appearing on television as pundits 
or even hosts of cultural programs, found themselves frozen out of publications for which 
they had written extensively. Their work was also at risk of being censured. Plans to air 
screenwriter Belal Fadl's television drama, "Alexandria's People," were scrapped in all local 
private and public broadcasting. According to a 2014 report by the Arabic Network for 
Human Rights Information (ANHRI) titled "Freedom of Expression After the First 100 Days 
of El-Sisi's Rule," one of the reasons cited by station heads for pulling Fadl's show was that 
"it would be improper to air a television drama that criticizes the performance of police" 
before the 25 January revolution.843 
Gamal Eid, director of ANHRI, observed, "There [was] a return to the Mubarak-era system of 
unofficially blacklisted public figures who are persona non-grata on television stations." 
According to Eid, privately owned media with allegiances to the regime decided among 
themselves to bar certain guests from appearing as pundits.844 
Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb had made a point in the early days of El-Sisi’s presidency to 
insist that there would not be any government censorship, one time using the known Egyptian 
polemic: "no free pen would be chopped down." However, the experience of professionals 
within the private media establishment point to a marked departure in the direction of the 
sector and how it is permitted to cover current affairs. Ahmed Ragab, formerly an executive 
producer of Yosri Fouda's show "Akher Kalam" and a managing editor in AlMasry AlYoum, 
said in response to Mehleb that "pens [have been] chopped down, columns discontinued, and 
the media were definitely silenced.”845 
However, Ragab believed that much of the censorship was the product of the “general 
atmosphere”, more so than a systematic censorship or official government-mandated bias. 
Instead, in his opinion, the lack of objective media stemmed from a combination of “social 
hysteria” around terrorism and the threat of political instability and commercial interests that 
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drove media outlets to toe the government line. "The market for neutral level-headed news 
shows, like Fouda's, was decreasing while the market for sensationalist nationalism was on 
the rise."846 
The multiple power shifts for many working in the private media space since before the 2011 
uprising until El-Sisi’s presidency had been palpable. "Right after the 25 January Revolution, 
the power was in the streets, so the media had to follow suit," said Khaled El-Balshy, the 
editor-in-chief of the left-leaning newspaper ElBadil.847 "What transpired was that the 
businessmen who ran the media returned back with the state and were doing their work for 
them.848"  
A TV news presenter working for a private network who spoke on condition of anonymity 
said that from the run-up to the June 30 protests through to the 2014 Presidential Election, he 
had been receiving direct orders from his superiors to prevent the appearance of any Muslim 
Brotherhood members on any of their programming. The presenter claimed he was told that 
this was a national duty, even when the Muslim Brotherhood were still in power and had not 
yet been declared a terrorist organization. 
Many media insiders supported Ragab's assertion that news coverage by the private stations 
still in operation then were not directly dictated by the regime. “Most media executives had 
not directly released any gag orders against any of these personalities,” according to 
Mohammed Nasser, who was producing a talk-show for OnTV while also working as the 
Cairo bureau chief of the Lebanese TV station AlMayadeen in 2015. Nasser had only recently 
moved from Dream TV.  
The media sector was still on high alert about the possibility of a government clamp-down on 
media that would be far broader than the closure of Muslim Brotherhood outlets. The first 
such hints came from public television. Aida Seoudy, who hosted a variety show on Radio 
Hits, a publicly owned radio station took to her program on November 29, 2014, to voice her 
frustration that the legal case against former President Hosni Mubarak had been thrown out 
on procedural grounds,849 leaving him free to go. She did not criticize the court's ruling itself, 
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which would have been illegal and could carry a jail sentence. Her annual contract, which she 
had been renewing regularly for more than five years, was due to expire on December 1, 
2014, and on the day after her outburst, Seoudy said, she was told that her contract would not 
be renewed. After making headlines, she received a phone call on December 2 from a 
policeman working in El-Sisi's office, telling her "the president has ordered [her contract] 
renewed ... and sends his regards.850" A representative of the president's office called in to a 
talk show to confirm that the president ordered Seoudy back to work. She recounted the 
conversation in a television interview with Mahmoud Saad the next day. 
Observers were left to wonder whether the conflicting actions regarding Seoudy's contract 
signified a disconnect between decision-makers in the media and the presidency or other 
executive authorities. That is a topic that Seoudy had also raised on her show. 
Other editorial executives found that the close relationship between major newspapers and 
TV stations with different state apparatuses meant that state intervention in local news 
reporting sometimes came in the form of informal telephone conversations, a form of agenda-
setting by the state. Ragab subscribed to this theory as well: "The majority of media owners 
found it in their best interest to be in the state's good graces [such] that they would not refuse 
direct requests [such as] avoiding certain subjects or figures. I feel that, on the contrary, they 
go overboard in trying to prove their loyalty.851" 
Self censorship 
A day after the incident with Mahmoud Saad, while the country was consumed with news of 
terrorist attacks in Sinai, the editors-in-chief of all of the major newspapers met and issued a 
statement to collectively declare that they would "support all of the measures taken by the 
government in combating terrorism and protecting the national security of the country." The 
meeting followed another incident on Dream TV in which host Wael El-Ibrashy's show was 
cut short while he was criticizing the Ministry of Education.  
The phrase "prioritizing the national interest," was recurring among government and media 
officials and regulators. It was a vague statement, often open to interpretation by the party in 
power. Another producer on a private television show, who requested anonymity for the same 
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reason cited by others-fear of retribution-said he had received direct orders from his superiors 
to refrain from covering any Muslim Brotherhood protests or gatherings, saying "if you just 
watched TV on most Fridays-you would see no coverage of protests on television, but 
Facebook will be filled with photos from them.852" 
Gamal Eid had heard similar reports from other sources saying their stations had ordered 
them to avoid covering the Muslim Brotherhood in any positive light, and to continue to 
blame them for the problems that the country was facing.853 
Those who do cover Muslim Brotherhood protests faced clear perils. Some had been killed 
and wounded during violent encounters and, at the very least, have found little support for 
their reporting. "I had reporters who were assaulted by the police for covering an Muslim 
Brotherhood protest, and others attacked by Brotherhood supporters believing that they were 
there to misrepresent them,” said Helmy, who was in charge of all external reporting for CBC 
Extra854. Helmy noted that his station was actively in support of the government at the time. 
During the first years of the Sisi presidency, many of the private television stations made 
conscious decisions not only to self-censor in favor of government, but to actively strive to 
become government mouthpieces. Increasingly, broadcasters from these outlets were seen 
rubbing shoulders with the President and his inner circle, more than their counterparts in 
publicly funded media. The bias towards the government was quite clear in some cases. 
British journalist Imogen Lambert recalled a job interview with the heavily pro-Sisi Sada 
ElBalad television’s nascent online English portal. During the interview she was unabashedly 
told the network supported the government. "The editor that was interviewing [her] had no 
qualms saying, 'Here we support the government, we support the president, and we support 
the military, and we do not like the Muslim Brotherhood.’855” 
The editor, Lambert recalled, also said that if she were to report a foreign story she should 
remember that the network was averse to Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. She would, however, be 
free to cover the Scottish referendum. "See, this is something that your BBC would not let 
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you cover freely. That's how we are with the Brotherhood," the editor added, according to 
Lambert, a British citizen. She quit the job after two weeks856. 
The openings experienced in private media after the revolution, and even during the latter 
years of the Mubarak presidency, were closing up, even if the private mass media outlets 
remained. Ragab noted that "during the time of Mubarak boundaries and red-lines existed, 
but [he] covered many more topics openly. These days (in 2015) we don't hear much talk 
about journalistic integrity as much as about the mania regarding this concept of national 
priorities.857" 
New independent government bodies meant to oversee media space also continued to be 
tightly controlled. Article 211 of the 2104 Egyptian Constitution called for the creation of a 
National Media Council that would be responsible for “guaranteeing and protecting the 
freedom of press and media, safeguarding its independence, neutrality, plurality and diversity, 
and preventing monopolistic practices." 
The Council was drawn to appear to be an Egyptian version of the Federal Communications 
Commission in the United States, or the U.K.’s OFCOM, but with broader jurisdiction. 
Numerous media executives at the time expressed concern at how far the council would go in 
ensuring "national goals.858" The Egyptian Radio and Television Union, a government body, 
is authorized to compile a list of 50 people to choose the council's 25 members, excepting the 
two members whom the president selects. The president also has the authority to choose the 
council's chair. Hafez Mirazi resigned from his post on the ERTU board, partially over the 
formation of this council.859 
The “other Heikal” and Fourth Generation warfare 
Media systems were once again looked at by the government as an area of National Security 
as many of the major figures in the field found themselves being assessed by the state under a 
strict “with us” or “against us” binary.860  The omnipresence of Osama Heikal in the upper 
echelons of all media regulation in the country (since 2011 until the time of writing) was a 
reflection of the state’s desire to maintain a certain perspective regarding the development of 
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the sector. In addition to enjoying a close relationship to the top brass at the military, Heikal’s 
worldview coincided with that of the President, especially in their view that the “fourth 
generation warfare861” is one of the biggest existential threats facing Egypt. In January 2015 
Heikal penned a book on the subject entitled Fourth Generation Wars: Media and the 
Fragmentation of Societies. In it, he outlines how media is at the epicenter of global and 
regional conspiracies to foment a state of chaos in Egypt.862 El-Sisi on more than one 
occasion warned the public of 4th generation wars. After his initial appointment as Minister of 
Information in 2011, Heikal was moved to manage Media Production City, with a de-facto 
mandate to regulate all private television. He was also the head of the Media and Culture 




Political power during AbdelFattah El-Sisi’s presidency became more centralized in time. 
The initial expansion of the role of individuals with military backgrounds in government 
betrayed a general distrust of civilian leadership. In September 2016, six new provincial 
governors were named, five of them with military backgrounds. At the time, only 8 of 
Egypt’s 27 provinces were run by civilians.864  
Prior to that, Hossam Bahgat an investigative journalist detailed how the General Intelligence 
Agency interfered directly to place loyalist candidates in the 2015 parliamentary election.865 
Notably, rather than forming a new political party, the candidates were organized in an 
“electoral list” called For the Love of Egypt, which acted more like a coalition than like an 
organized political entity. In 2018, El-Sisi’s consolidation of power looked complete. The 
president ran essentially unopposed, after his main opponent, Sami Annan, was arrested and 
his campaign managers beat-up and intimidated.866 Another potential candidate, human rights 
lawyer Khaled Ali, dropped out of the race citing violations and a obstacles placed before 
him after several members of the campaign were arrested. Ali said he found it difficult 
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getting the election authorities to even put him on the ballot.867 The Ali campaign was 
undoubtedly on edge following the arrest of Anan as well. El-Sisi’s only opponent, the little 
known Moustafa Mousa868 only entered the race after all other candidates withdrew. Mousa 
had endorsed El-Sisi for presidency, prior to entering the race, and paradoxically continued to 
endorse him while running against him.869 El-Sisi won with 97 per cent of the vote. 
Similarly, the first few years of Sisi’s presidency saw power in private media slowly shift 
hands, as the role of the the military and security organizations continued to noticeably 
expand. The regime believed that media played a big role in fomenting the 2011 protests. 
Their thinking changed therefore from allowing security-minded and easily manipulated 
businessmen to control the private media space to controlling the sector more directly.870 In 
the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, the rise of Mohamed El-Amin’s mass media 
empire (which was likely supported by senior military figures871) and the often direct 
intervention of military figures and censures in private television programming showed that 
the control of mass media as a soft power tool in the hands of the regime was on its way back. 
Prior to 2011, most direct interventions into private media content would come from either 
the office of the Presidency, the Ministry of Information or a dedicated department in the 
National Security Directorate.872 The interest taken by El-Sisi in these private media and the 
prompt elimination of all Muslim Brotherhood allies or sympathizers from the airwaves and 
newspapers proved to be a precursor to a more direct involvement of the Armed Forces in 
private media in parallel with the expansion of their role in other areas of civilian life.  
Military Economy  
The Egyptian Military has been a major economic actor since the birth of the Republic in 
1953. The decline of the monarchy and the “blockage of capitalist development…spurred 
officer castes to replace faltering national bourgeoisies and their powerless political 
representatives873.” The Nasserite model became a military dictatorship that worked to 
augment the means at the armed forces’ disposal.874 Ironically, the death of Nasser in 1970 
and Sadat’s push for “de-Nasserisation” further entrenched the role of the military in the 
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economy. While dramatically decreasing defense spending, the Egyptian Armed Forces were 
largely responsible for massive infrastructure and development projects, ultimately giving 
way to the rise of an expansive and diversified parallel military economy.	“Mubarak endorsed 
the MOD’s self-supporting approach as a means of securing political influence within a 
restive officer corps while shifting defense costs at a time of deepening financial austerity.”875 
Under AbdelFattah El-Sisi, the role of the military expanded as never before to become the 
principal economic broker and manager.876 The armed forces also began to encroach in on 
sectors traditionally under the “quasi-exclusive” domain of the General Intelligence 
Directorate such as oil, natural gas and media.877 
Yezid Sayigh who studied the Egyptian military’s economic expansion chronicled a shifting 
pattern of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) business alliances between 2013 and 2020. He 
saw the EAF expanding into several sectors in which private businesses have long been 
dominant—most notably media, cement, and steel—undermining businesses and 
destabilizing markets.878 Many private business owners who entered the media space after 
2011 said that they were being crowded out of the sector by businesses that represented 
military interests879.  
 
Military Media Takeover 
In November 2015, El-Sisi, lambasted the media coverage of his Presidency in a keynote 
speech delivered at an Armed Forces Cultural Seminar880. The tirade ended with an everyday 
phrase for Egyptians “ma yisahish kidda” (this is not right) that some saw as an indication 
that that he had in fact lost patience with the sector, indicating a change in the future. News 
presenter Dina Abdelrahman said that this speech synthesized El-Sisi’s outlook for media in a 
televised interview, noting that even mere questioning of the President’s policies or actions 
would not be tolerated.881 
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The wheels had in fact already been in motion for what Yazid Sayigh described as the hostile 
takeover of media by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and allied agencies.882 
The introduction of the DMC television network represented one of the early forays of the 
MOD into the private media scene. The channel appeared in 2015 with seemingly limitless 
resources. Ali Gabr, a broadcast engineer with broad experience across the sector described 
the company’s deep pockets in its early phases, when he was recruited to work there from 
OnTV: 
 
Money was absolutely the least worry. They built a state-of-the-art studio 
in almost no time, because it didn’t matter how much money needed to be 
thrown at any facility: studios, sat-ops, broadcast systems. They got things 
done. No one knew who the owner was. At least I didn’t. The way things 
just “got done” hinted to me that the ownership had the backing of a very 
important organization.883 
 
One of the DMC Network’s stations, DMC News, was to become the first privately-owned, 
Egyptian round-the-clock news network. Other attempts to create a 24-hour news channel by 
private media owners such as Mohamed Gohar were always met with refusal on national 
security grounds.884 Tarek Ismail, the channel’s founder was seen as a direct front for 
Military Intelligence. According to Mada Masr’s sources, DMC was the brainchild of El-Sisi 
and his Chief of Staff, Abbas Kamel, both of whom emerged from Military Intelligence. 
They had envisioned D-News to become a competitor for other regional news outlets, like Al 
Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Sky News Arabia.885 Ismail was removed in 2018. According to the 
same report, the order to push Ismail out came from Abbas Kamel, -who at that point was the 
head of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID)- over Ismail’s squandering of funds 
allotted to him.886 
 
Egyptian Media Group, An Eagle and a Falcon 
Another group to burst onto the scene was the Egyptian Media Group (EMG). The company 
was fronted by businessman Ahmed Abu-Hashima, owner of Egyptian Steel Group. He had 
initially acquired Youm7 newspaper in 2011 and began his expansion into media through the 
Egyptian Media Group in 2016. It would very quickly become the largest media 
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conglomerate in Egypt. Hossam Bahgat, once again, chronicled the rise of the Group in detail 
for Mada Masr.887 According to Bahgat, while Abu Hashima was always seen as the group’s 
owner, his stake in the company paled in comparison to the majority owner, the General 
Intelligence Directorate. The group initially expanded in print media, acquiring major online 
and print publications in 2016 including: Dotmasr, Sout Al-Ouma, Youm7, Egypt Today and 
Business Today. 888 EMG expanded into television as well, first acquiring OnTV in 2016, and 
then in 2018 it acquired Al Hayah TV Network and a majority share of Future Media 
Holding, the owner of CBC.889 
In 2017, Abu Hashima was ousted from his role with EMG after the company was acquired 
by Eagle Capital for Financial Investments, a private equity fund run by former Investment 
Minister, Dalia Khorshed, which managed all GID-owned companies.890  
Publisher Hesham Kassem, had told Bahgat at the time that numerous private media owners 
in print and broadcast were contacted by Khorshed “to negotiate possible partnerships with 
the General Intelligence Service, or to complete acquisition deals.”891 Bahgat had reached 
anonymous sources within these companies, who were able to detail the contents of certain 
transactions. However, the reality of companies entangled with security organizations is that 
many of the relationships are informal. “The only way to get to the bottom of these 
institutions was to grab onto credible hearsay and investigate it. Otherwise, getting primary 
sources or documents is nearly impossible.892” 
Not to be outdone, Military Intelligence continued to aggressively engage in the sector. In 
January 2017, Al’Asimah television network came under the management of the Cheri Media 
company, whose deputy head was a former EAF spokesperson. In August, Al’Asimah and its 
subsidiaries were acquired by Falcon Group International, which established Tawasol for 
Public Relations to handle its growing media portfolio. 893 Falcon group had appeared on the 
scene as an international private security firm based in Egypt. It was consistently rumored to 
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be closely linked to the armed forces, given the presence of many prominent retired generals 
on its board. Yezid Sayegh described the group’s growth in the following manner: 
The most significant beneficiary of the growing private security market has 
been Falcon Group International. Established in 2006, various sources claim 
its workforce grew to 4,000 by 2011, and to between 6,000 and 12,000 by 
2014. By then, it was reported to have a turnover of LE2 billion 
(approximately $283 million, as the pound had devalued), representing 45 
percent of the market…Falcon Group is the product of an unusual mélange 
of the public and private sectors. It was founded by the Commercial 
International Bank... One of Egypt’s biggest businessmen, Naguib Sawiris, 
joined its board in 2008. Although its executive director is a civilian, the 
company is widely seen as a front for military intelligence.894 
 
Six years into El-Sisi’s presidency, the military was seen to have nearly a complete 
stranglehold on the sector. The private media sector nominally existed and expanded. Much 
































Chapter 6- AlMasry AlYoum: The Print Experiment 
The proliferation of neo-liberal reform and the growing influence of connected businessmen 
in Egyptian politics contributed to an atmosphere where some of this group felt empowered 
to engage in the public sphere. Televised broadcasting hadn’t seen any local private 
ownership true beginnings in 2001. But, the advent of private print publishing at the turn of 
the 21st century was more of a re-emergence or a resumption of a long tradition that could be 
traced back to the late 1800’s.895 AlMasry AlYoum (AMAY), became the first locally 
published and mass distributed private newspaper in Egypt during the Mubarak era. Its 
content, publishing, distribution, and operational structure were reflective of the political 
environment as well as of the changing economic climate at the time.  The paper managed to 
stand out among its peers in its longevity and expansion efforts. At its height, AlMasry 
AlYoum was the main competitor for the century-old AlAhram, reaching that point a mere 6 
years after launching.  
The paper’s first CEO, Sherif Wadood described its establishment as being the result of a 
confluence of context and coincidence,  stemming from the initiative of its founders, the 
balance of power in the country at the time, and a host of fortuitous circumstances to help 
along the way.896 According to Wadood, by the time the security and political establishments 
realized that this private paper could actually become a thorn in their side, the option to shut 
it down had become politically disadvantageous for the regime.897 This section will look at 
the circumstances of AMAY’s establishment, and how it came to aptly represent the shifting 
dynamics at the time.  
Unlike the first private television station Dream TV, AMAY’s establishment was not the 
result of a direct push by the state. Dream’s founder was approached directly by Hosni 
Mubarak to return to Egypt. He was able launch the station making use of major government 
infrastructure spending in the Media Production City and satellite transmission technology. 
As this chapter will show, the establishment of private newspapers was not sought after by 
the state (perhaps the opposite). Rather, the political, economic and security state of the 
country along with the positioning of the main actors behind AMAY in the overall paradigm 
of power and wealth in the country, were to become factors that came together to help 
successfully launch the paper.  
																																								 																				
895 See Chapter 3	







Some of the sourcing for this portion of the case study is based on the researcher’s first-hand 
experience working with AlMasry AlYoum, contributing primarily to its English language 
online publications, (first named AlMasry AlYoum English, then rebranded into Egypt 
Independent).  
1) Accidental beginnings 
Origin and Founder 
AlMasry AlYoum was the brainchild of Salah Diab, a business tycoon whose main 
investments had been centered in energy industry and commodities, chiefly in oil services 
and agriculture. Diab had been entrenched in the highly politicized petroleum sector, creating 
the country’s first private oil services company in the 1970’s, PICO. For decades his firm was 
the only local private owner of some oil concessions in Egypt, and became partner to major 
international companies, notably the U.S.’s Halliburton.898 Despite being a member of the 
Wafd Party’s high committee (rather than the ruling National Democratic Party), Diab was a 
major beneficiary of the Mubarak regime.  In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, he was 
among many businessmen under investigation for having illegally appropriated land at below 
market price and was often criticized for being entrenched with the political elite under 
Mubarak.899 
Aside from his business interests, Salah Diab was also a descendent of one of the major 
trailblazers of Egyptian print journalism. He would consistently refer to this relationship as 
being the main motivator behind AMAY’s establishment. His grandfather, Tawfiq Diab900 
was a journalist and political activist who had been involved in the renaissance of private 
print journalism during the political upheaval in Egypt at the time of the 1919 revolution. He 
had either co-founded or helped establish a number of news publications in the decades that 
followed, most of which were shutdown by government orders over their constant opposition 
to government, the monarchy, or Britain’s High Commission in Egypt.901 Tawfiq Diab had 
also become a prominent member of the Wafd Party, an affiliation that was the driving force 
behind the establishment of his most renowned Wafdist paper, AlJihad (The Struggle) in 
1930, which at its peak distributed more copies than AlAhram. Historian Younan Labib Rizk, 
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called Diab Al-Mutammarid Al-Nabil (The Noble Rebel).902 Most modern accounts of Diab’s 
life present him as a key figure in the history of Egypt’s journalism, who helped cement a 
connection between journalism, activism and independent intellectual thought.  
 
Within the AMAY offices, Salah Diab would attempt to deflect any insinuations that he had 
any political or economic motives in establishing the paper. He would instead point to his 
affinity to real journalism, highlighting his lineage in the industry as the origin of this 
sentiment. New employees to the company would be introduced to the story of the paper’s 
genesis, by portraying it as a childhood passion of Salah Diab and a lifelong dream that has 
its roots in his relationship with his grandfather.903 
The reality according to Sherif Wadood was that the motives were more varied and reflected 
both Diab’s family history as well as a desire to protect his business interests.904 The paper’s 
founding publisher, Hesham Kassem had a more direct perspective:  
As an observer, let me tell (you) that all media owners were in it for political 
gain. They would swear that it's not why they were involved. They are looking 
for political influence that surpasses parliament by a lot. They are not interested 
in entering politics at that level.905  
“Coincidence” of licensing 
The actual establishment of AMAY occurred through a series of coincidences and 
opportunities, aided by the general context of Egypt at the time. Initially, AMAY was meant 
to be another Wafdist paper, run by journalist Magdy Mehanna (b.1957-d.2008) who had 
recently been let go from his position as editor-and-chief of the AlWafd Newspaper for 
attempting to publish a series of articles on corruption in the oil sector that would embarrass 
both the government, and some influential businessmen.906 Salah Diab said that he initially 
wanted to establish a paper for him “out of guilt,” since he was the source of the information 
that Mehanna used for the reporting that would get him fired.907 Sherif Wadood, who had 
been a business management consultant for PICO, was charged with the task of embarking on 
the mission to license a new paper. He found that the easiest route to obtaining a license 
would be by purchasing an existing one, rather than going through the tedious and 
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unpredictable process of having a new license issued. The decision was made to purchase the 
license of a weekly paper that was up for sale called AlZaman in October 2001, which was 
licensed only as an entertainment paper. The sale was agreed for LE450,000 ($100,000). By 
31 December 2001, the actual purchase of the license was complete.  
After concluding the initial step, the AMAY founders found themselves faced with three 
main hurdles to cross, all of which stemmed from the novelty of their endeavor, to establish a 
locally published, private news publication: 
1) Passing regulatory barriers in order to produce a daily “all-news” publication. 
2) Convincing other prominent businessmen to join the ownership team 
3) Finding a team of professional journalists with the appropriate know-how to publish and 
distribute the paper 
 
Regulatory hurdles 
The next phase would involve changing the commercial registration, establishing the 
ownership structure and shifting the licensing to a daily news publication covering all topics. 
In theory, the normal registration process allowed for all of this. But the fact that it had not 
actually been done in recent years (at least not for a locally licensed, private, news 
publication) meant that there was a palpable sense of possible failure. The main hurdle for the 
completion of this task was the ever-imposing security approval that always presented a 
looming barrier for endeavors in ‘sensitive’ sectors. Wadood recalls being in disbelief at just 
how easily he was able to obtain the license: 
Since the 1950’s, there hasn’t really been an actual privately-owned and 
locally licensed daily newspaper. Given the current climate at the time 
(liberalization), we thought we could try by purchasing an existing 
license… I didn’t believe it when the employee at the civil registration 
office actually told me that all I needed to do was hold a shareholders 
meeting for the company, to declare that the paper would be covering “all” 
areas including politics, sports, business et cetera, not just entertainment… 
It was as simple as that.  
 
The process of changing it to a daily publication was more complicated, as it required at 
least LE1 million ($400,000) of capital to be put forward. The licensing fee would be utterly 





around $1,200/year.908 However, for Diab and his would-be partners, it was a relatively 
insignificant sum. Wadood believes he had another stroke of luck when the sale of the 
license, and changes to the company registration were signed-off by the civil authorities 
without first being vetted by the security establishment. He thought that the employee 
responsible for this, may have “made a mistake, by their own standards.909”  
The owners: public champions of neoliberal change 
In accordance with the law, which limited individual stakes in mass media outlets to 10% of 
capital, at least ten shareholders would have to own the paper, purchased from ten 
shareholders who owned AlZaman. Initially, the ten shareholders were friends and family 
members whom Wadood included as placeholders as he embarked on a mission to gather co-
owners from Salah Diab’s cohort of influential and well-connected businessmen 
acquaintances. “[Diab] felt some trepidation in starting a paper, and thought that it might 
backfire. Since the 1950’s the state had assumed all ownership of the media. No matter what, 
it was unchartered territory, and he still felt that having active, significant partners would 
provide some cover, if the state looks at this paper with suspicion or attempts to react in a 
bad way to it.”910 
But Wadood saw a shift in the balance of power around this time in the country, and felt 
that it may encourage some members of the business community to get involved:  
There was no absolute power in the authoritarian regime during Mubarak’s 
time, it was relative. His regime needed the business community, and knew 
that they could provide them cover from the overall power of the military.  
The government would basically tell the business and civil community, ‘if 
we let the military loose on you, they will devour you.’ Because the 
military had veto power for anything happening in the country. So there 
was a general sense of more dispersed power with Mubarak undeniably at 
the center of all of it. Despite the regime’s overall control, they understood 
that there needed to be a certain degree of unconventional checks and 
balances, and a good example of that is the “ventilator system” of the state, 
where they would allow every once in a while a certain degree of free 
speech either in the media or public protests, or letting certain dissidents 
out of prison at different times. 
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The businessmen that were initially approached to invest in the paper met the idea with an 
array of responses. Most did not think it could happen. Wadood had a full presentation 
prepared, and was able to gain access through his employer’s entrenched position in the 
society of wealthy Egyptians. He had pitched it to his managing team and co-investors as an 
opportunity to create a professionally run, profitable, independent newspaper that would be 
interested in providing objective news.911  
The reactions he received varied. For the most part, the response was a firm “no”, as most 
did not understand why anyone in such a position would enter a field with such obvious 
pitfalls and perils that could threaten their position vis-à-vis the regime. They were puzzled 
and slightly suspicious with regards to Salah Diab’s motives and what he stood to gain.  
The most enthusiastic about the project were individuals who would continue to help shape 
the entire private print and broadcast media landscape in the country. These were: Ahmed 
Bahgat, Naguib Sawiris and Akmal Kortam. Naguib Sawiris was the first to join the fray. He 
had twice attempted to launch his own newspaper in the preceding year, but could not find 
industry professionals that could present a workable business model to establish and run a 
private newspaper. Advertising as a sector was similarly underdeveloped in the country, 
which made him believe that it would be difficult to transition the newspaper to a 
sustainable business.912 He believed that the paper (and in years to come television) would be 
able to engage in a process of moving the country in a more liberal direction. Sawiris’ 
approval for the project hinged on wanting the paper to commit to becoming self-sufficient 
financially and ensure that “there was a separation between finance and the editorial 
process.913”   
Ahmed Bahgat, had already established Dream TV for two years by that time, and saw it as 
an extension of his media interests. Bahgat’s position in the media space would be a boon 
for Diab as it would help convince authorities who were initially skeptical of allowing the 
project to proceed. “Mr. Diab would half-jokingly tell anyone from the government who 
approached him with concerns about the paper’s establishment, ‘How can you logically 
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attempt to deny Ahmed Bahgat a newspaper license, when he already has a television 
license?!”914  
Akmal Kortam, Diab’s nephew was the last major enthusiast to sign onto the project. 
Kortam was also an oil executive, as chairman of Sahara Oil and Gas. At the time, he was 
less known than his counterparts, however he would later be more concretely entrenched in 
politics. He won a seat in the 2010 parliamentary elections as a member of Mubarak’s NDP, 
and after the Arab Spring would help establish and lead the center-right Muhafizzeen 
(Conservatives) Party. Kortam would also purchase AlTahrir newspaper in 2013, only two 
years after it was established by journalist Ibrahim Eissa after the Arab Spring.915  
According to the paper’s first publisher Hesham Kassem, the realistic breakdown of owner-
ship in the paper was as follows: Diab and his relatives (including Akmal Kortam) 
controlled 50% of the paper; Naguib Sawiris and his associates owned 30% and Ahmed 
Bahgat’s cohort held roughly a 20% stake.916 
Diab was by far the most active shareholder in the running of AMAY throughout its early 
years, often referred to in Egyptian media as “the owner of AlMasry AlYoum.” He was a 
frequent contributor as well, writing a weekly column under the pen name “Newton.” 
2) Finding Professionals 
The search for an industry professional who could run AMAY from an operational 
perspective would be a short one. According to Wadood, the options were limited, and in 
April 2003 he approached Hisham Kassem, a publisher of the weekly English language 
magazine, Cairo Times. Kassem’s initial reaction was disbelief that someone had been able 
to actually register a daily newspaper.917 He agreed to join after being reassured that he 
could be in charge of hiring the entire newsroom staff and would have full operational 
control.918 This led to the replacement of Mehanna as chief editor and his reassignment to a 
columnist position. Kassem had also opted to introduce a new team in order to ensure a 
mode of operation and work culture that departed from the normative model of established, 
public media outlets (similar to Dream TV’s approach). He replaced an entire team that was 
brought in before him, because “they were all from state papers and would be unable to 
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embody the paper’s vision.919” 
 
Wadood recalls being summoned along with Diab to Mabahith Amn El-Dawla (State 
Security Investigations Service)920 to meet with the bureau charged with the overseeing 
media. The high-ranking officer that met them was livid towards his staff over the fact that 
AMAY had been licensed and registered without them raising any flags. State Security only 
heard of the matter when the Supreme Council of the Press sent them a courtesy notification 
that the paper was being launched. The security establishment attempted to dissuade the 
Council from moving forward with Kassem as a publisher because of his background of 
working with various human rights NGO’s. Diab and Wadood told the officers that 
Kassem’s function would be to help with distribution. Ultimately, the security authorities 
felt that regardless of the individuals running the paper, they would still be able to control 
publication via the government-owned Ahram printing presses and distribution services, 
which AMAY would be forced to use for lack of any other viable options.921  
 
The shareholders agreed with the choice of Kassem because of his business-like attitude 
towards running the paper and the fact that his staunchly liberal economic views coincided 
with their own.922 Before joining AlMasry AlYoum, Kassem learned how to run a publication 
in Egypt on a trial-and-error basis. The state of the industry, according to him, was that no 
one knew how to run a paper using private resources. He would describe himself as a 
“numbers guy” who spent more time with his financial managers than he would with the 
editorial staff. He would say that the main deterrent for many would-be newspaper owners, 
was the commercial aspect:  
After the [AMAY] experience, I’d often be approached about starting 
newspapers in Egypt by individuals with idealistic notions of changing 
public opinion. Once I’d begin talking about the harsh financial reality, I 
wouldn’t get a call back. It is a symptom of the industry not being 
properly developed. Unfortunately, not enough private enterprises were 
interested in that. 923   
Kassem’s approach also highlighted an editorial vision of presenting objective news in a 
way that was credibly detached from archaic notions associated with publishing under the 
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auspices of the state. These notions included viewing the state as a patriarch and overlord 
and dealing with most news with exaggerated caution and fear.924  
Armed with LE16 million, Kassem sought to build a newsroom that could be taught how to 
report, rather than find journalists trained in state institutions. As a result, many of his 
recruits had been brought with minimal background in the field. Ahmed Ragab, joined as a 
reporter in 2005 with a salary of LE900/month ($160).925 The salary was low, but common 
for starting journalists at the time. His training was entirely “on the job,” having graduated 
with a degree in general sciences.  
During the first two years after the paper’s launch, Kassem was still unsure if the paper 
would be able to make enough money out of distribution and advertising to cover costs, and 
so wages remained low. The result was that most journalists were allowed to have second 
jobs. Aside from journalists, photographers and business administration staff, AMAY was 
forced to resort to public organizations to source technical operators, distribution and 
publishing personnel. 
Some of the more experienced journalist positions were filled by individuals who came from 
some of the established publicly-funded press organs. On 7 July, 2004, AMAY hit the stands 
for the first time, with former AlAhram journalist Anwar ElHawary as Chief Editor. Six 
months later, he would be replaced by Managing Editor Magdy ElGallad, also an Ahram 
alumnus. He would remain in place until 2012, and would oversee the paper’s rise to 
prominence.  
A new age of reporting? 
The growth of AMAY had a ripple effect throughout all media spaces in Egypt. Talk shows 
in private broadcasting had become more concerned with discussing news of the day, rather 
than broad social issues. This had partially to do with the composition of its journalists, many 
of whom came from AMAY. The managers of AMAY were fully aware that many of its staff 
were complementing their newspaper income with work for television.926 This organizational 
structure reflects Giddens and Dalmyr’s views on “structuration927” and to a certain extent -
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Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory on social reproduction928- insofar as they reflect prevailing 
tendencies and structures in society at the time. The prosperity seen by the connected 
businessmen at the helm of these outlets did not necessarily trickle down to the lower rungs 
of the ladder in the profession. Media professionals did experience a qualitative shift in how 
they were allowed to pursue their careers, but their relative power vis-à-vis the business 
owners who represented the emerging cohort in power was limited. Their expanding agency 
was still bound to the prevailing power structure i.e. business owners, the ruling class and the 
security establishment. 
AMAY’s leadership was tolerant of the reporters essentially using their work to benefit 
private television stations, both because it alleviated pressure on the company to raise salaries 
and because it helped increase the profile of the paper and its network. In the cases of Dream 
TV and OnTV, the stations that employed the journalists, were also owned by the paper’s 
shareholders.  Wadood believes that AMAY’s moonlighting employees helped enhance the 
journalistic culture in the country. He found that “the most transformative shift during that 
period was ‘Freedom of Information’ and news, rather than just ‘Freedom of Expression.929” 
The paper’s reporting on potential fraud in the 2005 Parliamentary elections as well as 
several cases of corruption that year helped instantly boost AMAY’s profile and give it the 
credibility that its founders had envisioned.930 Within 5 years, it was distributing over 200,000 
papers, putting it in close competition with the government’s established giants.931 While 
AlAhram and AlAkhbar operated out of large, imposing landmark buildings in downtown 
Cairo, AlMasry AlYoum was operated mainly from 3 floors in a building 5-minutes away 
from the city center.  Out of all the publications in Egypt, AMAY was the most focused on 
domestic politics and human rights, suggesting that the paper’s journalistic mission 
resembled a Western model where journalists were seen as watchdogs.932  
The effects of media on public consciousness became apparent to the AMAY organization in 
the build-up to the 25 January Uprising. Journalists and management alike would see their 
reporting become topics-of-the day in cafes’ and everyday conversation.933 Ahmed Ragab 
said he felt the effects of his reporting during the 2005 Judges’ Protests and the Kefaya 
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Movement934 the same year, as well as the 6 April 2008 call for civil disobedience and 
subsequent labor protests: 
It became clear that we had a critical role in social consciousness at 
that time. This was something we wouldn’t really have imagined 
before, that a private organization reporting the news would not 
only affect all of public opinion, but also become a factor that the 
state has to contend with.935 
Ragab would become a managing editor at the paper and would be put in charge of its online 
publication by 2012. He believes that one of the main reasons behind the paper’s ability to 
distinguish itself in its reporting was the culture that it created among its staff, many of whom 
grew-up in the industry together as colleagues.936 A study of AMAY’s  content in 2008 found 
that its focus was on six major topics: corruption, crime, domestic politics, protests and sports, 
which is why it was seen as a populist project by its contemporaries.937 The study, which ran 
for two and a half years, found a strong divergence from AlAhram in every aspect, even the 
front page stories. Over the course of the study, the two had only around 5-6% overlap in 
their front-page stories.938 AMAY quickly began to overtake its established competitors. By 
2011, it had become a top-selling paper in the country distributing nearly 500,000 copies 
domestically, aided by the highly political and involved mood created by the Arab Spring.939 
Self-Censorship 
The concept of self-censorship for political and safety reasons was widespread and AlMasry 
AlYoum was not an anomaly in that sense. Magdy ElGallad was often described as being a 
Mubarak insider as a reason behind his long stint at AMAY, even though he sometimes 
published content that seemed to criticize Gamal Mubarak’s increasing power between 
2008-2010. The reality according to Ragab was that the power shifts during this period 
meant that being on the right side of the government “depended more on how tactful you 
were rather than how blindly obedient. [ElGallad] knew his boundaries better than almost 
anyone.”940 ElGallad himself said in a televised interview that there is nothing wrong with 
“political accommodation as a practice in journalism,” as long as certain journalistic 
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principles are maintained. He added that this practice was a necessity in journalism and that 
it allowed him to fulfil his main obligation, “to make sure the paper comes out.”941 The main 
areas of “accommodation” tended to involve the informally known “red lines,” which 
included: any commentary on the military, the President himself and immediate family.942 
The rise of Gamal Mubarak became one area where AMAY would have to choose between 
being politically accommodating or leaning into the paper’s growing reputation as being 
more objective compared to the state papers. Aside from Gamal Mubarak’s lineage, he also 
was an influential advocate for neoliberal policies from within the state. The shift in power 
toward the private sphere was much more palpable once Gamal Mubarak decided to enter 
politics and enact changes in the National Democratic Party943. However, his approach to 
communications had not changed. “The problem was he still wanted to have a one-way 
communication system while appearing to open up the economy and media, it just couldn’t 
work how they wanted it.”944 
AMAY had made the decision to publish numerous articles giving voice to movements and 
demonstrations against “the inheritance of power.” ElGallad himself wrote a column 
criticizing Gamal’s meteoric rise. Although he did attempt to stay within the “red lines” of 
not being critical of a Mubarak family member by pointing criticism regarding his ascension 
towards his entourage and the trusted circle who pushed him to take “ill-advised” political 
steps for their own benefit.945 He would also appear on numerous television shows to say 
that on a personal level, he would support a younger Mubarak’s presidential bid. In the run-
up and during the 2011 uprising, AMAY became known for publishing news that could be 
damning to the central government and critical of the cohort surrounding Gamal Mubarak.  
El-Gallad operated an open newsroom and was forthcoming with the red-lines he would 
keep. Criticism of military command and policy was one unambiguous topic that would be 
off-limits. From the early days of AMAY, if a news story involved the military as an 
institution or members of the military, the chief editor would have to be consulted before the 
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story is pursued.946 ElGallad seemed to always know exactly where that line stood as well. 
Two contrasting cases help illustrate that point: 
1) As mentioned in the previous Chapter. In 2012 ElGallad took the decision to 
immediately halt the weekly publication of AMAY’s English language subsidiary, 
Egypt Independent. That was when he learned that it would be running an opinion 
article by an American military expert specializing in Egypt that seemed to suggest 
certain divisions in the Egyptian Armed Forces leadership.947 
2) On the other hand, in 2010 when reporters were in the tourist coastal town of Sharm El-
Sheikh to report on shark attacks that led to a complete standstill of tourism, he 
authorized them to fully report the story. This was despite demands by the Governor of 
South Sinai at the time that AMAY only reports on the government’s findings. The 
governor was a retired General of the Armed Forces. He had personally called the 
AMAY reporters insisting they do not engage in their own investigations since it was a 
“matter of national security.” The governor was especially opposed to publishing an 
interview with an American shark attack expert948 before his office approves the 
answers. When the reporters told ElGallad about this exchange, his response was 
“continue with your work… ignore [the governor].”949  
 
Despite the self-censorship, most of the paper’s journalists would feel comfortable covering 
political stories, even if they involved members of the ruling party. The appetite to produce a 
compelling product became a driving force that competed with the desire to stay on the safe 
side of politics. The nature of the paper’s business model and mission statement had 
ultimately allowed many of the journalists and editors who worked with them to expand the 
horizons of what it meant to be a journalist in Egypt, especially given the link between 
appealing to public interest and producing a commercially viable product.950 There was a 
clear “marriage of convenience, and ambition for expansion, that did not exist in state papers, 
even if the owners’ ambitions were not driven by a desire to turn a profit as much as it may 
have been to have a strong political tool.”951 
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The growing readership of AMAY and its heavy distribution figures allowed it to begin 
relying on its own revenue to maintain operations and even expand as the major 
shareholders had insisted from the outset.952 Paper sales alone would barely cover costs, 
while actual profit was tied to advertising, which Hesham Kassem saw as his most important 
personal mandate.953 Between the first and second years of operation advertising revenue had 
expanded from LE9,000 to LE543,000.954 By 2007, one year before Kassem’s departure 
from the paper, it had begun to turn a profit, bringing in LE1.483 million in advertising 
revenue.955  After the 25 January uprising and Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, AMAY was the most 
read newspaper in Egypt.956 After Kassem left the paper, AMAY signed a deal with 
Promomedia group, giving it a media concession whereas in exchange for a fixed fee that 
would in theory cover annual costs, Promomedia would be guaranteed advertising space that 
it would control.  
Naguib Sawiris was a major investor in Promomedia and despite the clear conflict of interest 
involved, this would help even the balance of power among the major shareholders, given 
that Salah Diab had the most direct oversight over operations. When Kassem returned to 
AMAY as a consultant in 2014 to help restructure the paper after it ran into financial 
difficulties, he thought that, besides general mismanagement of funds, the media concession 
platform was a major culprit in stifling the paper both editorially and financially. 957  The 
idea behind the media concession was that it would guarantee the paper’s operating costs for 
the year upfront. However, it also meant that the media outlet would be completely bound to 
this one external advertising company’s payments to ensure its survival, giving the 
advertiser leverage that could be used to make demands over content.958 In television this 
leverage was used to force some stations to hire or fire certain talk show hosts. The 
concession agreement also implied higher fees, meaning it would mean a lower profit 
margin for the media outlet.959  
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AMAY continued to have a large readership after the 2011 uprising, which helped it 
maintain the guaranteed advertising deal. But, the deal backfired when Promomedia was late 
in many payments between 2011 and 2015, putting the paper under extreme financial 
duress.960 Since it only had one advertising concession, these late payments from one 
company were enough to endanger the entire business. AMAY was not the only newspaper 
bound to the constraints of media concessions. Its main competitor AlShorouk found 
difficulties addressing employee grievances for late pay,  reportedly due to Promomedia’s 
refusal to adhere to a fixed-term payment schedule, putting the newspaper’s entire 
accounting system in disarray.961  
Printing  
AMAY looked to establish a foundation for longer-term, independent operations. To that end, 
the company established its own independent printing press in 2010. Newspaper printing had 
previously been monopolized by publicly-owned companies, which afforded the state a 
significant degree of control. However, the newspaper’s leadership had come to realize that 
some of the measures in place giving the state the ability to control the sector, were not 
necessarily in place by any clear mandate. In other words, there had not been a definitive 
ruling, forcing all of the country’s newspapers to exclusively use these state-owned presses. 
AlMasry Printers was established in early 2010 in the “6 October” Cairo suburb. Its 
establishment came with minimal friction from regulators and without any of the expected 
probing and questioning from security officials.962 AlMasry AlYoum’s anecdotally tell a 
curious story, that the security officials who regulate media had been so far removed from 
AMAY’s printing press plans, that they were only made aware of its existence on a day when 
AlAhram’s printers experienced major technical glitches, causing a delay in the distribution of 
nearly all major newspapers. AlMasry AlYoum was the exception and was the only paper to hit 
the stands on time that day, leading to the “discovery” of its printing operations.963  
The move allowed the paper to control costs, with the ability to print newspapers at a rate of 
44,000 copies/hour.964 Self-sufficient printing also allowed for higher production standards 
and more relaxed deadlines, giving teams time to create a more polished end-product.965 This 
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also meant that the editors in charge would have to be more vigilant in monitoring content, so 
as to catch potentially problematic content before it was printed or distributed, rather than 
risking litigation for any of the existing “Crimes of Publication.966”  
AlAhram’s distribution company continued to control the actual dissemination of the papers, a 
decision based on practicality and cost-efficiency, rather than an imposition by the state. 
Egypt Independent 
AlMasry AlYoum had sought to increase its profile to a broader audience. By 2009, AMAY 
was the most important media project in Egypt and the business-minded owners began to 
prioritize expansion beyond the main Egyptian audience.967 They wanted to have an 
international profile, so they decided to launch an online-only English version, initially 
called AlMasry AlYoum English. The paper’s website had also become a focal point for 
development within the organization. The following period led to a recruitment drive to 
bring staff that was both bi-lingual and tech-savvy. They also happened to be driven as 
journalist-activists, which suited the owners’ political ambitions at the time, according to 
Lina Attalah, one of the Managing Editors of AlMasry AlYoum English: 
There was a sense that the Diabs partially wanted to start the English 
paper to have their name attached to a pioneering journalistic 
enterprise that is at the forefront of Egypt’s transformation. It was 
still in a sense tied to “power” for the owners, but not as much in the 
way of direct local influence, as much as it was about increasing 
their profile internationally. That is why we were able to operate 
with much more editorial freedom and for a long time we were not 
bound by some of the same restrictions as the main Arabic paper.968 
 
AlMasry AlYoum English was thus well positioned to report on the 2011 uprisings to a 
global audience when it happened. Reporters from both editions had ventured to cover the 
25 January 2011 demonstrations on “Police Day” against brutality and corruption by 
security forces. Over the following few days, reporters were arrested, attacked and some 
even “disappeared” while on the job. When the government made the decision to cut off the 
internet on 28 January (as the uprising was becoming “the” major international story), over a 
dozen AMAY reporters stayed in a bustling suite in the Semiramis Hotel, adjacent to Tahrir 
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Square, the epicenter of events, where satellite internet allowed the reporters to continue 
producing stories, becoming one of the main sources of news from Egypt during the 
attempted communications blackout.969  
The revolution was a seminal moment for the paper, with one journalist from the English 
edition noting that it “lifted the newspaper out of its lethargy, and the usefulness of 
journalism—until then a topic of theoretical debate—seemed manifest.”970 AMAY English 
felt a further separation was possible from the Arabic edition, and decided to rename itself 
Egypt Independent in November of 2011 as a way to mark the “exciting moment of 
transformation in the country’s history,” while maintaining its mandate of covering the 
country’s main socio-economic and political stories.971 This coincided with the launch of a 
weekly paper, which was at the center of a censorship battle with Magdy ElGallad within 
less than a month, after he decided to halt production due to an opinion article that 
highlighted possible divisions in the Armed Forces as related above.  
Following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the subsequent rule of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(having won both a majority in Parliament and the Presidential elections in 2012), Egypt 
Independent, like AMAY operated as a journalistic watchdog.  It was more adventurous than 
its Arabic counterpart in voicing potentially critical news about the Armed Forces, going as 
far as calling the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces’ assumption of power in the 
aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster a “coup by law”.972 In the run-up to the 30 June army-backed 
protests that led to the ouster and imprisonment of President Mohamed Morsi, along with the 
designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and the resumption of a 
form of military rule, Egypt Independent experienced a change that was reflective of the 
political climate at the time. That period saw a fundamental shift in the paper with a new 
Chairman, Abdel-Moneim Saeed coming in after running the state’s mouthpiece AlAhram. 
Magdy ElGallad was replaced by Yasser Rizk in 2012 a former editor of AlAkhbar state 
paper known for his close ties with the Minister of Defense at the time and future President, 
General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. Rizk, like other media heads of that period, had been 
forthcoming with his intentions saying, “We were the spearhead of the battle to topple the 
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Muslim Brotherhood by uncovering their failures. We did not create it. This was their 
reality.”973  
Rizk had actively sought to regain editorial control of Egypt Independent as he steered the 
course of the paper in a direction that was strictly anti-Brotherhood and pro-military.974 He 
eventually would succeed and would severely and significantly downsize the English 
publication, essentially rendering it indistinguishable editorially from AMAY under his 
stewardship.975 Management justified this move by the lack of income brought in by Egypt 
Independent976, which was true, but had also been expected since the English edition’s 
inception. When Attalah protested, she was told, “we are not going to keep losing money on a 
bunch of leftist kids.”977 Wadood left the paper during this period as well.  
4) Facing difficulties 
AMAY was able to survive a period of takeovers and newspaper closures that plagued many 
of the other private newspapers between 2012 and 2018. The financial reality of running a 
newspaper in Egypt amidst the extremely underdeveloped infrastructure for the industry at 
the time, would require relatively low-cost budgets and frugal spending.978 When Hesham 
Kassem returned to AMAY as a business consultant in 2014, he found that the paper had 
stopped running as a business, and that spending had departed from being attached to any 
commercial rationale.979 The paper would face serious restructuring and downsizing that 
were easily justifiable in financial terms.  
On the other hand, the political landscape was also changing and the new president had 
stated on multiple occasions that all media must support the state in its endeavors.980 
Newspapers such as AlTahrir, AlDostor, Sawt al-Oumma and DOTMASR had either 
changed hands or limited their operations. Others shut down completely following the 
blockage of websites that started in 2017.  
AlMasry AlYoum maintained its ownership under the nominal control of the Diabs. The 
ownership started facing a more stringent political reality. Salah Diab was theatrically and 
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very publicly arrested from his home in 2015 and detained for 15 days after being charged 
with the possession of unlicensed firearms.981 Khaled Dawoud- a journalist/politician and 
former member of the Journalists Syndicate High Committee- thought that the arrest was tied 
to the paper’s “increasingly critical coverage” of the president.982 Diab was acquitted two 
years later.  
Ironically, the first arrest was not related to the corruption charges that were levied against 
him in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring when he was among many businessmen under 
investigation for having illegally appropriated land at below market price, benefiting from a 
clientelistic relationship with the Mubarak regime.983 Diab would eventually be arrested for 
these charges five years later in September 2020, when he was also facing tax evasion 
charges. The arrest was ordered by a military prosecutor.984 The accusations against Diab 
came well after many of other Mubarak era businessmen were acquitted of similar charges. 
Some of the latter even made strong comebacks in business and politics,985 raising concerns 
that once again, Diab’s arrest was over political disagreements revolving around AMAY 
coverage. Diab was also essentially banned from continuing writing his own column after the 
Council for Media Regulation banned any outlets from using pseudonyms for authors without 
providing good reasons and disclosing to the authorities who the writer is. As indicated 
earlier, he had been writing under the pen name “Newton.”986 
5) Mada Masr, continuing the Egypt Independent experiment  
Lina Attalah and a handful of journalists- who had exited Egypt Independent after its 
restructuring (opting to avoid its new editorial restrictions)- would start another bilingual 
news organization that same year with the hope of maintaining their role as journalists 
during what they thought would be another major year of transformation in 2013. The idea 
was to create a newsroom and develop a sustainable journalistic institution in Egypt that was 
run and owned by its journalists. They launched Mada Masr on the 30th of June 2013, the 
day of the anti-Morsi protests. The paper would grow, funded by a community of subscribed 
readers as well as by institutional support from organizations recognizing its role in 
journalism. In 2019 Mada Masr won the Free Media Pioneer Award from IMS 
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(International Media Support). “It was operating during a a very turbulent time that looked 
only to point to more tightening and so Mada Masr had been operating on the assumption 
that the project could end any day.”987  
By 2017, Mada was among 60 websites that were shutdown by the government.988 No 
evidence of legal action was given. Instead, officials made vague statements to the media 
saying that it was in connection with “publishing false information” and “supporting 
terrorism”.989 Mada was registered under the Ministry of Investment, meaning that it was not 
initially protected as a journalistic organization, especially since it could not seek protection 
from the Journalists Syndicate, making it more vulnerable for shutdown. When a unified 
media law was passed in 2016 to govern all mass media, Mada immediately submitted their 
paperwork to register as a media organization under the law, but their application was not 
responded to for at least 2 years.990  
The paper experienced a series of additional challenges, including the persecution of 
investigative journalist Hossam Bahgat for reporting on military trials.991 Its offices were 
raided by plain-clothed policemen and 3 journalists detained in November 2019, soon after 
publishing an article about President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s son.  
6) Conclusion: 
AlMasry AlYoum was born in a period of Egyptian history when a certain cohort of liberal-
minded business leaders felt empowered and emboldened enough to delve into mass media 
publication, which for decades had been dominated by the state or its political parties. The 
newspaper’s main founder had drawn on the legacy of his grandfather who had been a 
pioneer in utilizing print journalism to influence social and political change. But he most 
likely viewed owning a newspaper as a means to bolster his influence. The rapid expansion 
of the paper showed the appetite for and effectiveness of an independent press. Egypt was at 
the time implementing liberalization policies that required the participation of the cohort of 
the paper’s owners, which would help explain why they thought that owning a paper would 
not endanger their business interests. AMAY’s licensing and registration showed that the did 
not oppose it. This ambivalence would allow the paper to expand, while maintaining a level 
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of uncertainty as to how the state’s attitude vis-à-vis print mass publication would be during 
times of political duress. The restrictions faced by the paper and the difficulties faced by its 
founder after the 25 January uprising point to a change both in the state’s attitude to an 
















































Chapter 7- OnTV: Building a Liberal Media Empire 
 
1) Introduction 
By 2007, AlMasry AlYoum newspaper was fast becoming a household name. Its reach and 
effectiveness were growing. Around that time, one of its main shareholders, telecom 
billionaire Naguib Sawiris sought to extend his investment in mass media, by launching his 
own television network. By then, six years had passed since regulations were put in place 
allowing for private satellite broadcasting outlets to launch from Media City under the 
auspices of the General Authority for Investment (GAFI). Private television stations were 
able to immediately compete with the state’s outlets once satellite access itself became 
widespread in the country. Most television managers had the ability to create content that 
could compete with the public television’s statist perspective. Access to these networks was 
also on its way to becoming ubiquitous, with costs of sharing cable or satellite access 
dramatically decreasing during the first decade of the 2000’s.992 
Dream TV had already laid the groundwork and business model for private Egyptian 
television outlets since launching in 2001, having been the first fully Egyptian-owned and 
managed network of its kind. Licenses for private television stations established within 
Media City were obtained from the GAFI as private businesses. Unlike newspapers, the law 
did not limit the percentage of ownership one person could have over a television outlet, 
allowing for total control. Around this time, the government’s policies were becoming more 
skewed towards private investment growth, and a handful of privately owned outlets -all by 
friends of the Mubarak regime- were increasing their audiences and expanding their content. 
By the time telecom mogul, Naguib Sawiris launched the variety channel OTV in 2007, he 
had developed a belief that privately-owned broadcasting could have a future in Egypt and 
might be allowed by the state to grow. OTV was Sawiris’ third variety/entertainment 
television investment. His stated goal at that point was to combat religious fundamentalism 
and extremism, by promoting ideas to counter them.993  
He was already a majority shareholder in the media network Melody and was looking to 
launch another station, OnTV as a 24-hour satellite news station. However, the state’s de 
facto ban on licenses for round-the-clock news stations, meant that OnTV could only be 
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licensed as a variety channel. The goal of OnTV in Sawiris’ eyes, would be the promotion of 
liberal values, while also acting as a bridge with the West.994  
The station’s first CEO, Emad Gad reflected this outlook in a 2009 interview calling it “a 
liberal channel that focuses on reviving the Egyptian identity and the values of citizenship, 
freedom, equality, modernization, rationality,” adding that it expresses all these values 
through its slogan, ‘stay in the light.’995 A basic content analysis of OnTV would show that 
the outlet did in fact attempt to provide analysis and insight into the news in a more profound 
way . At the same time, Naguib Sawiris’ media interests cannot only be looked at and 
analyzed through the prism of their intended cultural value, but also as a unit within his 
business operations and a tool he had at his disposal that could be deployed to further other 
goals pertaining to his commercial interests or social/political aspirations.  
2) Sawiris investing in television 
Naguib Sawiris’ Orascom Telecom Holdings (OTH) first rose to prominence when it was in 
partnership with France Telecom, winning Egypt’s first privatized mobile operator license 
and launching Mobinil in 1997. OTH became the vehicle through which Sawiris would 
expand in Africa, Asia and Europe. It would come to be viewed as the fastest growing 
emerging market telecom company by 2005. That year OTH purchased Italy’s third largest 
mobile operator, having already acquired market-leading telecom businesses in Pakistan and 
Algeria.996 At a World Economic Forum meeting in 2006, Naguib Sawiris said he built OTH 
as a regional enterprise and hoped to replicate that model in media.997 By 2015, Sawiris had 
divested most of his business activity away from telecoms, but still held onto a belief that the 
opportunity for growth in media regionally was massive, albeit shackled by politics.998 The 
development of his own media organizations, especially OnTV, seemed to always hinge on 
his other business or political activities, which may be an indication that the development of 
these organizations were hindered by internal structural factors, as well as external concerns. 
Like Ahmed Bahgat, he was not politically active when making his foray into broadcasting. 
But unlike Bahgat, Sawiris’ ambitions did eventually extend into politics, which would play 
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into the development of the channel, and into the two times he sold OnTV. The first sale was 
in 2012. He repurchased it a year later. The next and seemingly final sale was in 2016. 
When he first entered the media fray, Sawiris was considered an ally of the Mubarak regime 
insofar as he supported its liberalization policies and fashioned himself as an entrepreneur 
with global ambitions who could help Egypt in its push to become a destination for foreign 
investment, and as a hub for global business. 999 He saw his positive relationship with the 
regime as a pre-requisite to conducting business in Egypt. 1000 His stated goals for opening 
television networks were in line, (and partially in service) of these priorities. Sawiris’ 
involvement in media tended to correspond with the direction of his business, and at times 
with his political stances, as the story of OnTV shows. 
Media scholar Naomi Sakr sees these media endeavors as being partially an extension of his 
business interests.1001 The level of risk these activities posed to him and his family who have 
major holdings in construction, tourism and industry could be offset by having newspaper or 
television outlets that could act as a viable bargaining chip with authorities, especially under 
an authoritarian regime such as Mubarak’s at the time, where there was a non-linear approach 
to laws and regulations.1002 His media ventures according to Sakr also fit with what she 
describes as the “trait of expansionism shared by media moguls”: 
By investing in ‘free’ media, expansionist entrepreneurs can hope to 
put their own visions, policy preferences and even favorable 
interpretations of their eccentricities into circulation in parallel with 
their capital.1003 
OnTV was structurally meant to be an expansion of Naguib Sawiris’ business empire. It was 
not initially thought of as a major money maker, but more of a passion project of the 
owner.1004 With sustainability in mind, the station was structured as a business that would be 
run with the same kind of financial prudence deployed in Orascom Telecom. During the first 
few years of the station’s launch, its managers were concerned with balancing budgets and 
creating compelling content, rather than with the more politicized aspects of running a 
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Haitham El-Sawy who helped found and run the ONA academy, OnTV’s media training 
program, said that Sawiris would show up, and briefly make sure everything was in order, 
without engaging too much. “He made a point not to appear like he was meddling in day-to-
day running, but you had to show him that you kept everything in order.1005” The plan was for 
OnTV to eventually become profitable, but early on, Sawiris knew that it would be difficult 
for it to make enough of a profit to be considered a ‘money maker’.  Reflecting on the driving 
force behind his decisions with the station, he said: “OnTV held a special place in my heart. I 
already knew that in television, entertainment was where profit would be. But at the same 
time, I would never accept for it to be run loosely, or at a constant loss.”1006 
Sawiris’ general broader involvement in media, especially regionally, suggests that he was 
opportunistically looking for openings where he would have an immediate impact through the 
sector. His first major mass media/current affairs broadcasting investment was in Iraq, 
immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2004. VideoCairo founder Mohamed Gohar 
was asked to lead the project. He established AlNahrain television network with an initial 
investment of $25 million dollars. The project was meant to be an expansive entertainment 
network, at a time when the country was still in the throngs of a bloody conflict.1007 According 
to Gohar, Sawiris was interested in increasing his profile in Iraq as well as possibly 
dominating the media landscape there, to have the infrastructure in place as the country 
rebuilds. In reality, Sawiris’ media investment paled in comparison to his telecom interests in 
the country.  
In 2003 he led a consortium that had won a bid to essentially build-up and launch the 
country’s mobile telephone capacity.1008 It was described as being “among the most 
potentially lucrative and high-profile contracts to be offered in post-war Iraq” since the 
country did not have a mobile phone network prior.1009 The reconstruction project alone was 
worth $325 million.1010 The persistence of the conflict forced Sawiris to rethink his position in 
Iraq, but the availability of high-end bidders for the mobile contract allowed his Orascom 
Telecom to walk away from the country with a sizeable profit, selling its stake in the Iraq 
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telecom company “Iraqna” for $1.2 bn.1011 The closure of AlNahrain was a by-product of 
Orascom’s divestment from the country, and its existence seemed to hinge on Sawiris’ overall 
involvement in Iraq, rather than on its viability and profitability as a business.1012  
OnTV held more of a personal importance to Sawiris. He expressed privately and publicly 
nationalistic sentiments and depicted his desire to contribute to the liberalization and 
democratization of Egypt as the underlying importance of the network for him. 
3) OnTV: Early Operations and Aspirations 
OnTV was initially conceived of as an outward-looking channel. The accessibility of cable 
and satellite programming from Egypt- coupled with the fact that the only available broadcast 
licensing scheme was for satellite networks out of Media City- allowed the station to 
organically position itself as a regional/globally-oriented endeavor. More than just being a 
liberal channel, it was also meant to be a “bridge with the West”.1013  
The first station head, Emad Gad had more of an academic background as well as some 
experience in print journalism, but he was most notable for how closely aligned he was to 
Naguib Sawiris intellectually. Gad wouldn’t last long at the helm, being replaced by Albert 
Shafik, an alumnus of VideoCairo, who helped run AlNahrain before returning to Egypt. 
Shafik’s appointment was an indication that the station had acknowledged it would not be 
able to survive independently without industry professionals at the helm.1014 Shafik would be a 
more technically-minded executive with broadcast experience who could help deliver Sawiris’ 
baseline of a self-sustained business.1015  
Like others who tried before him, Sawiris was unable to get a license for 24-hour news and 
current affairs programming. Instead Shafik was able to cultivate the station’s reputation as 
“Egypt’s first independent news channel1016” by building a robust and global news bulletin, 
coupled with the tried and tested “talk-show” model, that often involved well-known hosts as 
“talking heads” for the majority of the shows, delving into major socio-political issues.  
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Prior to the Arab Spring, OnTV recruited media professionals who were not known for their 
allegiance to the Mubarak regime. The goal was to introduce unique programming as well as 
concepts such as debate shows that could not be seen elsewhere. Sawiris recalled receiving 
angry calls from security officials or from members of the Mubarak administration when 
OnTV would host prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood around the 2010 
parliamentary elections.1017 The Brotherhood at that time had tens of members running for 
parliamentary seats. They ran as independents since the group itself was not granted license to 
operate politically. 
Ibrahim Eissa was one of the hosts recruited to work on the station. He was chief editor of 
AlDostor Newspaper and had been released from jail in 2009, one year before his recruitment, 
after having been detained on charges of spreading false information about Mubarak. His 
criticisms of the regime and commentary on politics were rumored to have led to a state order 
to end his participation in a show focused on local politics called “Baladna Bilmasry,” (Our 
Country In “Egyptian”) which he co-anchored with Reem Maged, a progressive anchor 
known as well to be a government critic.1018 Sawiris acknowledged that despite his desire to 
have a free and independent news channel, it would not be practical to operate without a 
certain degree of self-censorship or acquiescence to state demands: 
To be fair and honest, we have to acknowledge we cannot escape 
government pressures. So we have to deal with them on a case-by-case 
basis. Otherwise, what you don’t want is to get into a collision with the 
government and then they close you down.1019 
Around the time of the 2010 elections build-up, OnTV hired Yosri Foda, an investigative 
journalist who had just aired a wildly popular series on AlJazeera Network, Sirry lil’Ghayya 
(Highly Confidential). Foda knew that he would be moving to a fledgling station that was on a 
much tighter budget than the Qatari funded AlJazeera, but he was persuaded by Sawiris to 
join and present his own “pioneering” investigative talk-show in Egypt.1020 Shortly afterwards, 
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4) The Arab Spring: A second birth? 
According to Sawiris, OnTV found its feet with the Arab Spring. He was criticized for 
complying with the government order of an internet and mobile network blackout, but he 
maintains that he was a staunch supporter of the anti-Mubarak uprising through OnTV and by 
placing financial bets on the country to reassure the business community.1021 During that 
period, OnTV expanded its hiring, and the company found itself needing to spend to keep up 
with the sudden influx of private television stations being licensed.  
OnTV anchor Lilianne Daoud had just moved to Egypt from London where she hosted a talk 
show on BBC Arabic, Noqtat Hiwar (Talking Point). The uprisings had encouraged her to 
make the move, and after calling Albert Shafik proposing that she host a talk-show focused on 
global affairs, a deal was drawn up to bring her in. Daoud has said that “there was a huge 
appetite and belief in the sector in 2011. OnTV and Sawiris were very keen on becoming 
Egypt’s voice to the region and potentially the world.”1022  
Yosri Foda’s nightly talk show Akher Kalam (Final Words) had become one of the most 
popular programs in the country, and the channel had made him Egypt’s most well-paid news 
media professional.1023 Akher Kalam, as well as other shows on OnTV, resorted to hiring 
established print journalists looking to supplement their income at a time when independent 
journalism seemed to be a growing profession amid the heightened appetite for information. 
The main producer on Foda’s program during the 25 January protests was Ahmed Ragab, a 
journalist with AlMasry AlYoum, where Sawiris was a major stakeholder. Ragab recalls the 
station’s almost spontaneous and unanimous (among managers) decision to report on the 
protests at a time when state media and other privately owned stations were more tentative.1024 
Ragab and Foda produced segments alluding to potential financial corruption in the Mubarak 
regime and highlighting the protesters' demands for social justice and regime change, having 
received an implicit green light from Sawiris and Albert Shafik.1025 Foda, who had his 
beginnings as a BBC journalist, had been given the institutional backing to run his show as he 
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saw fit in 2011, prompting him to make long term plans to work in Egypt at the time, 
something he had not felt possible when migrating over a decade earlier.1026  
Reem Maged, who had continued to host Baladna BilMasry was allowed to unabashedly side 
with the demonstrators in her program. After Mubarak stepped down on 11 February 2011, 
Maged along with some of her colleagues in the station extended their reporting and criticism 
to the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces that had taken power. Prior to the uprising the 
Armed Forces had been the other major red line journalists knew not to cross along with 
Mubarak’s family. “There was a sense of purpose and feeling of contributing to real change” 
at that moment, according to Maged.1027 
Foda on the other hand, claimed that while he was not censored by the station, he was 
contacted directly and constantly by high-ranking members of the Armed Forces to question 
his work.1028 These conversations would forecast for him the direction the country’s media 
would ultimately take. 
5) New leases, longer leashes 
Broadcasting in Egypt experienced major shifts in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s 
ouster. The sudden licensing of 16 new privately-owned stations pointed to a more 
competitive media scape. OnTV would be responsible for a major milestone and potentially 
seismic development in the industry after the network managed to obtain a license to air 
OnTV Live a 24/hour live station generally focused on news. The station itself was launched 
with a $3million/year budget, requiring basic investments in broadcasting and manpower to 
be able to air live from around the country. Operationally, the additional investments and 
procurements were simple to attain for OnTV and Sawiris.1029 While launching OnTV Live 
may have been a relatively simple financial and operational endeavor, it was a major 
milestone, having been established as a non-state entity that could essentially provide round-
the-clock broadcasted news, with reporters on the ground across the country. Many media 
investors had attempted and failed to gain the necessary regulatory approval, since private 
broadcasting began in 2001. VideoCairo founder, Mohamed Gohar, who was laying the 
groundwork for his own outlet (25TV) noted that this development helped solidify the shift in 
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broadcast media brought about by the Arab Spring.1030 Gohar had himself been rebuffed in 
numerous attempts to create a news channel prior to 2011, being told by authorities that 
ownership of news channels would still be exclusive to the state. He ended up following suit 
and establishing 25TV, which provided an array of programming, but was heavily skewed 
towards reporting the news. The station was able to air from a building adjacent to the state’s 
media complex building, Maspero, outside of Media City, which was also a milestone at the 
time, since private broadcasting occurred almost exclusively from the media production city. 
Gohar recalled that at the time, a rich pool of enthusiastic young journalists was available and 
would help bolster the sector, due to the promise of a shift towards a more open, private 
broadcasting sector.1031 Many such as Gohar and Sawiris, decided to invest, believing in a 
green horizon for the businesses.  
OnTV was also the first to introduce political satirist Bassem Youssef to television after his 
popular YouTube posts. Youssef had been a successful heart surgeon before making the shift. 
He would be known as the Middle East’s John Stewart and his would almost immediately 
become the most popular show in the Arab World.1032 It pushed the envelope of political satire 
in the country and helped validate OnTV as a “pro-revolution” station aimed at progression. 
Youssef’s career in political comedy would take off leading him to move over to two more 
stations (in just three seasons), CBC and MBCMasr. 
Muslim Brotherhood in Power: TV as Politics 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to win both the parliamentary and presidential elections in 
2012 led to a polarized political scene. This polarization extended readily to the entire 
broadcasting sector, which had become essentially split between supporters and opponents of 
the MB. OnTV, continued to consider itself a liberal outpost for the country, and had 
dedicated itself behind closed doors to help turn public opinion away from the Brotherhood, 
with the almost explicit goal of taking them down.1033 Albert Shafik laid these plans out in no 
uncertain terms to media professionals under him at one point.1034 In public, Shafik would 
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express his opinion that the Islamist wave in Egypt, led by the MB, was attempting to erase 
Egyptian culture and change society.1035 
Sawiris had also established the Free Egyptians Party, which he funded without attempting to 
hold office through it. He made a point of rarely appearing on his network himself, but his 
party was heavily featured through news coverage as well as advertisements.  
While he would insist that OnTV was not preoccupied with pushing Free Egyptians to 
election victory, the station’s owner was unambiguous with his desire to turn public opinion 
against the Brotherhood, which he viewed as a backward, religious fundamentalist 
organization.1036 This was not lost on the MB-led government who Sawiris believes was 
pressuring his businesses in order to force him to soften its stance. On October 6, 2012, 
President Mohamed Morsi singled out the Sawiris family as owing nearly $1 billion in back 
taxes. The government then launched legal proceedings to retrieve the funds. Naguib insisted 
on fighting the case, while his siblings and father initially opted to settle. Within the TV 
network, Yosri Foda’s show was briefly suspended between June and September 2012. Foda 
said it was in protest against the Brotherhood-led government’s attempted interference with 
his reporting.1037 
According to Sawiris, the pressure was great enough that he decided to sell OnTV, “at least 
while the Brotherhood was in power,1038” to his friend, Tarek Bin Ammar, a Tunisian media 
producer. The sale prompted speculation that it could be a cover for capital flight out of the 
country, especially as Sawiris and his brothers1039 appeared to be moving massive amounts of 
capital abroad. It was a moment when business and political interests clashed, and the telecom 
tycoon felt that the rift with the state would be difficult to reconcile. He saw his ownership of 
the network as one of the main liabilities for him in Egypt, especially after having left the 
country on a self-imposed exile during most of Morsi’s presidency.1040 The following year, 
Ben Ammar and Sawiris announced a media partnership between the two, creating a clear 
pathway for the Egyptian to return as owner of OnTV. That same year, the Muslim 
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Brotherhood were removed from power by the military on 3 July 2013 following the “30 June” 
protests. Naguib would subsequently regained control of his station. 
6) After the Brotherhood: Paradigm shift 
OnTV began to lean into the idea of the channel becoming a hub for current affairs 
programming in the country, especially with OnTV Live continuing to be the only functioning 
round-the-clock privately owned news channel.1041 The station also began to lay the 
groundwork for ONA Academy, as Egypt’s first private media training hub, ostensibly to 
train the station’s next generation of media professionals. “Sawiris wanted OnTV to be the 
main ecosystem for media in Egypt and was excited to launch an entity that would elevate the 
sector,” according to ONA’s founding manager.1042  
After the fall of the MB and its designation as a terrorist organization by the government, the 
station’s ownership and leadership found itself theoretically in line with the interim 
government’s political direction (insofar as they both opposed the MB). However, some of the 
presenters of its flagship shows maintained their critical positions of government, especially 
of the military leadership that administered Morsi’s ouster and maintained corporal control.  
Yosri Foda recalls receiving phone calls directly from military commanders during this period 
and having to deal personally with their requests or attempts to steer his reporting.  He would 
leave the network for good in September 2014, just four months after General Abdel-Fattah 
El-Sisi won the presidential elections by an incredible 97%. Foda’s  decision to leave was 
grounded in his personal belief that the country was returning to an era where the media 
would be forcefully brought under direct control by a militaristic government and that his 
program would be on a “collision course with the military”.1043 
El-Sisi held numerous sessions and focus groups with members of the media in his first few 
months in office. Foda said that it was during one of these meetings where he made up his 
mind to leave OnTV and the country, after one of the attendees suggested to El-Sisi that 
August 14 should be a national holiday. The suggestion was made as a way to celebrate the 
Rab’a Massacre of August 2013, when over 1,000 supporters of Mohamed Morsi were killed, 
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after a month-long sit-in protesting his removal from office.1044 According to Foda (who had 
publicly condemned the massacre) that meeting gave a clear indication that whatever 
freedoms the media enjoyed after 25 January would be lost. He thought that the natural 
response to such a suggestion should have been immediate dismissal and outrage, and was 
therefore horrified that this was not the case. “The proposal, of course was not taken up, but it 
was alarming enough that he felt it was ok to propose it to the president of the country!” 1045 
Foda’s assessment of that time was that “there was an immediate feeling the media would be 
classified by the state as either ‘with us, against us or independent thinkers.’ The independent 
thinkers to a militaristic nation was as much of a problem as any rivals they may have.”1046 
Similarly, Reem Maged left the station in 2015, writing a statement saying she was forced to 
leave due to a host of pressures forcing her to end her tenure as a TV host on the station 
saying, “I’d rather remain silent than tell only half truths.”1047 The station said Maged’s show 
was suspended over scheduling issues, but she never returned as a television host. 
During this period, Sawiris believed Egypt was changing, and that there was no longer an 
appetite for the same level of critical current affairs programs. He wanted to steer the station 
more towards entertainment broadcasting, which was a difficult task since it ran counter to the 
organization’s main set-up and reputation.1048 OnTV was also beginning to become a business 
liability for Sawiris as he claimed that some of his big acquisitions were being stalled by 
security services who had concerns about him. Most notably, he said his attempt to purchase 
CI Capital (an investment bank) was being stalled by National Security1049 in March 2016.1050 
Less than two months after his CI Capital bid was rebuffed, Sawiris sold OnTV. In public, he 
claimed that the sale was due to the station’s inability to make a profit,1051 something that he 
privately said did not bother him, given his personal affinity for the project. “Egyptians’ 
Media Group” purchased OnTV in May 2016. This company that seemed to have burst on the 
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Abu-Hashima’s media company was rumored to be a front for the General Intelligence 
Directorate, and its acquisition of media outlets was seen to be a way for the state to control 
the private media, without bluntly nationalizing the sector.1052 
At the time of the sale, Lilian Daoud was the last of the critical talk-show hosts to remain at 
OnTV. As she was a Lebanese/British National with an Egyptian daughter, Naguib Sawiris 
guaranteed he would secure her position in the station (through which she had a work visa) 
prompting her to spur other offers of employment outside the country.1053 Her program 
AlSoura AlKamila (The Full Picture) was also one of the last emissions from Egypt to still 
host individuals from a wide array of voices, especially giving voice to individuals and groups 
who opposed military rule and were symbols of the 25 January Revolution. One month after 
the sale was made, Daoud announced her departure from OnTV. Just hours after her 
announcement, she was visited by plain-clothed policemen, with an order to have her 
immediately deported, claiming that her work visa was no longer valid and that she was 
therefore staying illegally in the country.1054 That night, she was forced to go with a police 
escort to the airport, and given a choice between Lebanon (her country of birth) and Britain 
(her country of citizenship). She believed that the state was taking revenge on her for her 
positions, while also sending a message to other like-minded media professionals that there 
would no longer be any tolerance for critical reporting or opinions on Egyptian television.1055  
The station would move on from political and current affairs programming. Under the new 
ownership it would launch a sports channel and shift more concretely to entertainment 
programming.  
Sawiris moving on from OnTV 
Naguib Sawiris had almost completely divested from his main broadcasting undertakings in 
Egypt, just nine years after launching OnTV. His interest in media continued in other ways. 
Through his company, Media Global Network, he purchased a controlling stake in Lyon-
based Euronews in 2015. He had also almost completely divested from his telecom holdings 
saying it didn’t hold enough opportunity for growth to his liking.1056  
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Despite selling OnTV under the pretext of television in Egypt lacking real prospects for 
profitability, he focused his attention on the advertising company that he owned, 
Promomedia. This company purchased media concessions for entire broadcasting outlets, 
usually for an entire year, and then distributed ads accordingly. Sawiris did not see a 
problem with the tactic of giving media placement companies such broad financial control 
over media outlets, saying it was standard practice in the country along with the Arab world, 
and that he was not going to reinvent the system.1057  
Promomedia specifically was a major player in the country’s media system, as it held 
concessions in multiple outlets with and across media platforms, which in theory would pose 
a conflict of interest given the identity of the company’s owner and his other media holdings. 
However, this was never probed by any of Egypt’s commercial regulatory authorities. 
Promomedia was accused of mismanagement by numerous private print and broadcasting 
outlets who were unable to pay staff after Promomedia reportedly were unable to pay for 
their concessions due to a stagnant market. This included AlMasry AlYoum, which Sawiris 
had a major share in. The blame was directed towards Promomedia’s CEO, Ehab Talaat, 
rather than at Sawiris himself.1058 
Despite turning his attention to Promomedia after OnTV, the ad company’s concessions 
dwindled in the years that followed. The company became an almost insignificant item in 
Sawiris’s investment portfolio, while his business interests continued to grow in other areas, 
meaning his role in Egypt’s mass media became effectively marginalized that year. 
7) Conclusion 
OnTV’s establishment in 2007 marked one of the first major endeavors for a businessman 
looking to gain a substantial hold on the country’s private broadcasting sector. The station 
was not necessarily set-up as a major source of revenue or profit, but it was set-up with the 
belief that the political climate in the country was more favorable to what network’s founder, 
Naguib Sawiris was a leading businessman with global reach, liberal attitudes and a positive 
relationship with the regime. It was launched during a period when the state seemed to be 
willing to recalibrate how it would oversee broadcast media, after four decades of an 
absolute state-monopoly over the sector. The uprising in 2011 and the subsequent events 
that led to the return of a military-led government, weighed on broadcasting in general and 
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on the development of the network, which ultimately could not maintain its original mandate 
as a station that would cater to current events and the news. Naguib Sawiris’s aspirations in 
the country’s media sector would be dashed as he sold the station in 2016 to a company 
















































Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Introduction 
Understanding the impact of structural changes and economic reform can be done using 
many different societal lenses and contexts where politics, power and capital intertwine. 
Egypt’s economic (and to a lesser extent, political) restructuring around the turn of the 
century, reflected on society as a whole in many ways, from a redistribution of political 
influence to the recalibration of some economic institutions and the spheres of influence 
within them. Media, as a sector and area of study, often helps shed light on the nuances and 
iterations of power dynamics in flux. 
This thesis has attempted to address the development of broadcast and print mass media in 
Egypt amid shifting transitions in political and economic structures. It assesses trends 
associated with outlets that have significant current affairs and news content. The years 
forming the focal point of this study (2001-2019) mark the emergence of privately owned 
print and broadcasting mass media outlets following the implementation of privatization 
policies amid a broader neoliberal shift in the country. Major socio-political upheaval also 
left an indelible mark on this period. As a result, the pendulum of power had swung multiple 
times, especially in the aftermath of the 25 January uprising in 2011 that ended Hosni 
Mubarak’s 30-year presidency. 
Having accepted the outlook that media systems develop in ways that are acutely sensitive to 
the prevailing political systems, this study has assessed the relative weight of political and 
economic transformations on the overall structure of media systems and organizations. A 
look into the history of mass media outlets in Egypt revealed that many of the state’s attitudes 
and posturing vis-à-vis media as a sector were carried through different regimes regardless 
and helped underscore how media were regulated and overseen through varying structures. It 
also shows that when private media emerged, the sector did not experience enough of an 
institutional shift in the state’s relationship with the media to allow for a systematic or linear 
development within that nascent portion of the media system. 
The political economy of media delves into the ways through which socio-political structures 
affect the development of communication and media systems. It provides a lens to assess the 
power structures within the sector and trends associated with its structural shifts. Scholars in 





model along with Hallin and Mancini’s typology of three media models. But only a small 
fraction of studies considers systems that are affected by two distinct circumstances:  
1) Mass media sectors caught between disparate levels of economic and political 
liberalization.  
2) Protracted and/or suspended periods of economic and political transition. 
Egypt as a case study exhibits both characteristics in the period under investigation. 
 
Findings:  
*How much has control over media transitioned to the private sector? 
Scholarly work on neoliberalism stipulates a continued, and palpable presence of the state to 
implement the liberalization policies it seeks. However, in the case of the media system, this 
state’s role wasn’t clearly defined, but the state attempted to manage print and broadcast 
emissions by attempting to create a trustworthy class of gatekeepers in mass media.  The 
development of private mass media at the turn of this century was in itself a major landmark 
for the sector, which had been under the near complete control of government organizations 
before then. Private media had quickly come to compete with all state-funded outlets altering 
the entire complexion of the media system.  
Growth of private ownership of mass media occurred in parallel with the expansion of private 
ownership in other sectors during this period. For example, the private sector’s stake in 
manufacturing grew from 58% in 1991 to 85% in 2001.1059 
This study finds that, while this organizational shift was highly significant, it was not 
immediately accompanied by an institutional shift in the state’s attitude and approach to 
media in general. The economic liberalization that led to the emergence of private mass 
media outlets was also lacking the kind of political reform that would allow these stations to 
flourish and operate without fear of upsetting the regime.  
Egypt had been at the helm of the Arab region’s cultural pulse, through the establishment of 
the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU). Located in the impressive Maspero 
building, this government-funded organization came to symbolize the importance the state 
would place on both developing and controlling audio and visual broadcasting. Gamal Abdel 
																																								 																				





Nasser launched the region’s first television station from there in 1960, the year when he 
decided to nationalize the press through “The Press Organization Law”.  When mass media 
ownership was made available to the private sector in the early 2000’s, a select group of 
business leaders were able to launch mass media outlets while exercising control over their 
output. Private outlets would be able to offer content not available through the public sector. 
The proliferation of satellite television and the internet had made it increasingly important to 
provide content that catered to audience demand.  
The ERTU had been unable to retain its viewers neither through an attempted revamp of its 
programing in the 1990’s, nor through the launch of new satellite stations under its Nilesat 
network. Its debts were mounting at that time and the organization which employed nearly 
40,000 employees faced becoming obsolete. Studies on that period showed that, Egyptians 
were already turning to Pan-Arab stations, such as AlJazeera, ART (Arab Radio and 
Television) and MBC for both entertainment and current affairs content.  
Therefore, the emergent commercially orientated outlets were able to immediately compete 
with the incumbent public organizations. New private television outlets such as Dream TV 
and OnTV offered programs discussing popular topics and news-oriented talk shows that 
would attract audiences hungry for a source of information from a non-governmental source. 
While these channels were dwarfed by Maspero and the ERTU in size and scope, they 
quickly became the most prominent and relevant audiovisual outlets, especially with the 
exponential growth of satellite television penetration in the 2000’s. Similarly, readership of 
the first private newspaper, AlMasry AlYoum (est. 2004) grew to the point where it was 
briefly the highest in Egypt during around the uprising against Mubarak, eclipsing AlAhram, 
which had for decades been the most widely circulated newspaper in the Arab World.  
Regardless of who ultimately controlled the content, output and ownership of media outlets, 
there is no doubt that, since the turn of the century, the sector shifted structurally to 
prominently featuring private enterprises.  
Control of these private outlets had shifted greatly along with the degree of state supervision 
of their content, but since they came to the fore, the state had not attempted an outright re-
nationalization, for a variety of reasons. The most important of these reasons was the state’s 
continued need to appear as democratic and engaged in a process of liberalization. Economic 
liberalization efforts were accompanied by a need to appear to be opening-up public life as 





believed that private media were a main area of window-dressing for the Mubarak regime to 
show that there was a true departure from the prior centralized approach. After the ouster of 
Mubarak, private media became even more entrenched as a staple in the psyche of the 
Egyptian media consumer.  
President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi exhibited a more limited tolerance to critical, independent 
media than his immediate predecessors, instead appearing to share the outlook of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, that all media in the country need to be supportive of state priorities and that 
they must all be part of state developmentalist efforts. Although El-Sisi did not eradicate 
private media outlets ownership, private media outlets would lose greatly during his 
presidency through various mechanisms. Most of the freedoms gained in the years directly 
preceding his reign would disappear.  
*Did the state set out to create and promote the growth of private media outlets? 
Beginnings: Design and Accidents 
One of the main takeaways from this study is that despite the eventual prominence of 
privately owned media in Egypt’s mediascape, the emergence and development of this part of 
the sector was unintentional as far as the government, the security services and the media 
regulators were involved. Rather, it came about in tandem with the settling-in of new realities 
in the political economy of Egypt at the time, where the economic and political clout of a 
group of connected businessmen were on the rise, and the implementation of neoliberal 
policies had become a priority.  Furthermore, the state was highly reactive when it came to 
the media system allowing for developments to occur external of any specific plan for the 
sector. This stands in contrast to the more active role the state played in mediating and 
shaping the political economy into what Adly calls a “national variety or globalized 
neoliberalism,1060” the state was much more reactive when it came to the media system.  
Egypt’s political economy created overall circumstances allowing for private sector growth in 
media in ways that differed slightly between television and print. But the common thread 
across platforms has been the effects of the implementation of neoliberal policies, and the rise 
of businessmen to prominence in the ruling NDP. In 1991 Egypt signed deals with the IMF 
and the World Bank, committing to increased privatization and liberalization on the 
economic and political front. The implementation of these policies gave rise to a growing 
																																								 																				





crop of connected businessmen, in a neopatrimonial regime that was also engaged in 
expanding a politically determined capitalism, where members of the ruling groups were 
taking advantage of the positions of power guaranteed to them, to accumulate wealth.1061  
This study concludes that one of the determining factors involved in the emergence of 
privately owned media was the fact that many businessmen felt emboldened by their recent 
ascension in the Egyptian power hierarchy.  The vast majority of the first private owners of 
media outlets did not have a history in the sector and they were all in good standing with the 
country’s ruling cohort or were themselves representatives of the party in the legislative 
branch.  
Furthermore, the Mubarak regime’s desire to appear to be veering towards a more democratic 
and politically liberal approach, prompted the state to avoid shutting down the private 
ownership of media, even when they seemed to over-step some of the unspoken rules and 
redlines such as refraining from any critical mention of the President or his family, along with 
the military and some of the more influential political figures.  
This part of the media system would also perform another function that the regime would 
come to appreciate: to act as an outlet for society to vent their anger and frustration with 
rising inequality and higher costs of living, as well as voice dissatisfaction with unpopular 
policies and flawed governance. Relative poverty was on the rise in Egypt at the time, despite 
the country achieving relatively high levels of top-level GDP growth (2008 was the highest 
since 19841062) and being considered a model reformer by the IMF.1063 But growth and job 
creation were restricted to certain capital-intensive sectors, while levels of unemployment and 
vulnerable employment were on the rise.1064 The government had come to value the role 
media outlets could play in both funneling and containing any public anger toward the state’s 
policies at a time of rising youth unemployment and subsequently dwindling public spending. 
By allowing businessmen who benefitted from the regime’s new direction to own mass media 
outlets, the state was also ensuring that private media would help promote the government’s 
main policy priority at the time, the neo-liberalization effort. 
However, rather than specifically plan for private mass media to take over the sector, it 
slowly became a reality that the regime tolerated, and considered it a being ultimately 
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beneficial for both its image and priorities. The sector itself experienced some characteristics 
of liberalization, but it was never “liberalized,” since the private sector was allowed to form 
and grow only within a set and specific regulatory structure. 
 
Audio-Visual Broadcast: Putting existing infrastructure to use 
Cairo’s Media Production City was designed initially as a production hub that would help re-
establish Egypt as the region’s cultural heartbeat through state-of-the-art facilities and laws 
facilitating investment in the sector. Privately owned current affairs stations emerged from 
MPC only after it had become clear that plans to create a global production hub for movies 
and television would not materialize on the scale that was hoped for. In a sense, the 
beginnings of private broadcast were merely reactive to this failure and may not have 
otherwise come to be. Television stations would help pay the rent on empty lots and make 
use of studio sets and equipment that were unused, this trend started with the launch of Saudi-
owned Orbit from MPC in 1998 after relocating from Rome, Italy.  
The government had clearly attempted to encourage private broadcasting as a motivational 
mechanism for business in Egypt in general by creating a Free Trade Zone and passing Law 
201/2000 that allowed the General Authority for Investment to grant licenses for TV outlets. 
But the state’s incentive strategy for the creation of these outlets was clearly geared to allow 
only for the creation of private individual stations, rather than the launch of a sustainable 
sector, a fact that became especially clear with the absence of genuine regulation of the sector. 
Rather, the Ministry of Information attempted to exercise an authority over these outlets, 
almost haphazardly. Laws ensuring free speech and the right to information existed, but they 
were still overridden by the ongoing “State of Emergency.”  
It is most likely that the state underestimated the ultimate impact of these outlets locally, 
since they were only to be allowed to air on satellite, from within MPC. The boom in cheap 
access to satellite/cable TV had to become a full-fledged societal phenomenon by the time 
Law 201 was passed. Furthermore, these outlets were subject to security approval, in the 
sense that the gatekeepers of both the technology (MPC) and content (approved license 
holders), whether individuals or entities, needed to be vetted by the central authorities. 
Stations were also running from within MPC, which was a confined space, and authorities 
could quickly “pull the plug” on any emission, if needed. The state’s grip on terrestrial 





sound strategy as the cost of access to satellite television was still inhibitive for the vast 
majority of Egyptians, whereas access to terrestrial TV was virtually universal.  
 
Early private broadcast outlets: champions of neoliberalism 
All of the outlets that initially launched within MPC initially promoted the neoliberal 
directive. In retrospect, the entire process of opening private broadcasting to the private 
sector was in line with the decades-old state belief that media had an overriding nationalistic 
obligation to propagate government policies and priorities. In 1960, Maspero and the ERTU 
were launched partially as mascots for Nasser’s brand of Socialism, and to symbolize 
achievement under his state capitalist system while also acting as a major element in Egypt’s 
drive for regional “soft power” advantages. Similarly, private television would come to be a 
symbol for “liberalization” and the state’s departure from state capitalism. Fittingly, the first 
private television station, Dream TV was owned by Ahmed Bahgat who was meant to be the 
poster child of of this new policy direction.  
Hosni Mubarak had first approached Bahgat, a businessman who was based in the U.S., 
asking him to return to Egypt and set up his business at home after finding success abroad. 
Dream TV was the first privately owned television outlet in Egypt, coming about in 2001, 
during a time when the Egyptian government was trying to encourage foreign direct 
investment in the country.1065 The channel would showcase Bahgat’s investments in Egypt 
(mostly in real estate), at a time when the state was striving to propagate an image of Egypt 
as a fertile ground for new investments and economic growth. Bahgat would also allow the 
station managers to push the traditional envelope of news coverage.  
The station’s managers saw an opportunity to expand content based on what would attract 
viewers, which meant covering socio-economic and political issues in ways that are not tied 
exclusively to the state narrative. However, when certain red lines were crossed (especially 
with respect to the President, his family or the military), the state intervened and personnel 
changes at Dream ensued. But Bahgat’s perceived proximity to the President gave many of 
the channel’s employees the feeling that they may be “protected” while expanding their news 
coverage.  
																																								 																				





Bahgat’s fellow owners of private media space were also mostly businessmen with close ties 
to the Presidency or the ruling National Democratic Party. Their positions were also 
relatively protected.  
Some, such as OnTV owner and telecom mogul Naguib Sawiris, were not initially involved 
in politics but professed to maintain good relations with the regime (as a rule) to avoid run-
ins or disruptions to his businesses. Sawiris had ambitions in the sector, but he stressed that 
he aimed to contribute to the liberalization process in Egypt. Like others, Sawiris had 
previously explored creating a television station that would report on current affairs, but he 
met resistance from the state – until 2007 when he felt that the state’s new approach and 
shifting policies created an environment conducive to major changes in the sector.  
Bahgat, Sawiris and some of the other early broadcast owners seemed content for their 
television enterprises to either supplement their broader businesses, or boost their own 
personal profiles or political ambitions.  
 
Private Print beginnings: Fortune favors the prepared 
Unlike in broadcast, daily privately owned print newspapers did not benefit from a specific 
law or tax incentive. The state had not planned for such ventures and did not provide any new 
infrastructure for its creation. Rather, the establishment of AlMasry AlYoum (AMAY) as the 
first private print outlet in 2004 seemed to come about off the momentum of the 
establishment of Dream TV. Sherif Wadood, the paper’s first CEO, relates a series of 
“coincidences” and loopholes that led to the paper’s registration. The paper’s main owners, 
oil tycoon Salah Diab and Naguib Sawiris were both willing to invest in it, while many were 
leery of investing in print, seeing it as a hazardous and unprofitable sector. Daoud found it 
difficult to find investors as a result. This put raised doubts about their ability to launch the 
paper since newspaper ownership had been limited to 10% per individual. 
When the time came for the sector to move beyond state control, the process of learning to 
operate outside the state was easier than for its TV counterpart, since unlike television, 
newspapers had an existing history of having private owners and of playing an active role in 
society. In the case of AMAY, its very foundation is influenced by the relationship between 
the paper’s founder, Salah Diab and his grandfather Tawfiq Diab, a pioneering journalist and 





1930’s. Tawfiq Diab was given the nickname AlMutamarrid AlNabil (The Nobel Rebel1066) 
due to his activity in the field. When private print journalism re-emerged since the 
nationalization drive in 1960, it had a rich history and set of traditions to build on.  
 
New means of controlling media after allowing privately owned broadcast and print 
mass media 
Despite the apparent emergence of a private mass media scene, this study shows that there 
was never a bottom-line shift in control over media and information flow away from the 
central government and security establishment. Rather, at times when there appeared to be a 
vibrant private mass media system operating with relative independence and freedom, the 
state and security services were in fact recalibrating their tools to control the sector and more 
than likely figuring out how to react to react to the changes, while taking into account the 
political environment and the proliferation of new technologies. 
The state’s attitude that mass media was a necessary tool for the propagation of state goals, 
and a matter of constant consideration for national security implications, did not change. 
Since the first privately owned independent print and broadcast outlets launched, it was 
evident the government was able and willing to rein in the sector with relative ease if it 
deemed it necessary. The Ministry of Information and its different iterations1067 had been 
considered one of the four so-called “Sovereign Ministries” (wizarat siyyadiyyah), along with 
Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense. These are the cabinet appointments that hold the most 
potent national security implications for the state. This “sovereign ministry” designation 
(which is informal, but widely used) was only partially lifted when the Ministry of 
Information itself was briefly abolished after the 2011 uprising. But the idea that the Ministry 
of Information deserved to be treated with the same sensitivity as the other three, in and of 
itself conveyed the state’s approach to regulating mass media. It also suggested (and this 
study confirms) a belief from within government that media should uphold and promote the 
state’s main objectives. The state’s notions regarding its relationship with the flow of 
information in the country precluded the development of a robust and open private media 









allowing the private sector enter the mass media market. The state’s unwillingness to change 
its security-centered ethos and conceptions regarding media led to highly disjointed 
developments in the sector between the editorial, operational and commercial spheres.  
Neoliberal reform and the general shift away from state capitalism were the essential spark 
plugs leading to the creation of privately owned mass media outlets, but the government and 
its security services never fully relinquished their centralist approach to the sector. The state 
played a role in preparing the ground for the creation of a private mass media as a sector by 
creating infrastructure and licensing opportunities (mostly in broadcast), but it neglected to 
provide adequate regulatory provisions that would allow the sector to develop within a 
holistic and functioning ecosystem that would enable organic growth. During most of Egypt’s 
recent history, politics was the major determinant in the composition of the media system. 
This changed slightly when the relative power of private business owners grew while 
economic policy was changing in ways that bolstered this growth.  
Ultimately, developments in media moved in tandem with political developments and along 
with shifts in the balance of power. These moves were not by design, but rather a result of 
many different factors in the context of the period in question. This thesis shows how the lack 
of a consistent and earnest intention by the state to allow this sector to grow, meant that it 
was not able to develop sustainably so that revenue, professional development and 
consumption could be maintained in a consistent way. Meanwhile a lack of institutional 
change to the rules governing the sector’s role with the government, contributed the 
continuously stunted growth of the private media space as a whole.  
 
The Arab Spring and its aftermath: political parallelism in play 
Despite attempts by the government to maintain control of the nascent private mass media 
sector, the sector played a potent role in the transformation of public consciousness1068 and 
bringing areas of social discontent to the fore.1069  They helped boost awareness and the 
collective drive to protest police brutality, and deteriorating standards pushing many to 
demonstrate against the state, leading to the eventual removal of Hosni Mubarak following 18 
days of protest (25 Jan- 11 Feb 2011). This period also highlighted the public’s appetite for 
private mass media as a main source of information, with audiences clearly migrating away 
																																								 																				
1068 Albeit a secondary role to that of social media 





from public broadcast and print into the consumption of news and current affairs content. 
When the protests first erupted, one of the first things the military did was to secure the 
Maspero building and ensure that the state’s mouthpiece and main means of communication 
remained in their hands. Meanwhile much of the country turned to alternate sources of 
information. For the computer-literate youth, social media was the main medium. But for the 
rest of society, private media outlets were the main choice. The 2011 uprising thus helped 
cement the position of private media in society. 
Changes in the media system for the two years immediately following Mubarak’s ouster 
confirm this study’s thesis that political changes have been the most acute determinant of the 
sector’s structure. Between 2011 and the end of 2013, Egypt experienced a period of relative 
pluralism, when the groups in charge of the country1070 were not able to exercise “total 
control.” The Muslim Brotherhood took over the main seats of government, but they did not 
exercise the same grip over the country’s other institutions, most notably the security 
establishment, as the preceding regime.  
The result was that the Brotherhood did not actually exercise any real measure of hegemonic 
power in the Gramscian sense of a command of both coercive and consensus control. The 
political sphere was more open, and this was reflected in the relatively high levels of diversity 
and participation in public life and the media. Private broadcasters and newspapers grew 
greatly in stature, and several licenses in both print and broadcast were granted to launch 
publications representing a variety of political and social ideologies. Media professionals 
during this period migrated towards the sector, which was also generating more revenue and 
was seemingly on the cusp of even greater expansion.  
 But the state was not necessarily at an equilibrium, in the absence of real institutional change 
allowing for an environment that could nurture this budding pluralism. The enduring legacy 
of generals ruling the country would come to the fore once more in 2013, after another round 
of upheaval lead to the ouster of the Brotherhood and the installation of another military-led 











Looking ahead: Back to the barracks  
Like Gamal Abdel Nasser, El-Sisi came to power convinced that he would be rebuilding the 
country and that it required mass mobilization, with the media having a duty to help the state 
in promoting its vision. Unlike Nasser however, El-Sisi maintained the private media, since 
the state was not in a financial position to re-engage in outright nationalization efforts and 
was still pivoting towards encouraging foreign investments and gaining the trust of Western 
financial institutions. However, the elimination of all media outlets with a sympathetic tilt 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood was an early indication that the state was moving towards 
reinstating a media system that was strictly in-line with its aims, objectives and ideology.  
The private media space since El-Sisi’s regime came into power saw major changes in 
ownership and the emergence of media owners and companies with reported ties to various 
agencies within the security establishment. Most major television outlets saw leadership 
changes and purges of personnel critical of the government, even if they were also staunchly 
against the Muslim Brotherhood. Dream TV was among the few exceptions. AlMasry 
AlYoum’s owner, Salah Diab, began facing a myriad of legal troubles. Many speculated this 
was due to the paper publishing an interview that didn’t portray the president in the best light. 
Overall, from the time El-Sisi came to power, the environment was one of progressive 
restrictions. Through the course of this research, interview subjects in Egypt grew 
increasingly more hesitant to speak about their experiences for fear of losing their jobs, or 
even worse of facing persecution of sorts. This attitude coincided with the structural changes 
seen in ownership and management within the private media space that saw mass media 
essentially return to the state.  
The most recent law regulating media and the press still affirms the right to “free media and 
the press in the context of free competition1071”. However, this document is peppered with the 
ever-present warning allowing the state and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation 
(SCMR) to intervene in the sector when necessary “as required by National Security.”1072 
This caveat has been a catchall in Egyptian public life in recent history and it looks set to 
underscore the media system for the foreseeable future.   
																																								 																				
1071 Law 180/2018 (Article 69), From sis.gov.eg 





In September 2020, the relatively new SCMR met to discuss the overriding guidelines for the 
sector. They agreed to uphold the aforementioned guarantee of free media. They also agreed 
on “Five Constants of the Egyptian State” that media practitioners would not be allowed to 
question and must uphold: the geographical boundaries1073, respecting the flag and the 
national anthem, the armed forces, upholding the Egyptian identity, and adhering to media 
code of conduct. These five constants reflect the state’s desire to militarize the media and 
hold them to standards that seem consistent with the role of the Armed Forces as stated in the 
constitution which says, “[The Armed Forces’] duty is to protect the country, and preserve its 
security and territories.1074 And as the de facto 60-year-old state of emergency persists, many 
of those interviewed who had entered private media in Egypt at its early stages, have found it 
safer to remove themselves from the sector, or steer away from involving themselves in 
current affairs content or any area that the state may deem politically sensitive. 
Meanwhile, non-government private media ownership in Egypt has been restructured and 












1073	In 2016 President El-Sisi signed a maritime border agreement with Saudi Arabia that resulted in Egypt 
ceding two islands previously considered part of its sovereign territory, despite outcry by journalists, activists 
and lawmakers alike. That following year, the state cracked down on all opposition websites, censoring 69 of 
them in May, just one month before El-Sisi ratified the agreement. 	
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